## 60 Speech Challenge

1. Everyone should prepare the following five speeches at some point during tonight’s lab. Each student will have the opportunity to give two speeches to an instructor. Students should give the other three speeches to one another or to a wall/their phone.

2. See this doc for the sign-up and scheduling procedure: <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1m4MktBjI1Ew06DIjhItirp5tdWDcHHujiZ3_w9TCMuY/edit?usp=sharing>. Please sign up for two speeches.

3. When you’re not giving a speech, you should be prepping in the lab room — not hanging out in the dorm.

4. To get to 60, we can only miss three slots. Our goal should be 63 — a perfect game.

## #1 — T vs. Knowing China

### Format/Explanation

Assume the Knowing China 1AC (included below).

Students should design a 1NC shell that includes up to three definitions and up to two impact/standard cards.

Students should tell the instructor what definitions and impacts/standards were in the 1NC. The full set of available materials is included below so that instructors may review specific cards.

The student has five minutes to extend topicality against the 2AC frontline (below).

### 1AC — Knowing China

#### First, the resolution tasks the affirmative with formulating plans for more United States federal government economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China. The process of constructing these plans relies on a self-delusional methodology that attempts to “*know China*” by objectively studying it. We refuse to participate in this project.

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A Case for Watching China Watching

Critical epistemological reflection on the field of China’s international relations is anything but trivial. At one level, some measure of self-reflectivity is not only necessary but also unavoidable. It pervades all literary works, as literature is always implicitly a reflection on literature itself. 25 All forms of knowledge contain within themselves some conscious or unconscious, direct or indirect, autobiographical accounts of the knowing/writing self at either individual or certain collective levels. As evidenced in the self-image of positivist knowledge in general, the very absence of critical self-reflection in China watching already denotes a particular way of speaking about itself, namely, as a cumulative body of empirical knowledge on China. The problem is that this scientistic self-understanding is largely uncritical and unconsciously so. If Pierre Macherey is right that what a work does not say is as important as what it does say, 26 then this curious silence and unconsciousness [end page 4] in the writing of China’s rise needs to be interrupted and made more conscious, a process which Jürgen Habermas calls reflection. 27

Besides, it seems impossible for China watching to watch only China. Aihwa Ong notes that ‘When a book about China is only about China, it is suspect’.28 We may add that it is also self-delusional. China as an object of study does not simply exist in an objectivist or empiricist fashion, like a free-floating, self-contained entity waiting to be directly contacted, observed and analysed. This is not to say that China is unreal, unknowable or is only a ghostly illusion constructed entirely out of literary representation. Of course China does exist: the Great Wall, the Communist Party, and more than one billion people living there are all too real. And yet, to say something is real does not mean that its existence corresponds with a single, independent and fixed meaning for all to see. None of those aforementioned ‘real’ things and people beam out their meaning at us directly, let alone offer an unadulterated, panoramic view of ‘China’ as a whole. China’s existence, while real, is better understood, to use Martin Heidegger’s term, as a type of ‘being-in-the-world’. 29 The ‘in-the-world-ness’ is intrinsically characteristic of China’s being, which always needs to be understood in conjunction with its world, a world which necessarily includes China-bound discourse and representation.

R. G. Collingwood once said that ‘all history is the history of thought’, meaning that no historian can speak directly of hard historical facts without reference to various thoughts about those facts. 30 Likewise, insofar as China cannot exist meaningfully outside of language and discursive construction of it, no study of it is ever possible, let alone complete, without studying our thoughts about it. For this reason, echoing George Marcus and Michael Fisher’s call for ethnography to ‘turn on itself’ and ‘to create an equally probing, ethnographic knowledge of its social and cultural foundations’, 31 this book takes the representation of China (rather than ‘China’ itself ) as its main object of study. It calls for a critical autoethnographic turn in China watching.

#### Second, any plans that call for increased engagement *necessarily* rely on a violent and hypocritical understanding of China that minimizes its agency and attempts to convert it in the Western image. We refuse to participate in this *irredeemably flawed* imperial project.

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Mission impossible (I): the false promise of constructive engagement

Thus far, I have argued that constructive engagement operates, whether in sincerity or out of expediency, on a normative goal of converting the Chinese Other in the EU’s self-image. This normative project, similar to many liberal attempts to assimilate difference in international relations, sets itself up for a fall. Its overly ambitious goal of transforming China, for all its normative appeal, is mission impossible.

The reasons for this are several. To begin with, while there is a constant normative undertone associated with “constructive engagement,” the term also serves as a convenient grab bag for an array of China policies pursued by a number of governments for various purposes during different [end page 48] periods. That is, policy varies not only across different countries, but also between successive governments within a given country. As a consequence, constructive engagement is a vague, ill-defined policy concept in theory, and is inevitably fraught with contradictions and inconsistency in practice. Although it officially seeks to integrate and transform China, in reality it is more often than not a product of necessity and compromise. As Algieri (2008: 77) puts it,

European foreign policy towards China is, when it comes to democracy promotion and the human rights dimension, clearly incoherent. The EU argues that a policy of cooperative engagement of China is most suitable for European interests—but behind this approach lies the very pragmatic conviction that the costs of non-cooperation with China cannot be afforded.

Indeed, Kagan (2004) suggests that the so-called “normative power” of the EU itself is a virtue made out of necessity, namely, the relative military weakness of the EU. As such, it cannot function without the security guarantee of US military power. Both its inherent concern with and dependence upon power thus make the policy of constructive engagement, to paraphrase Wood (2009a), more of a normal policy than a normative policy.

This is of course not to single out “constructive engagement” for criticism, as the same can be said of almost any foreign policy. Yet, given that constructive engagement takes upon itself a normative goal of transforming China, its internal inconsistency seems less forgivable. It is argued that “normative power can only be applied credibly under a key condition: consistency” (Nicolaïdis and Nicolaïdis, quoted in Manners, 2008: 56). But consistency is precisely what is lacking in EU-China policy. In any case, by preaching lofty ideals on the one hand and refusing to sacrifice economic, strategic, and political interests of the EU on the other, constructive engagement smacks of hypocrisy. Commenting on France’s two-pronged policy of playing the Tibetan human rights card and at the same time pursuing economic trade relations with China, Chinese scholar Feng Zhongping was quoted in China Daily (2008) as saying that “China doesn’t want the West to think that ‘OK, we will meet the Dalai Lama and business will go on as usual’.” Similarly, many Chinese see nothing but double standards in the EU’s continued refusal to recognize China’s complete market economy status, even though it has granted such status to Russia (Ruan, 2008: 291; also Li, X. 2007: 109). [end page 49]

If one takes into account the long history of Europe’s encounter with China in the past one and a half centuries, as many Chinese do, this European policy inconsistency is brought into even sharper relief. As Yahuda (2008: 21) notes, for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries the Europeans, despite their professed desire to modernize China, had been unsympathetic to China’s new generations of nationalists, preferring instead to deal with the Qing state—and when that dynasty collapsed—with some kind of “strongman.” What is more, many EU policy-makers are unapologetic about their double standards and policy inconsistency. Robert Cooper (2003), for example, justifies the practice of double standards on the basis that Europe, being a postmodern entity, should differentiate its foreign policy toward other postmodern states from that toward pre-modern and modern states. In his words, “In the jungle, one must use the laws of the jungle” (Cooper, 2003: 62). However, the problem is that, as Hyde-Price (2008: 29) notes, “no actor can effectively pursue its own interests in a diverse and pluralist international system, and claim to be ‘doing good’ by others, at the same time.”

The upshot of policy inconsistency and double standards in both contemporary and historical contexts is that the credibility of “normative power Europe” has been found wanting, which in turn undercuts the efficacy of constructive engagement. Though not solely responsible for the lack of “hoped transformation” in China, there is little doubt that the lack of consistency in the practice of constructive engagement is central to understanding China’s “failure” to live up to European expectations.

Also contributing to this problem is the failure of “constructive engagement” to recognize the agency of China as a relatively independent subject in international relations. While China’s importance as an emerging economic and geopolitical power has long been widely recognized, until today, its role as an international agency with the ability to think and respond to international stimulus has yet to be fully appreciated. Although the rhetoric of “dialogue” and “partnership” supposedly affords China some measure of equal agency, in reality China has been assumed almost invariably as a passive learner of international (EU) norms. But China is anything but a passive follower. For instance, while European policy-makers see the existence of normative differences between the EU and China, and hence the need for China to learn from the West, China often sees no such difference. As China’s EU Policy Paper (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003) argues, there is “no fundamental conflict of interests between China and the EU.” Although it [end page 50] does acknowledge the existence of differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system, and economic development level, the Chinese document does not see them as a sign of its own normative inferiority. This Chinese self-perception, rightly or wrongly, runs counter to the construction of China in the EU’s self-imagination, and thus greatly undermines the normative starting point of constructive engagement.

My point here is not that with its own subjectivity, China will not learn from others. Rather, Chinese learning from others is likely to take place on their “own” terms, and they are fundamentally capable of deciding from whom they should learn and for what purposes. The fact that there are always many competing Chinese subjectivities makes China’s learning or socialization an even more dynamic and less linear process. As a consequence, there exists an almost inevitable mismatch between what is intended by the EU’s constructive engagement policy and Chinese response to it. Callahan (2007: 801) captures this mismatch well when he suggests that while engagement seeks to socialize China into the international community dominated by European and Western norms,

China is not necessarily learning the lessons that the EU is teaching. Rather than reproducing the Eastern European reform experience of becoming democratic in a peaceful borderless community, Beijing is setting its own standards in order to promote the party-state’s interests: authoritarian capitalism and a multilateralism that preserves national sovereignty.

Moreover, even as China is being socialized into certain Western norms, there is no guarantee that it will behave in accordance with Western or European interests. In the past, for example, China’s internalization of such European ideas as Westphalian sovereignty and nationalism has served to resist European dominance and interference. Today, its embrace of the rule of law, the free market, or even democracy may have a similar effect.

In any case, China’s agency means that EU-China relations are better seen as a two-way interaction, a contractual relationship, or a bargaining process, rather than a one-way street as presupposed by the policy of “constructive engagement.” China’s EU Policy Paper (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003) emphatically stresses the importance of the principles of “mutual respect,” “mutual trust,” “mutual benefit,” “reciprocity,” and “consultation on an equal basis” as the foundation for EU-China relations as well as for its EU policy. [end page 51] By Callahan’s (2007: 787) counts, the word “mutual” appears 19 times in the 2003 EU document A Maturing Partnership (European Commission, 2003) and 26 times in the much shorter Chinese document on China’s EU policy. This interesting contrast should not be dismissed as merely coincidental or trivial, for it seems to indicate Beijing’s desire for an equal and essentially reciprocal relationship with the EU. As shown in its EU policy paper, China is able to play a more assertive role by asking the EU to “fulfill a long list of conditions before they could be considered deserving of a ‘strategic partnership’ with China” (Cabestan, 2008: 95). True, such demands, along with other Chinese perceptions of Europe, to some extent betray China’s own utopian wishful thinking about the EU,4 and should bear due blame for the mutual disillusionment between Europe and China. But what this illustrates is that the logic of reciprocity rather than one-way convergence is characteristic of EU-China relations. Without a reciprocal relationship between the EU and China, the latter’s cooperation, to say nothing of its conversion, is unlikely to be forthcoming (Wu, 2007: 88). For instance, when the EU failed to honor what Beijing regarded as a “formal commitment” from the EU (i.e., the lifting of EU arms embargo), China in return decided not to proceed with the ratification of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Callahan, 2007: 780; also Yahuda, 2008: 28).

Another reason why the transformation of China in European image is almost impossible lies in the paradoxical role of the Other in self-imagination. On the one hand, the presence of the Other, seen as a potential moral threat to the EU’s self-identity, calls for the engagement and ultimate conversion of that Other. But at the same time, by virtue of its “existence,” the Other proves to be a useful foil against which the EU self can be constructed and sustained. Should constructive engagement ever succeed in transforming a significant Other such as China into sameness, the very “unity” of the EU self may run the risk of falling apart. Such is the acute dilemma facing the policy of constructive engagement. On the one hand, the success of engagement is measured by its ability to ultimately bring the self and Other into convergence, but at the same time, by removing the self/Other difference, such success would rob the engagement policy of its mission, justification, and raison d’être. Hence the contradiction between the professed goal and the normative foundation of constructive engagement.

#### Third, engagement policies *necessarily* rely on fear and fantasy to understand China. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.

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At the core of the Western self-imagination is the modern knowing subject. Implying the existence of a certain, objectively knowable world 'out there', this self-fashioning affords the West both the confidence and duty to know and lead that world. When certain knowledge about a particular 'object', as in the case of China, is stubbornly not forthcoming, the self-professed knowing subject then resorts to certain emotional substitutes such as fear and fantasy to make up for the absence of certainty. With fear, one may restore a sense of (negative) certainty about an existential threat 'out there', a threat which seems readily accounted for by the timeless wisdom of realism (and to some extent liberalism). Alternatively, with the subliminal aid of fantasy, the West can envisage an immensely soothing scenario of opportunity, engagement and convergence that carries with it a teleological predictability about how History begins, evolves, and ends.

Thanks to those emotional substitutes, the initial 'inscrutability' of China's Otherness gives way to more comprehensible imageries: it is now either an affront to, or an opportunity for, the Western self and its will to truth and power. Either way, it becomes a reassuring object of aversion and attraction that allows for continued Western self-posturing as the modem knowing subject. Indeed, as evidenced in the two dominant sets of China discourses, the Western self and its Chinese Other are mutually constitutive. [end page 148]

More importantly, such mutual constructions are from the outset linked to power and political practice. At one level, they are complicit in the political economies of fear and fantasy 'at home'. At another level, they are constitutive of foreign policy which in turn helps construct the Other in reality. Consequently, the China discourses turn out to be an integral and constitutive part of their 'object of study'. For example, as illustrated in Chapters 4-5, America's 'China threat' discourse both contributes to, and is reproduced by, the US partisan politics of fear and military Keynesianism. At the same time, this threat imagery helps sustain a containment policy of sorts. By provoking similar responses from China, such a policy ends up participating in the creation of the very threat it seeks to contain.

#### Fourth, this self-fulfilling prophecy is inevitable as long as China is treated as an object to *study* and *engage*. War is unlikely unless we embrace this methodology.

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The ‘China Threat’ Paradigm as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

If changing Chinese public opinion and Beijing's growing assertiveness in foreign policy are better understood in the context of mutual responsiveness, then threatening as they may appear, they at least partly reflect the self-fulfilling effect of the China threat theory as practice. That is, they are to some extent socially constructed by Western representations of the China threat. At this juncture, we may return to the question raised earlier—What's the cost of having an enemy? The cost, simply put, is that perceiving China as a threat and acting upon that perception help bring that feared China threat closer to reality. Though not an objective description of China, the 'China threat' paradigm is no mere fantasy, as it has the constitutive power to make its prediction come true. If this China paradigm ends up bearing some resemblance to Chinese reality, it is because the reality is itself partly constituted by it. With US strategic planners continuing to operate on the basis of the China threat, this self-fulfilling process has persisted to the present day. For example, in July 2010, when China objected to the joint US- South Korean navy exercise in the Yellow Sea to no avail, it announced that its navy would conduct live fire drills in the East China Sea for the duration of the US-South Korean manoeuvres. 329 Meanwhile. a Global Times (a Chinese daily tabloid affiliated with the official People’s Daily) editorial opines that 'Whatever harm the US military manoeuvre may have inflicted upon the mind of the Chinese, the United States will have to pay for it, sooner or later'. 130

All such Chinese 'belligerence' seems to have provided fresh evidence to the 'China threat' paradigm, whose image of China has now been vindicated. 131 Without acknowledging their own role in the production of the 'China threat', 'China threat' analysts thus play a key part in a spiral model [end page 105] of tit-for-tat in Sino-US relations. Mindful of this danger, some cool-headed observers have warned that a US attempt to build a missile defence shield could be reciprocated by China deploying more missiles. Even the highly classified US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report Foreign Responses to U.S. National Missile Defense Deployment has hinted at this possibility. 133 In early 2006, Mike Moore, contributing editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, predicted that if the US continues to weaponise space by deploying a comprehensive space-control system, 'China will surely respond’.134 And respond it did. In early 2007, it launched a ballistic missile to destroy an inoperational weather satellite in orbit. That test immediately caused a stir in the international press, even though it came after Washington's repeated refusal to negotiate with China and Russia over their proposed ban on space weapons and the use of force against satellites. A Financial Times article noted that 'What is surprising about the Chinese test is that anyone was surprised'.135 In a similar vein but commenting on the broader pattern of US strategy on China over the years, Lampton notes that 'Washington cannot simply seek to strengthen ties with India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and central Asian states as an explicit offset to rising Chinese power and then be surprised when Beijing plays the same game'.136

Nevertheless, such surprise is commonplace in the China watching community, reflecting an intellectual blindness to the self-fulfilling nature of one of its time-honoured paradigms. This blindness, in turn, allows the justification of more containment or hedging. In this way, the 'China threat' paradigm is not only self-fulfilling in practice, but also self-productive and self-perpetuating as a powerful mode of representation.

One might take comfort in the fact that neither Beijing nor Washington actually wants a direct military confrontation. But that is beside the point, for the lack of aggressive intention alone is no proven safe barrier to war. As in the cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the outbreak of war does not necessarily require the intention to go to war. 137 Mutual suspicion, as US President Theodore Roosevelt once observed of the Kaiser and the English, is often all that is needed to set in motion a downward spiral.133 And thanks to the 'China threat' paradigm and its mirror image and practice from China, mutual suspicion and distrust has not been in short supply. 139 A war between these two great powers is not inevitable or even probable; the door for mutual engagement and cooperation remains wide open. Nevertheless, blind to its own self-fulfilling consequences, the 'China threat' paradigm, if left unexamined and unchecked, would make cooperation more difficult and conflict more likely.

It is worth adding that my treatment of Chinese nationalism and realpolitik thinking is not to downplay their potentially dangerous consequences, much less to justify them. Quite the contrary, for all the apparent legitimacy of [end page 106] reciprocal counter-violence or counter-hedging, Chinese mimicry is dangerous, as it would feed into this tit-for-tat vicious cycle and play its part in the escalation of a security dilemma between the US and China. Thus, to emphasise Chinese responsiveness is not to deny Chinese agency or exonerate its responsibility. While the general nature of Chinese foreign policy may be responsive with regard to the US, its 'contents' are not simply passive, innocent mimicry of US thinking and behaviour, but inevitably come with some 'Chinese characteristics'. That said, those 'Chinese characteristics' notwithstanding, there is no pregiven China threat both unresponsive to and immune from any external stimulus. To argue otherwise is to deny an important dimension of Chinese agency, namely, their response-ability.

By examining the self-fulfilling tendency of the 'China threat' paradigm, we can better understand that Sino-American relations, like international relations in general, are mutually responsive and constitutive. Thus, both China and the US should be held accountable to the bilateral relationship of their mutual making. To the extent that this 'China threat' knowledge often denies such mutuality, and by extension, US responsibility in the rise of the China threat, it is all the more imperative to lay bare its intrinsic link with power practice.

#### Fifth, instead of *studying China*, we study *the study of China*. This requires abandoning positivism and beginning from a different starting point.

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China Watching Rarely Watches Itself

These questions may strike many scholars as trivial and superfluous, if not odd. To others they may immediately smack of empty epistemological speculations — surely China watching is about uncovering and accumulating knowledge on China, with its core business centred on understanding key empirical issues that really matter in China’s relations with the world, issues ranging from power, capabilities, interests, intentions and identity to foreign policy, grand strategy and behaviour patterns. Thus, where periodically there have been welcome attempts to reflect on the ‘state of the art’ in China watching, 6 the main objectives of those reflections have been to help ‘build cumulative knowledge’ and to explore some ‘potential avenue for new research’.7 Predictably, such stock taking has been largely positive and self-congratulatory in tone. At the ‘Trends in China Watching’ conference held at George Washington University in 1999, participants seemed genuinely impressed by ‘the diversity of approaches an d perspectives’ in the field, which they regarded as ‘the most valuable asset China watchers have today’.8 Two prominent experts on Chinese foreign policy , Robert Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston, would concur . In their edited book on new directions in this China field, they claim that China scholars are now in a better position to meet the growing demand for sophisticated anal y sis on China’s foreign policy. 9 For still others , ‘the field is doing a good job of keeping up with and interpreting fast- changing developments in China, and… the international “state of the field” can be judged to be healthy and growing’.10 [end page 2]

Growing this field may be, but healthy it seems not. According to Roland Barthes, a ‘healthy’ sign should be honest about its own arbitrariness. Rather than pretending to be ‘natural’ or ‘objective’, it admits ‘its own relative, artificial status’. 11 Judging by this requirement, the IR branch of China watching appears far from healthy. As just noted, amidst an ongoing celebration of its scientific contribution to China knowledge, this field has thus far shown little critical self-reflection required of a healthy sign. True, some China watchers are aware of the limits of their own work and even the problematic status of China watching as objective knowledge. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno lament that ‘the rich comparative and foreign policy scholarship on China’ is ‘under-theorized’, and they call for its better engagement with the ‘theoretical insights of international relations’. 12 David Shambaugh notes that while ‘rich in monographic literature on different periods and bilateral interactions’, the field ‘lacks studies with aggregate and reflective perspectives’.13 In a semi-autobiographical reflection on China watching, Richard Baum admits that objectivity in China studies is ‘an elusive grail’ and that our understanding is often coloured by ‘personal sentiments and emotions’. 14 Such reflections, however, often limited in scope and made in passing, remain a rare commodity.

Such a problem is not unique to IR China watchers. Anthropologists are said to be skilled at ‘probing other cultures’ but often fall short of reflecting on their own.15 Likewise, political scientists, always ready to expose the political and ideological baggage of practitioners, seldom subject their research to similar scrutiny.16 All this, it seems, reveals a common pitfall in human understanding itself: ‘The Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of itself: And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance , and make it its own Object’, thus wrote John Locke. 17 If human understanding needs to better understand itself, China watching as a particular subset of human understanding should also make itself its own object and allow for self-watching.

In research, watching the self may come in different forms. Autoethnography, for one, calls for the explicit use of the self as a methodological resource in the production of knowledge. 18 In this book, by ‘self’ I mean not literally the personal experience of China watchers (though that is no doubt fascinating in itself), but rather their collective knowledge products, the broader intellectual, socio- political context of their knowledge production, and their underlying ideas and imaginations of themselves as the knowing subject. Thus defined, self-watching in China studies requires not only a methodological shift, but also an ontological and epistemological rethinking (if we suppose that the former can ever be separated from the latter).

A key suspect for the conspicuous absence of healthy self-reflection in China watching has to be the ever-appealing positivism, an epistemological [end page 3] glue which helps hold an otherwise ‘argumentative China watching community’ together. 19 As an extremely influential theory of knowledge, positivism presupposes the existence of an objective reality ‘out there’, independent of our thought but ultimately amenable to scientific analysis.20 Crucially, claiming to have reached ‘the end of the theory of knowledge’, positivism performs ‘the prohibitive function of protecting scientific inquiry from epistemological self-reflection’.21 In this way, the epistemological question of how we know what we know seems no longer necessary. Insisting on a clear distinction between ‘observable facts and often unsustainable “speculations about them”’, David Martin Jones is irritated by the postcolonial effort of ‘exposing representation in literary “texts” or in film and music rather than addressing the empirical realm of social facts’. 22

Rallying around the positivist tradition, most China watchers in the IR field treat China as something made up of such observable facts. However complex those facts may be, and however difficult for China watchers to completely detach themselves from personal biases, it is believed that there is an ultimately knowable Chinese reality. The main task of China watching, by definition, should be about watching China. If China knowledge is indeed objective, scientifically testable, and professionally cumulative, then it would seem meaningless, if not self-indulgent, to dwell on questions such as what China knowledge is, who is producing it, how and for what purposes. 23 Consequently, it is no surprise that few in the China-studies community have shown interest in such philosophical reflections and still fewer are keen on epistemological debates on China watching; 24 such debates, standing apparently in the way of accumulating further knowledge on China, would appear not only unhelpful but needlessly polemic and divisive.

#### Sixth, an affirmative ballot represents a deconstructive move of intellectual decolonization of the latent (neo)colonial desire and mindset that actively shapes the study of China. Put simply, vote aff to *study the study of China*.

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Also, underlying those question is the belief that deconstruction is essentially destructive and thus has little constructive to contribute to China studies. However, as Derrida notes, deconstruction is 'a way of taking a position' rather than merely 'a flourish of irresponsible and irresponsible-making destruction'.8 By way of deconstruction, this book has hoped to generate both critical and constructive reflections on the way we think about the nature of China knowledge as well as the way such knowledge can be [end page 150] better produced. To the extent that methodology is always implied in ontology and epistemology, my ontological and epistemological critique is not an exercise of esoteric verbal incantation, but carries important methodological messages for China watching, even though such messages could well be dismissed as hollow, mystifying or even alien by conventional standards.

One message from this study is that it is no longer adequate for us to be merely 'China' specialists who are otherwise blissfully 'ignorant of the world beyond China'.9 China watching needs autoethnography or 'self-watching' to consciously make itself part of its own object of critical analysis whereby the necessary but often missing comparative context can help us put China in perspective. All research, to be sure, must already contain some level of reflectivity, be it about methods of inquiry, hypothesis testing, empirical evidence, data collection, or clarity of expression. And the Western representations of China's rise, predicated on some particular ways of Western self-imagination, are necessarily self-reflective in that sense. And yet, such narrow technical reflectivity or narcissistic posturing is not what I mean by 'self-watching'. In fact, the unconscious Western self-imagination as the modern knowing subject (who sets itself apart from the world and refuses to critically look at itself) is the very antithesis of self-watching.

Self-watching, I suggest, requires at once discarding this positivist self-(un)consciousness and cultivating a critically reflective, philosophising mind. 'The philosophizing mind', wrote Collingwood, 'never simply thinks about an object, it always, while thinking about any object, thinks also about its own thought about that object'. 30 This position is similar to that of 'ironists'. According to Richard Rorty, ironists are 'never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves’.11

In the concluding chapter of his Scratches on Our Minds, Harold Isaacs seemed to have endorsed such 'ironist' approaches to China studies: 'we have to examine, each of us, how we register and house our observations, how we come to our judgments, how we enlarge our observations, how we describe them, and what purposes they serve for us'.2 Back in 1972, John Fairbank put such reflection in practice by suggesting that America's Cold-War attitude towards China was based less on reason than on fear, a fear inspired not by China but by America's experience with Nazi and Stalinist totalitarian regimes. 13 These examples clearly show the possibility of reflective China watching, but alas, as noted from the beginning, such reflectivity is hardly visible in today's 'China's rise' literature. Indeed, without the trace of a single author, the two dominant China paradigms hinge onto a ubiquitous collective psyche and emotion that is often difficult to see, let alone to criticise from within. [end page 151]

Yet it is imperative that such self-criticism should occur, which entails problematising China watchers' own thought, vocabularies and taken-for-granted self-identity as disinterested rational observers. It requires us to pause and look into ourselves to examine, for example, why we constantly fear China, rather than taking that fear as given: 'We are wary of China because we are wary of China'. Self-watching demands an ironist awareness of the contingency, instability, and provinciality of mainstream China knowledge, its intertextual and emotional link to the fears and fantasies in the Western self-imagination, the political economy of its production, and the attendant normative, ethical and practical consequences both for dealing with China and for serving the power and special interests at home. Put it differently, it requires a deconstructive move of intellectual decolonisation of the latent (neo)colonial desire and mindset that, despite the formal end of colonialism decades ago, continues to actively operate in Orientalism knowledge and China watching, facilitated by its various scientific, theoretical, and pedagogical guises.

#### Seventh, the affirmative results in better knowledge about China because it fosters critical self-reflection. Learning to accept that there are things we don’t know is important. Demanding that we propose *new plans for increased engagement* requires us to be too arrogant about our knowledge. We choose intellectual humility instead.

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“China watching: towards reflection and dialogue,” *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1782544240, p. 152-153)

In this context, self-reflection cannot be confined to individual China watchers or even the China watching community. Never a purely personal pursuit or even a disciplinary matter, China knowledge is always inextricably linked with the general dynamism of Western knowledge, desire and power in global politics. Its self-reflection should thus extend to the shared collective self of the West, its assumed identity and associated foreign policy (China policy in particular). If China can be seen as a being-in-the-world, these issues are part and parcel of the world in which China finds itself and relates to others. But until now they have largely escaped the attention of China watchers. Maybe it is because these are primarily the business of scholars of Western/American culture, history and foreign relations, rather than that of China scholars. After all, there is a need for division of labour in social sciences. True, for various reasons it is unrealistic to expect China scholars to be at the same time experts on those 'non-China' issues. Nevertheless, since China watchers both rely on and contribute to their collective Western self-imagination in their understanding of China, it is crucial that they look at their collective Western self in the mirror. Take the negative image of China's brutal Soviet-style sports system for example. Every now and then, such an image will be reliably brought up to reinforce China's Otherness more generally. But if the ways American young talents are trained are put under the same spotlight, the difference between the US and China is no longer as vast as it appears. 14 In doing so, the previous China image is no longer as defensible as it seems. In brief, the broader point here is that the same China may take on quite different meanings when we are willing to subject ourselves to similar scrutiny. We may better appreciate why China looks the way it does when we are more self-conscious of the various lenses, [end page 152] paradigms, and fore-meanings through which we do China watching. Conversely, we cannot fully comprehend why the Chinese behave in a certain way until we pay attention to what we have done (to them), past and present. Such self-knowledge on the part of the West is essential to a better grasp of China. Without the former, China knowledge is incomplete and suspect.

Yet, to many, self-reflection is at best a luxurious distraction. At worst it amounts to navel-gazing and could turn into 'a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world'.15 Such concern is hardly justified, however. The imagined Western self is integral to the real world, and critical self-reflection also helps reconnect China watching to the 'real' world of power relations to which it always belongs. By making one better aware of this connection, it helps open up space for emancipatory knowledge. As Mannheim notes:

The criterion of such self-illumination is that not only the object but we ourselves fall squarely within our field of vision. We become visible to ourselves, not just vaguely as a knowing subject as such but in a certain role hitherto hidden from us, in a situation hitherto impenetrable to us, and with motivations of which we have not hitherto been aware. In such a moment the inner connection between our role, our motivations, and our type and manner of experiencing the world suddenly draws upon us. Hence the paradox underlying these experiences, namely the opportunity for relative emancipation from social determination, increases proportionately with insight into this determination.16

Still, there may be a lingering fear that excessive reflectivity could undo much of the hard-won China knowledge. But again to quote Mannheim, 'the extension of our knowledge of the world is closely related to increasing personal self-knowledge and self-control of the knowing personality'. 17 Even when that does expose our lack of knowledge about China, all is not lost. Such revelation is not a sign of ignorance, but an essential building block in the edifice of China knowledge. Confucius told us that 'To say that you know when you do know and say that you do not know when you do not know—that is [the way to acquire] knowledge'.13 Thus, the knowing subject can emancipate itself from its delusion about its own being;19 the real meaning of ignorance is that one claims to know when one does not or cannot know.

#### Finally, we cannot understand China without first understanding the discourses and representations used to describe it. Our methodology prioritizes questions of ontology and epistemology because there is no “*objective reality*” of or about China. Their disadvantages aren’t neutral descriptions of the world; they *actively create* the world that they attempt merely to *describe*.

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“Preface,” *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1782544240, p. vii-viii)

Among the most reported stories in the first decade of the twenty-first century, topping the list was not the global financial crisis, the long-running Iraq War, or even the 'September 11' terrorist attacks—it was the rise of China.1 These findings, announced by Global Language Monitor in 2011, were based on a study of global media reporting trends among 75000 print and electronic media sources. Were there a similar survey on the issues concerning the international scholarly community, China's rise would almost certainly rank among the most closely scrutinised as well. Long gone, it seems, are the days when an American publishing company did not publish a single book on China for fifteen years.2 With such extensive coverage on China's ascendancy today, there seems hardly a need for yet another study on this subject. Existing commentaries, books, and articles must have already covered a sufficiently wide range of perspectives.

Despite or precisely because of the vast amount of literature on this issue, I feel compelled to join the chorus. However, in doing so this book does not, as do many other books, seek to examine whether China is rising or not, or what its rise means. This is not because I believe such questions are unimportant or have already been settled; I do not. Rather, I believe what China's rise means cannot be independently assessed in isolation from what we already mean by China's rise. Though tautological it might sound, the latter question draws attention to the meaning-giving subject of China watchers. It turns the spotlight on our thoughts and representations of China's rise, which constitutes the main focus of this book.

Though it may appear that way in the eyes of some, going along this path is not a cunning attempt of finding a literary niche in an increasingly crowded field to score some cheap points all the while dodging the heavy lifting of tackling complex 'real-world' issues surrounding China. Nor is it to deliberately court controversy or strike an affected pose of malaise about an otherwise vibrant field of study. To me, this book is a necessary move justified on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, the book rejects the prevalent assumption about the dichotomy between reality and representation. Contra positivism, we cannot bypass thoughts and representations to come into direct contact with China as it is. What we see as 'China' cannot be detached from various discourses and representations of it. Works that purport to study China's rise, as if it were a transparent and empirically observable phenomenon out there, are always already inextricably enmeshed [end page vii] in representations. In all likelihood, those works will then become themselves part of such representations, through which still later studies will gaze at 'China'. In this sense, my focus on representation is less an expedient choice than ontological and epistemological necessity.

On practical grounds, given the inescapable immanence of representation and discourse in the social realm, a proper study of discursive representation is not a retreat from the real world but a genuine engagement with it in the full sense of the words. Perhaps with the exception of sleepwalking or unconscious twitching, no human action (let alone social action) can do without thought and representation. Constructivists are right in saying that words have consequences. But we may add that all social domains and human relationships are mediated through and constituted by thought and representation. China's relationship with the West is certainly no exception. With regional stability, prosperity and even world peace at stake, there is now an urgent, practical need to understand how the various strains of representation and discourse pervade and condition this critical and complex relationship.

For these reasons, this book turns to Western representations of China's rise. In particular, it focuses on two influential paradigms: the 'China threat' and the 'China opportunity'. Commonly held by their respective exponents as objective truth about the implications of China's rise, both paradigms, despite their seemingly contrasting views, are reflections of a certain Western self-imagination and its quest for certainty and identity in an inherently dynamic, volatile and uncertain world. While understandable, such a desire often proves elusive in the social world. With no lasting law-like certainty in sight, the desire for certainty then often comes full circle to two subsets of desire: namely, fears and fantasies. For these forms of desire can provide some emotional substitutes for the holy grail of certainty and truth. In this book, I will argue that the two China paradigms are, respectively, discursive embodiments of these two popular types of emotional substitutes. As such, they are not objective China knowledge, but are closely linked to habitual Western self-imagination and power practice. By probing into the interrelationship between knowledge, desire and power, the book aims to deconstruct contemporary Western representations of China's rise. Although it will tentatively point to some methodological openings for what one might call 'critical China watching', due to its scope and ontological stance as well as limits of space, it promises no ready-made alternative toolkit through which to better understand China as it is. Alas, the 'China as it is' simply does not exist except in our ingrained desire and conventional imagination.

### 1NC — Topicality [Stem]

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division of affirmative and negative ground. It was *negotiated* and *announced in advance*, providing both sides with a reasonable opportunity to prepare to engage one another’s arguments.

#### This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge — only that the *topic* should determine the debate’s subject matter.

#### The affirmative violates this interpretation because they do not advocate that the United States federal government substantially increase *its* economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

#### [insert definitions/impacts]

### Definition — USFG

#### “United States federal government” means the three branches of the central government. The affirmative does not advocate action by the USFG.

OECD 87 — Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Council, 1987 (“United States,” *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*, p. 179)

1. Political and organisational structure of government

The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

### Definition — Its

#### “Its” implies ownership. Engagement with the PRC *by the USFG* must be increased.

Gaertner-Johnston 6 — Lynn Gaertner-Johnston, founder of Syntax Training—a company that provides business writing training and consulting, holds a Master’s Degree in Communication from the University of Notre Dame, 2006 (“Its? It's? Or Its'?,” *Business Writing*—a blog, May 30th, Available Online at http://www.businesswritingblog.com/business\_writing/2006/05/its\_its\_or\_its\_.html, Accessed 07-04-2014)

A friend of mine asked me to write about how to choose the correct form of its, and I am happy to comply. Those three little letters cause a lot of confusion, but once you master a couple of basic rules, the choice becomes simple. Here goes:

Its' is never correct. Your grammar and spellchecker should flag it for you. Always change it to one of the forms below.

It's is the contraction (abbreviated form) of "it is" and "it has." It's has no other meanings--only "it is" and "it has."

Its is the form to use in all other instances when you want a form of i-t-s but you are not sure which one. Its is a possessive form; that is, it shows ownership the same way Javier's or Santosh's does.

Example: The radio station has lost its license.

The tricky part of the its question is this: If we write "Javier's license" with an apostrophe, why do we write "its license" without an apostrophe?

Here is the explanation: Its is like hers, his, ours, theirs, and yours. These are all pronouns. Possessive pronouns do not have apostrophes. That is because their spelling already indicates a possessive. For example, the possessive form of she is hers. The possessive form of we is ours. Because we change the spelling, there is no need to add an apostrophe to show possession. Its follows that pattern.

### Definition — Engagement

#### Economic and/or diplomatic engagement means an attempt to influence the target state through the establishment and enhancement of contacts across multiple issue-areas.

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

\* Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

\* Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

\* Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

\* Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

\* Arms transfers

\* Military aid and cooperation

\* Military exchange and training programs

\* Confidence and security-building measures

\* Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

\* Trade agreements and promotion

\* Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

\* Cultural treaties

\* Inauguration of travel and tourism links

\* Sport, artistic and academic exchanges

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.26 For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.27 Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.28

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Engagement means the use of the promise of rewards to influence a rising power’s behavior. The goal must be to convert a revolutionary state into a status quo power.

Schweller 99 — Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Ohio State University, former John M. Olin Post-Doctoral Fellow in National Security at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, 1999 (“Managing The Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, Edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0203979494, p. 14)

Engagement

The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major power’s behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order.

The most common form of engagement is the policy of appeasement, which attempts to settle international quarrels “by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous.”67 Typically, this process requires adjustments in territory and “spheres of influence” and the reallocation of global responsibilities and other sources of prestige commensurate with the growth in power of the rising state.

Engagement is more than appeasement, however. It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice, engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target’s behavior.

The primary objective of an engagement policy is to minimize conflict and avoid war without compromising the integrity of the existing international order. In essence, the established powers seek to restore system equilibrium by adjusting the international hierarchy of prestige and the division of territory in accordance with the new global balance of power, while at the same time maintaining the formal institutional arrangements and informal rules of the system, that is, its governance structures.68 The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system.

#### Engagement must be rewards-based and status quo transforming. Topical plans need to adopt positive incentives aimed at transforming China’s behavior.

Roberts 4 — Liam Roberts, M.A. Candidate in Political Science at the University of British Columbia, holds a B.A. from Concordia University, 2004 (“Engagement Theory and Target Identity: An Analysis of North Korean Responses to Contemporary Inter-Korean Engagement,” Thesis Submitted in Partial Completion of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, August, Available Online at https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/id/56483/ubc\_2004-0612.pdf, Accessed 09-12-2013, p. 13-14)

Overall

Mindful of the possibilities for misinterpretation between source and target as to which strategy is being pursued, we can distinguish between the theoretical rationale for engagement, deterrence, and compellence by the following definitions:

Figure 1.1: Methods and Objectives in Managing Dissatisfied States [Figure converted to text]

Logic — Method — Objective

Engagement — Rewards-based — Status-quo transforming

Deterrence — Threats-based — Status-quo preserving

Compellence — Threats-based — Status-quo transforming

Engagement, then, is a rewards-based initiative that offers the target gains for cooperative action, and nothing for the status quo. The target enjoys a relatively high degree of space in determining its own participation rate with the source without risking losses. Deterrence works conversely: it is a threat-based initiative that offers the target losses for challenging action, and nothing for maintaining the status quo. The target is relatively constrained by fear of incurring further losses, but neither is it necessarily motivated to alter the status quo. Compellence is more extreme, as a threat-based initiative that demands the target pursue a specific alteration of the status quo, but it may motivate the target to confront the source, and thus may generate tension and raise the odds of conflict.

In the above table, I have not alluded to a link between a rewards-based method and a status quo preserving objective, as we should proceed with an understanding of engagement as a change-oriented strategy. If a dissatisfied state was driven to disturb the status quo in either limited or revolutionary ways, and a source state sought to mete out rewards to encourage a status quo preserving objective, this would not be engagement, but rather "appeasement" — the delivery of gains [end page 13] has no sunset clause, nor any timetable for reciprocal expectations of any kind, excepting that the target abide by general norms of international behaviour. Appeasement, then, is much costlier than engagement, as only the latter is driven by the endgame of inculcating either specific or broad changes in the target. A variety of engagement sub-streams, as described above, will also vary in terms of their cost, contingent on their applicability to specific targets. In none of these sub-streams, however, do we see appeasement's key flaw: buying targets out without any objective of socialization or status-quo change, and no mechanism to advance long-term compliance.

#### In the context of U.S. foreign policy toward China, engagement means any strategy *other than isolationism*.

Feaver 6 — Peter D. Feaver, Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University, served as Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council during the Clinton administration, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, 2006 (“The Clinton Administration’s China Engagement Policy in Perspective,” Paper Presented at the Conference on War and Peace at Duke University, Available Online at <https://web.duke.edu/pass/pdf/warpeaceconf/p-feaver.pdf>, Accessed 06-22-2016, p. 8-9)

4. The Debate Over Constructive Engagement Misstates the Alternatives

The Clinton Administration frames the debate as a choice between constructive engagement and containment. This is sloppy analysis but shrewd rhetoric. Sloppy analysis because, in fact, containment is not the opposite of engagement. The opposite of engagement is isolationism. Isolationism can either be generalized, as was the case for the first hundred years of the American Republic (at least vis-a-vis Europe) or specific, as was the case with US-Albanian relations during the Cold War. Framing the issue this way, however, is shrewd rhetoric because virtually no one supports isolationism. The Clinton Administration says that if you do not want isolationism, you must therefore support our policy.

This of course, misstates the area of real debate. There is a widespread consensus that the United States needs to engage China. The true debate is over how to engage.

Under the rubric of constructive engagement, there are four basic options depending on the degree to which the interests of the players overlap: (1) direct confrontation/rollback, where one country seeks to diminish the position of the other (viz. U.S. policy on Iraq); (2) containment, where one country seeks to limit the advances of another country’s position (viz. U.S. Cold War [end page 8] policy on the Soviet Union); (3) appeasement, where one country seeks to manage the apparently inevitable advance of the other with concessions on minor points so as to avoid concessions on major issues (viz. British policy on the United States at the turn of the century); or (4) enlargement, where [one] country views the other’s interests as so harmonious that virtually any advance for one is an advance the other (viz. U.S. policy on Great Britain ever since World War I).

Given this more accurate range of choices, it is evident that the Administration has adopted a general posture of constructive engagement (not isolationism) and under that general rubric is pursuing a specific policy of appeasement. Several years ago, I asked the architect of the Administration’s Asia security policy what was the difference between our policy and a policy of appeasement. His response: “Appeasement has a long and distinguished history in diplomatic affairs.”

#### In the context of China, engagement can be differentiated from containment. Topical plans must increase the relative balance of engagement vs. containment.

Ross 99 — Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, 1999 (“Engagement in US China Policy,” *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, Edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0203979494, p. 180)

America’s response to China’s developing power will depend not only on how Washington balances short-term and long-term interests but also on the strategy it chooses to address its long-term interest in managing Chinese power and to create a favorable strategic environment in East Asia. American policy options are usually portrayed as a choice between “containment” and “engagement,” with containment characterized as coercive policies designed to prevent China from developing and using its growing power to displace American influence in Asia and engagement as strategic adjustment to legitimate Chinese objectives in an effort to establish an East Asian order that is both conducive to US interests and characterized by peaceful resolution of conflicts of interest.1

How the United States resolves the competing pressures between short-term and long-term interests and between long-term coercive and long-term adjustment policies will be a decisive factor in determining the prospects for peace in East Asia and a stable world order in the twenty-first century. Ultimately, however, there will be no clear-cut policy choices. Rather, US policy will inevitably reflect a mix of these competing interests and this mix will evolve over time in response to ongoing evaluation and re-evaluation of Chinese behavior and objectives and to developments in US relationships with other Asian countries and, equally important, in US domestic politics.

#### Engagement is distinct from containment — topical plans must attempt to balance China via cooperative policies, not coercion.

Ross 99 — Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, 1999 (“Engagement in US China Policy,” *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, Edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0203979494, p. 186-188)

There is a broad American consensus on America’s role in Asia in the twenty- first century and in the need to balance potential Chinese power; but this consensus has not created a consensus on policy toward China. Consistent with a balance of power strategy, there remains a wide array of US policy options for developing the bilateral US-China relationship and for influencing the nature of the regional and global order. It is these choices that have led to the debate over [end page 186] US strategy for dealing with the rise of Chinese power between proponents of containment and proponents of engagement.

These two policy packages are both premised on the assumption that should China become more powerful, it will inevitably challenge US supremacy in Asia, but their policy preferences are premised on diametrically opposed understandings of Chinese intentions. Advocates of containment argue that once China has modernized its military it will use armed force to achieve its territorial ambitions, including reunification of Taiwan with the mainland and control over the Senkaku Islands, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands. Insofar as China will be a major importer of oil, it will seek to control the sea lanes connecting Chinese ports with the Middle East. These analysts also argue that Chinese leaders have already concluded that the United States will be the most important obstacle to realizing China’s objectives and that escalated US-China conflict is inevitable. In this view, China’s strategic objective is to weaken and ultimately oust American influence from East Asia to achieve its territorial objectives as well as its ultimate strategic objective—regional hegemony.11

Because they believe that Chinese intentions are not reactive, advocates of containment foresee little benefit in trying to reach compromise solutions to conflicts of interest. On the contrary, conciliatory US behavior simply encourages Beijing to encroach on US interests and to pursue its expansionist objectives because it suggests that the United States is neither prepared to inflict a cost on PRC “rogue” behavior nor to resist PRC hegemonic aspirations. Indeed, in this view American conciliatory behavior abets PRC efforts to subjugate smaller powers because it signals to states in the region that Washington is not prepared to challenge Chinese expansionism and that it is content that local powers, such as the Philippines, contend with China without American support.12

This perspective resembles US containment policies of the US-Soviet Cold War period insofar as it advocates a stiff retaliatory response to any PRC diplomatic, economic, and military initiative that challenges US interests and because it opposes PRC participation in international economic and security regimes until Beijing evidences its intent and its ability to “follow the rules.” Proponents of containment criticize Washington for its inadequate response to China’s military modernization program, its arms sales to the Third World, and its naval activities in disputed waters in the South China Sea. They view US-China economic ties as providing Beijing with the technological know-how and financial resources to eventually challenge US economic and strategic interests.13

Engagement is the other package of policy options consistent with a strategic policy of balancing PRC power. It agrees that the United States must not and will not allow China to establish a unipolar East Asia, but it also argues that within a balance of power system, policy choices can determine the levels of tension and violence that characterize conflicts of interest between the great powers. Consistent with the concept of engagement developed in Randall Schweller’s chapter, American proponents of engagement argue that Chinese [end page 187] leaders have yet to formulate an immutable view of long-term US-China relations and that American policy can influence China’s willingness to adopt cooperative policies. Washington should develop policy toward China that will balance growing Chinese power, protect US interests, and minimize the potential for global and regional instability and bilateral tension. As one advocate of engagement explained, the problem with the containment strategy is that “If you treat China as enemy, then you will have an enemy.”14 Engagement strategy, on the other hand, is premised on the possibility that if the United States treats China as a partner, then it will not become an enemy. Advocates of engagement further argue that the United States, having consolidated its alliance with Japan and its strategic presence in East Asia, Washington can use its strategic superiority to engage China from a position of strength, thus maximizing Washington’s ability to encourage China to adopt cooperative policies toward regional order.15

#### In the context of China, engagement means bilateral accommodation, societal entanglement, and multilateral accommodation over economic and security issues.

Ross 99 — Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, 1999 (“Engagement in US China Policy,” *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, Edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0203979494, p. 188-189)

Advocates of engagement generally promote three variants of the engagement strategy. The first is a bilateral approach. It stresses that how the United States addresses contemporary US-China conflicts of interest will affect the Chinese leadership’s perception of US intentions and thus whether in the long term Beijing will perceive opportunities to cooperate with Washington to develop a stable regional order. On the other hand, mismanagement of PRC perceptions will lead Beijing to view the United States as an implacable adversary requiring adoption of destabilizing militant policies to realize Chinese interests and to weaken US presence in Asia. In this view, prospects for cooperation will be maximized if Washington eschews heavy-handed coercive policies. Engagement calls for negotiated solutions to conflicts of interest that avoid escalated tension and realize immediate American policy objectives. This aspect of policy is consistent with a traditional understanding of appeasement as defined in Chapter 1.16

The second variant of an American engagement strategy stresses a multilateral approach to promoting PRC participation and interest in a stable international order. It is this variant that separates Schweller’s understanding of appeasement from engagement.17 This strategy does not require that the necessary precondition to PRC membership in global institutions is immediate Chinese adherence to the rules as they now exist. In contrast to bilateral appeasement, this approach recognizes that Chinese leadership and a Chinese stake in international institutions and the global order can be a source of international stability and promote peaceful change. It stresses that Chinese entry into multilateral institutions, including the World Trade Organization and various security regimes, must be a negotiated process, so that membership does not require that China sacrifice important interests. It is premised on the understanding that for multilateral institutions to be effective, Beijing must be part of the rule-making process and benefit from the rules. Engagement advocates acknowledge that this process would necessarily be a consensual process in which the United States would not be able to maximize its interests. But they argue that US compromises [end page 188] reflecting Chinese interests are preferable to developing a global order without Chinese participation, one in which China would have an interest in violating its rules and undermining its effectiveness. Adherents to this policy package would agree with US Ambassador to China James Sasser, who argued that as China reveals a willingness to live in a rule-based system of institutions, it “must be allowed to help make the global rules.”18

The third variant of American engagement stresses the importance of long-term cooperative US-China societal and institutional relationships as determinants of Chinese behavior. Engagers argue that rather than isolate China, the United States should promote Chinese societal and political interests in stable US-China relations and in a stable international order. These interests will affect PRC calculations regarding the value of revisionist foreign policies, insofar as conflictual policies would impose costs on Chinese domestic actors and political constituencies. This is the bilateral equivalent to a strategy of multilateral “binding.” It is an “entanglement” strategy insofar as, by enmeshing China in a web of entangling relationships, Chinese leaders may be more inclined to tolerate a sub-optimal international order.

These three approaches toward peaceful management of a rising power — bilateral accommodation, societal entanglement, and multilateral accommodation — can be mutually complementary and reinforcing. Moreover, each has its particular policy expression in both economic and security matters. A comprehensive engagement policy would pursue all three variants in both policy arenas.

### Definition — PRC

#### PRC is the official name of China.

Oxford 16 – Oxford Online Dictionary, “People’s Republic of China”, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\_english/people's-republic-of-china

People's Republic of China

Official name (since 1949) of China.

#### PRC refers to the country of China.

Collins 16 – Collins English Dictionary, “People’s Republic of China”, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/people-s-republic-of-china

a republic in E Asia: the third largest and the most populous country in the world; the oldest continuing civilization (beginning over 2000 years bc); republic established in 1911 after the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty by Sun Yat-sen; People's Republic formed in 1949; the 1980s and 1990s saw economic liberalization but a rejection of political reform; contains vast deserts, steppes, great mountain ranges (Himalayas, Kunlun, Tian Shan, and Nan Shan), a central rugged plateau, and intensively cultivated E plains. Language: Chinese in various dialects, the chief of which is Mandarin. Religion: nonreligious majority; Buddhist and Taoist minorities. Currency: yuan. Capital: Beijing. Pop: 1 349 586 000 (2013 est). Area: 9 560 990 sq km (3 691 502 sq miles)

### Impact — China Policy Literacy

#### Debates between students about U.S. policy toward China are essential to global peace and stability.

McGiffert 15 — Carola McGiffert, President of the 100,000 Strong Foundation (now called the U.S.-China Strong Foundation)—a nonprofit organization that seeks to strengthen US-China relations by investing in a new generation of leaders who have the knowledge and skills to engage with China, former Senior Advisor and Director of the 100,000 Strong Initiative at the U.S. Department of State, former Vice President and Chief of Staff at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Special Assistant at The White House during the Clinton Administration, holds an M.A. in Chinese Studies and International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2015 (“Preface,” *Strengthening U.S.-China Relations One Student At A Time: Perspectives From Leaders In The Field*, Signature Report of The 100,000 Strong Foundation, Available Online at [http://asiasociety.org/files/[ENG]%20Strengthening-US-China-Relations-One-Student-at-a-Time-Perspectives-From-Leaders-in-the-Field.pdf](http://asiasociety.org/files/%5bENG%5d%20Strengthening-US-China-Relations-One-Student-at-a-Time-Perspectives-From-Leaders-in-the-Field.pdf), Accessed 06-23-2016, p. 8-10)

The US-China relationship stands at a critical juncture. Long marked by competition and contention, today the relationship is being tested in new ways. With China’s growing economic and military strength come new fears about Beijing’s true goals. With the US pivot toward Asia come new Chinese concerns about Washington’s true intentions. “Strategic mistrust”—now a cliché in think-tank circles—remains very much the predominant theme in the US-China narrative.

This is dangerous, not only because mistrust can lead to miscommunication, miscalculation, and even conflict, but also because we need this relationship to work—for America’s own economic and strategic interests as well as to ensure global stability. Every global crisis will require the United States and China to work together toward resolution; every new challenge will necessitate collaboration.

Those crises abound. As I write this, the deadly Ebola virus continues to ravage West Africa; climate change inflicts record droughts and storms on the Western US; Middle East conflicts are exploding; and poor nations keep getting poorer, while developed nations keep getting older. How will the world’s two most powerful nations address these and future challenges? Will we be able to work together decades from now on the many issues we’re sure to face?

How we manage this relationship today will have long-term impact. To ensure a robust relationship, America’s leaders and workforce must be China fluent. Regardless of economic or personal background, regardless of the professional paths we choose, all Americans should understand China. We need a deeper bench of well-trained Americans who are negotiating and cooperating with their Chinese peers. This is a national imperative, one that our two governments have recognized and endorsed. [end page 8]

Our choice is clear: We must invest in our young people to ensure that they—our future leaders—have the skills to guarantee the ongoing success of the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

This report is about charting the future of that critical relationship. These authors are pioneers in their fields. They know that understanding China, as Blackstone CEO Stephen A. Schwarzman has said, “is no longer an elective; it is a requirement.”

To put this effort into context, renowned scholar David Lampton reflects on the productive development of US-China relations and the critical importance of study abroad in fostering that relationship over the past 35 years.

Vice Minister of Education Hao Ping, Former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Richard Stengel, and representatives Charles Boustany and Rick Larsen all have advocated at the highest levels of the US government for strong US-China educational ties.

Business leaders Stephen A. Schwarzman and Muhtar Kent have secured economic opportunities for this China-fluent generation, enhancing both the present and future prosperity of our two peoples. [end page 9]

Two leaders in global civil society, Josette Sheeran and Mark Tercek, have confronted global issues like sustainable development, malnutrition and hunger, and environmental degradation— issues that won’t be overcome without a united US-China front.

Academic leaders, like university presidents Norman Francis and Jennifer Raab, work to ensure that students of all backgrounds have the opportunity to study in China.

Finally, two of our student ambassadors, Benjamin Brooks and Jarlene Choy, have shared their stories of appreciation for the hard work these leaders have done to broaden their futures.

These authors are part of a growing national movement. Leaders from business, academia, government, and civil society have united around the critical mission of 100,000 Strong. To them, the need for a productive US-China relationship is clear and urgent. We hope this report will serve as a call to action to others to join this movement and prepare our young people to compete, collaborate, and succeed in a world in which China plays a central role.

#### Ordinary citizens need to debate U.S.-China relations. *World peace* and resolutions to *every major issue* depend on it.

Watkins 16 — Tom Watkins, Advisor to Michigan’s Economic Development Corporation, the Chinese Association of Greater Detroit, and the Detroit Chinese Business Association who has traveled, written about, and worked in China for over three decades, former State Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Michigan, holds an Ed.D. in Educational Leadership and Administration from Wayne State University, 2016 (“China/US: Most Important Relationship In The World Today,” *Dome*, March 25th, Available Online at <http://domemagazine.com/tomwatkins/tw032516>, Accessed 06-23-2016)

Rhetoric or reality? As the second decade of the 21st century unfolds, the relationship between the U.S. and China remains the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

REALITY!

What happens in China and the U.S. impacts all humanity. Going forward, all major world issues will intersect at the corner of Washington DC and Beijing. The relationship between our two nations is the foundation for world peace, but we must find ways to rise above our differences and grow together. The thought of our relationship disintegrating is unthinkable.

It is in our respective countries’ self-interest, as well as the interest of the entire world, to ensure the continued understanding and improvement of U.S.-Chinese relations. The more we collectively achieve a deeper level of communication, understanding, and friendship between us—ranging from the average citizen to local, state and provincial leaders, scholars, NGO’s and policymakers in our respective countries and around the globe—the better off we will all be.

At the last U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue meeting in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jingping pointed out that the bilateral relations between our countries have gone through an extraordinary journey since the establishment of diplomatic relations 35 years ago. The Chinese leader reinforced the direction we should be taking saying, “China and the U.S. should stick to the general direction of building a new model of major country relationship which features no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. Both sides should also enhance mutual trust, expand converging interests, and manage and control differences, so as to promote the China-US relations to continuously move forward along the right track.”

I suggest that in the 35 years since normalization of relations between our country and China, we have done a remarkable job building connections between government leader-to-leader, academic, business, economic and more recently, even militarily.

But we need to do much more to educate and enlighten the average U.S. “Joe Six Pack” and China’s “Old Hundred Names” (e,g. “nao bai xing,” an idiomatic Chinese expression referring to ordinary people in China), about each other. The nationalistic urge to blame each other’s country for some perceived slight, economic downfall, or diplomatic or military mistake is right below the surface, ready to be exploited at a moment’s notice. Our leaders must be cognizant of this tendency. As Mao once proclaimed, “Even the smallest spark can start a raging forest fire.” The wrong nationalistic spark, once ignited, may not be retrievable and could set the world aflame.

#### *Despite competing priorities*, debating U.S.-China relations is vital — it’s the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

Jones et al. 13 — David Martin Jones, Associate Professor in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland (Australia), former Lecturer at the National University of Singapore, holds a Ph.D. in Government from The London School of Economics and Political Science, with Nicholas Khoo, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Otago (New Zealand), holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, and M.L.R. Smith, the pen name of Michael Rainsborough, Professor of Strategic Theory at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, University of London (UK), Fellow at the Royal Society of the Arts, former Senior Lecturer in the Department of History and International Affairs at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, former Consultant and Principal Lecturer at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), holds a Ph.D. from King’s College, University of London, 2013 (“Rocky rise: US-China relations in the post-Cold War era,” *Asian Security and the Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1781004625, p. 12)

In any work of political analysis, the scholar faces many competing topics that vie for attention. There is, therefore, a need to select and then assess what is critical as opposed to important; and what is important as opposed to what is tangential. The primary purpose of this chapter is to identify and evaluate the trajectory of Sino-US relations since the watershed year of 1989, from the George H.W. Bush administration through to the Obama administration.

It is the contention of this book that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Sino-American relationship is the single most important bilateral relationship in their respective foreign policies, and arguably the most important bilateral relationship in world politics. Thus, all the post-Cold War era US Presidents from George H.W. Bush through to Obama have emphasized the centrality of Sino-US relations as a long-term issue in US foreign policy, even if immediate exigencies may, at times, have compelled a focus on other issues.1 For their part, Chinese leaders have consistently viewed the relationship with the US as the single most important in their long-term considerations.2

### Impact — Deliberation Skills

#### Topicality facilitates a process of successive debates that develops important skills and fosters appreciation for multiple perspectives. Abandoning the topic forecloses the educational and democratic benefits of debate.

Lundberg 10 — Christian O. Lundberg, Associate Professor of Rhetoric in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, holds a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, 2010 (“The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina,” *Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century*, Edited by Allan D. Louden, Published by the International Debate Education Association, ISBN 9781617700293, p. 299)

In response to the first critique, which ultimately reduces to the claims that debate overdetermines democratic deliberation and that it inculcates an unhealthy antagonism, a number of scholars have extended the old maxim that dissent is critical to democracy in arguing that debate is a critical tool for civic deliberation (Brookfield and Preskill 1999; Levinson 2003). Gill Nichols (2000, 132) argues that a commitment to debate and dissent as a core component of democracy is especially critical in the face of the complexity of modern governance, rapid technological change, and an increasing need to deal with the nexus of science and public policy. The benefits of in-class debate espoused by Stephen Brookfield, Meira Levinson, and Nichols stem from the idea that debate inculcates skills for creative and open-minded discussion of disputes in the context of democratic deliberation: on their collective accounting, debate does not close down discussion by reducing issues to a simple pro/con binary, nor does it promote antagonism at the expense of cooperative discussion. Rather, properly cultivated, debate is a tool for managing democratic conflicts that foregrounds significant points of dispute, and then invites interlocutors to think about them together creatively in the context of successive strategic iterations, [end page 304] moments of evaluation, and reiterations of arguments in the context of a structured public discussion.

Goodwin’s study of in-class debate practice confirms these intuitions. Goodwin’s study revealed that debate produces an intense personal connection to class materials while simultaneously making students more open to differing viewpoints. Goodwin’s conclusion is worth quoting at length here:

Traditional teaching techniques like textbooks, lectures, and tests with right answers insulate students from the open questions and competing answers that so often drive our own interest in our subjects. Debates do not, and in fact invite students to consider a range of alternative views on a subject, encountering the course content broadly, deeply and personally. Students’ comments about the value of disagreement also offer an interesting perspective on the nature of the thinking skills we want to foster. The previous research . . . largely focused on the way debate can help students better master the principles of correct reasoning. Although some students did echo this finding, many more emphasized the importance of debate in helping them to recognize and deal with a diversity of viewpoints. (Goodwin 2003, 158)

The results of this research create significant questions about the conclusion that debate engenders reductive thinking and an antagonism that is unhealthy to democracy. In terms of the criticism that debate is reductive, the implication of Goodwin’s study is that debate creates a broader appreciation for multiple perspectives on an issue than the predominant forms of classroom instruction. This conclusion is especially powerful when one considers debate as more than a discrete singular performance, but as a whole process of inventing, discussing, employing, and reformulating arguments in the context of an audience of comparatively objective evaluators. In the process of researching, strategizing, debating, reframing stances, and switching sides on a question, students are provided with both a framework for thinking about a problem and creative solutions to it from a number of angles. Thus, while from a very narrow perspective one might claim debate practices reduce all questions to a “pro” and a “con,” the cumulative effects of the pedagogical process of preparing for, performing, and evaluating a debate provide the widest possible exposure to the varied positions that a student might take on an issue. Perhaps more significantly, in-class debate provides a competitive incentive for finding as many innovative and unique approaches to a problem as possible, and for translating them into publically useful positions.

#### Even if the content of the affirmative is valuable, the process they endorse is not. Debating the topic challenges students to articulate and defend positions grounded in the best evidence for and against the proposition. Knowledge of the topic increases depth of inquiry and quality of evaluation.

Lundberg 10 — Christian O. Lundberg, Associate Professor of Rhetoric in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, holds a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, 2010 (“The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina,” *Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century*, Edited by Allan D. Louden, Published by the International Debate Education Association, ISBN 9781617700293, p. 299)

Part of the benefit of debate in this regard is that more than simply fostering student engagement with the curricula by incentivizing mastery of the material and engendering a cooperative learning environment, debate practices also facilitate the application of course material to students’ everyday lives (Kennedy 2007, 183; Martens 2005, 4). Debate practice is uniquely effective in fostering application because it demands that a student have a relatively comprehensive grasp of a subject area, but, more important, that they articulate a position relative to the issues in the debate, and evaluate the competing claims that they might make in relation to the strength of the evidence that supports them (Schuster and Meany 2005). Thus, debate practices foster not only engagement with an issue but also an evaluation of a student’s position relative to an issue in the light of the best arguments for and against a proposition. Debate offers privileged access not only to content mastery, or even opinion formation, but what is more important is that it bridges the gap between the theoretical knowledge inculcated in the classroom and the specific personal stands that one might take both toward a specific resolution and, more broadly, toward the critical argumentative connections that a given resolution for debate accesses. Debate then has the potential to create a depth of inquiry and evaluation relative to the classroom curriculum that is unparalleled both in terms of knowledge of a subject area, and perhaps more significantly, in terms of a set of owned investments relative to the propositions at hand.

#### There’s nothing violent or oppressive about the deliberation we defend.

Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” *Criticism*, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)

Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that [End Page 285] is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police.

Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off:

Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand.

Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak [End Page 286] about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

### Impact — Manageable Limits

#### A limited topic facilitates more productive debates. The goal of debate should be to encourage in-depth clash over a well-understood subject area between well-prepared opponents. This is only possible when the topic is limited. Overly broad topics result in unfulfilling exchanges of sound bites and zingers instead of meaningful and enlightening engagement.

Gutting 13 — Gary Gutting, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, holds a Ph.D. from St. Louis University, 2013 (“A Great Debate,” *The Stone*—a *New York Times* blog featuring writing by contemporary philosophers curated by Simon Critchley, February 19th, Available Online at <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/>, Accessed 09-15-2015)

This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But our political “debates” seldom deserve the name. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.”

Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”).

There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique.

Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own.

Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — part of our political culture? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points?

A first condition is that the debates be focused on specific points of major disagreement. Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake.

Another issue is the medium of the debate. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They should not, however, be merely extemporaneous events, where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner. We want remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses.

Here’s one suggestion for an effective exchange. The debate would consist of a series of four half-hour televised sessions, carried out on successive days. In the first session, the Republican, say, presents a pre-written case for a particular position (say that tax-cuts are better for the economy than stimulus spending). The Democrat, who will have read the Republican’s presentation beforehand, presents a 15-minute point-by-point response. In the second session, the Republican asks the Democrat a series of questions (no more than one minute per question and three minutes per response) on the debate topic. In the third session, the Democrat questions the Republican. In the fourth session, each side has 15 minutes to present a final argument. This, of course, is just one idea. I welcome readers’ suggestions for refinements or alternatives.

Such debates will not end our political disagreements, but they will set much higher standards of discussion, requiring fuller explanations of positions and even modifications to make them more defensible. It’s unlikely that either side would ever simply give up its view, but, politically, they would have to react to a strong public consensus if they had not made a respectable case. Further, the quasi-official status of the participants, as representatives chosen by their parties, would make the parties’ politicians answerable to points the representatives have made. If Congressman X says at a press conference, “Lower rates have always produced higher tax revenues,” reporters might point out the party’s representative had to retreat to a more nuanced position. Such nuance might open the path to fruitful compromise.

The only major obstacle to implementing this proposal would be getting the parties to participate. Here, I suggest, shame would be a prime motivator. Given strong popular support for such debates, it’s hard to see how the parties could answer the charge that they are shying away because they don’t have confidence in their ability to make a convincing case.

Of course, many people will not have the time, interest, or the ability to follow debates of this sort. But those who do — including the leading commentators and opinion-makers — will be among the most concerned and articulate, and their views will have a significant effect on the terms and tone of the general discussion.

Facts and reasoning will never settle political issues. All of us have fundamental commitments that are impervious to argument. If an argument seems to refute them, we take this as a refutation of the argument. And, of course, many of us are too ignorant, self-interested or prejudiced on certain issues to be moved by rational considerations. But rationality almost always has some role in our decisions, and more rationality in our political discussion will at a minimum help many to better understand what is at stake in our disputes and why their opponents think as they do.

#### Exemptions from the negotiated and announced topic make it impossible to read enough and learn enough about the content of the 1AC to thoroughly prepare for a productive debate. This mirrors academia’s closed systems of self-referential scholarship and results in boring debates.

Grossberg 15 — Lawrence Grossberg, Morris Davis Distinguished Professor of Media Studies and Cultural Studies, Adjunct Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, and Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Senior Editor of *Cultural Studies*, holds a Ph.D. in Communication Research from the University of Illinois, 2015 (“The Fate of Knowledge,” *We All Want To Change The World. The Paradox of the US Left: A Polemic*, Published by Lawrence & Wishart, ISBN 9781910448496, p. 62-64)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced.

This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9 And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary [end page 62] efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to producing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One [end page 63] good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

Finally, everything is driven by highly exaggerated claims of originality (new discoveries, new theories, new solutions derived from new sources—and increasingly, new disciplines) that justify the extraordinary explosion of essays, journals and books. As much as it saddens me to say this, an ever-expanding body of work is full of exaggerated and self-aggrandizing claims of originality and import. The result is that a great deal of what is published is, to put it plainly, crap—certainly not worth reading —not because it is theoretical, or political, or contemporary, but because it appears to be written in a vacuum or at best, a rather boring conversation among a small group of people who share the same assumptions and habits of thought.10 Most of what is being said simply repeats what has been already said in different terms, often ignoring a history of discussions and debates (over certain positions, assumptions, practices, logics, etc.), so that one increasingly feels like intellectual history is repeating itself over and over.

#### An unlimited topic undermines students’ intrinsic motivation to gain more knowledge. Preserving a predictable and manageable preparation burden is a prerequisite to motivated learning. To be clear: our argument is not that what the affirmative discussed isn’t worth learning. It’s that students won’t be motivated to learn *anything* if the research burden is unreasonable.

Paras and Bizzocchi 5 — Brad Paras, Game Developer and Research Assistant at Simon Fraser University, and Jim Bizzocchi, Associate Professor in the School of Interactive Arts and Technology at Simon Fraser University, holds an M.Sc. in Comparative Media Studies from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005 (“Game, Motivation, and Effective Learning: An Integrated Model for Educational Game Design,” Proceedings of DiGRA—the Digital Games Research Association, Available Online at <http://www.digra.org/wp-content/uploads/digital-library/06276.18065.pdf>, Accessed 10-29-2015, p. 1-2)

To motivate is to “provide with an incentive”. To motivate someone to learn is to provide them with an incentive to engage in the act of gaining knowledge. In traditional instructional design practice, motivation is often considered as a preliminary step in the instructional process [2]. [end page 1] Intrinsic motivation in learning, however, focuses on the development of motivation throughout the entire instructional process. Though traditional instructional design practice focuses on a less integrated approach, developing life-long learners who are intrinsically motivated, display intellectual curiosity, find learning enjoyable, and continue seeking knowledge after their formal instruction has ended has always been a major goal of education [17].

Looking at the ‘effort’ expelled during the learning process will help determine whether learners are motivated. However, for ‘effort’ to even occur, there are two necessary prerequisites required: (1) the person must value the task and (2) the person must believe he or she can succeed at the task. In any given instructional situation, the learning task needs to be presented in a way that is engaging and meaningful to the student, and in a way that promotes positive expectations for the successful achievement of learning objectives [17]. To help understand motivation in instruction we can look at the ARCS Model of Motivational Design as developed by John M. Keller of Florida State University [9]. The ARCS Model identifies four essential strategy components for motivating instruction:

[A]ttention strategies for arousing and sustaining curiosity and interest.

- Learners are more motivated when the instructional design generates curiosity and interest about the content or learning context.

[R]elevance strategies that link to learners' needs, interests, and motives.

- Learners are more motivated when goals are clearly defined and align with learners’ interests.

[C]onfidence strategies that help students develop a positive expectation for successful achievement.

- Learners are more motivated when challenge is balanced in such a way that the learning process is neither too easy as to bore the leaner, or too difficult such that success seems impossible.

[S]atisfaction strategies that provide extrinsic and intrinsic reinforcement for effort.

- Learners are more motivated when there are rewards for correctly executed actions.

### Impact — Procedural Fairness

#### Procedural fairness is most important — it establishes expectations for preparation and facilitates respectful and productive dialogue between well-prepared opponents. Topicality-not-framework is a reasonable procedural norm.

Massaro 89 — Toni M. Massaro, Professor of Law at the University of Florida, 1989 (“Legal Storytelling: Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?,” *Michigan Law Review* (87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099), August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

B. The Rule-of-Law Model as Villain

Most writers who argue for more empathy in the law concede that law must resort to some conventions and abstract principles. That is, they do not claim that legal rules are, as rules, intrinsically sinister. Rather, they argue that we should design our legal categories and procedures in a way that encourages the decisionmakers to consider individual persons and concrete situations. Generalities, abstractions, and formalities should not dominate the process. The law should be flexible enough to take emotion into account, and to respond openly to the various "stories" of the people it controls. We should, as I have said, move toward "minimalist" law.

Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. n52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [\*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. n53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations.

My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. n54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas.

Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. n55

As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [\*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, n56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.

Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. n57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. n58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.

A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity – “law for law's sake" – because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [\*2113] party to follow them. n59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. n60

#### Fairness is a “real world” impact because prep time isn’t unlimited. The expectation that we prepare case-specific strategies against every non-topical affirmative requires students to compromise other aspects of their lives.

Harris 13 — Scott Harris, Associate Specialist and Debate Coach at the University of Kansas, holds a Ph.D. in Communication from Northwestern University, 2013 (“This Ballot,” Ballot from the Final Round of the 2013 National Debate Tournament, Posted on the *Global Debate* blog, April 6th, Available Online at http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/scott-harris-writes-long-ballot-for-ndt.html, Accessed 08-31-2013)

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says this community doesn’t care whether its participants have a life or do well in school or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.

### Impact — Policy Relevance

#### The affirmative’s refusal to endorse a topical policy is a failure of intellectual chutzpah. It takes *guts* to express a clear policy position on an issue as important to the world as U.S. foreign policy toward China because it requires scholars to expose their ideas to criticism. Topic-centered debates create a culture of intellectual bravery rather than one of perpetual intellectual anonymity.

Rothschild 15 — Amanda J. Rothschild, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Research Fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, Co-Chair of the Women in International Politics and Security Working Group, holds a B.A. in Political Science from Boston College, 2015 (“Policy Relevant Scholarship: What’s Chutzpah Got To Do With It?,” *War On The Rocks*—a scholarly blog that covers foreign policy and national security issues through a realist lens, July 6th, Available Online at <http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/policy-relevant-scholarship-whats-chutzpah-got-to-do-with-it/>, Accessed 07-12-2016)

One important component of policy relevance has thus far received little attention in the Schoolhouse series here at War on the Rocks: chutzpah. It often requires courage for a scholar to take a position on an important policy issue and to argue for it publicly, whether in an op-ed, on television, online, or through other mediums. You expose yourself to a new and enlarged audience for critique. You may be labeled an activist, which is a dirty word in academia. You may become associated with a certain political party or position regardless of your actual political beliefs. You may provoke disdain from your colleagues, who, in addition to disagreeing with your argument, might disagree with your choice to be engaged in policy debates in the first place. You could even alienate organizations that might have funded your research. The more controversial the topic, the more likely these consequences. In short, being policy relevant takes guts.

Examples of gutsy policy relevant writings from the international relations and security fields are numerous: Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations; Barry Posen’s Restraint; Robert Kagan’s The World America Made; Kenneth Pollack’s The Threatening Storm; Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and other writings on decline; several works by Stephen Van Evera from the War on Terror to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the respective work of Kenneth Waltz, Alan Kuperman, Frank Gavin, Nick Miller, and Or Rabinowitz on the Iranian nuclear program; and the advertisement signed by thirty-three senior security scholars against the war in Iraq in the New York Times on September 26, 2002. These intellectuals all took a highly public position on important subjects, and many of them faced intense and at times highly personal criticism in the wake of their publications and commentary. They argued in academic publications, on the radio, in America’s magazines, and in think tank forums. One need not agree with their positions to acknowledge that they adopted a clear and unambiguous stance on an issue, and that they were forced to weather the subsequent reaction.

This is policy relevance in one of its most effective forms. You can’t miss it. When you take a public position as these scholars did, no one wonders where you stand. Case in point: Does anyone question Barry Posen’s position on U.S. engagement with the world and American grand strategy? Can we say the same about everyone who claims to do policy relevant research? If we can’t, is that problematic?

It would seem that if you don’t know where someone stands, it is because that person has never taken a stand at all. Indeed, when it comes to policy relevance, where you stand may be more important than where you sit. Standing up requires chutzpah. If you never take a clear position publicly on an important policy issue, you can remain in perpetual intellectual anonymity. No one will know what you think, which means very few will care what you think. You will likely escape the aforementioned consequences of public commentary. Yet your impact and the policy relevance of your research are also likely to be minimal.

All of this is not to say that those who scream the loudest, most frequently, or most predictably are necessarily the most effective or even the most beneficial voices in the public debate. Nuanced, thoughtful commentary is of course much better than provocative writing intended solely to create controversy where perhaps none exists, or to shine the spotlight a little brighter on the author. Some stand up bravely better than others. Commentary that furthers civil debate and discussion is more valuable than commentary that merely boils the blood.

Policy relevance also comes in many forms, as noted recently by Michael Horowitz. Perhaps one of the most admirable forms of policy relevance is public service, which often happens quietly, without fanfare, on sabbaticals or summer breaks. These people contribute gracefully behind closed doors, away from the blogs, microphones, and op-ed pages.

Nevertheless, in international relations and security, we are studying issues with critical stakes for the world. Applying our research to these issues often necessitates entering the public debate and taking a position. As a result, we would be wise to cultivate a culture of intellectual bravery. Yes, all of us, from the first-year graduate student to the tenured professor, should learn to ask big questions, to write on important subjects, and to disseminate our work to the wider world in whichever outlet we feel most comfortable with. Yet we should also recognize that our discipline, the study of politics in various forms, requires those who speak out to take risks, to be bold in contributing to the world around us, to be a little scrappy, and to be intrepid. We have knowledge that can make a difference. Do we have the chutzpah to apply it?

#### By rejecting specific policy ideas in favor of promised outcomes, the aff echoes the magical thinking of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. Debating specific proposals is the only way to confront pressing problems.

Wittes 16 — Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, Editor in Chief of Lawfare, Member of the Task Force on National Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, 2016 (“Trump as National Security Threat,” *Lawfare*—a national security blog curated by the Brookings Institution, March 2nd, Available Online at https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-national-security-threat, Accessed 03-02-2016)

Finally, Trump’s entire candidacy is predicated on a weird kind of magical thinking that has no place in serious policy discussion generally but is particularly dangerous in the national security sphere. Trump does not propose policy ideas. He identifies and promises outcomes. We’re going to do a lot of winning. We’re going to smash ISIS. We’re going to have great trade deals. We’re going to be tough. We’re going to bring back jobs. We’re going to build a wall and Mexico is going to pay for it. We’re going to make America great again. He never proposes a modality for achieving any of these things. They're going to happen by force of personality and force of will.

Trump got in trouble this past weekend for retweeting a quotation from Mussolini. But the quotation in question was not the Mussolini line that Trump’s candidacy actually embodies.

My nomination for that dubious honor is the following: “Our program is simple: we wish to govern Italy. They ask us for programs but there are already too many. It is not programs that are wanting for the salvation of Italy but men and will power.”

This is Trump: promising outcomes without programs, promising to do by force of personality and will what a country cannot do through policy or democratic deliberation. It is a lie in all spheres. But in the national security space, it is a particularly pernicious lie. Our tools are too dangerous for cults of personality. Our problems are too hard to wish away with magical thinking. The stakes are too high to permit magic to eclipse persuasive thought and analysis. And the relationship between our tools and tyranny is too intimate to allow demagogues anywhere near the decisions the national security apparatus has to make—or the machineries with which it makes them.

#### In-depth knowledge about the USFG and its policies is empowering. This answers “*historical determinism*” and proves that government is responsive to citizen intervention.

Zelden 8 — Charles L. Zelden, Professor of History at Nova Southeastern University, holds a Ph.D. in History from Rice University, 2008 (“Foreword,” *The Legislative Branch of Federal Government: People, Process, and Politics*, Written by Gary P. Gershman, Published by ABC-CLIO, ISBN 1851097120, p. vii-ix)

Most of us know something about the federal government. At the very least, we can name its three branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—and discuss the differences between them. At an early age, we are taught in school about the president of the United States and his official roles and responsibilities; we learn about Congress and the courts and their place in our government. In civics classes, we often get a skeletal picture of how the nation’s government works; we are told that Congress writes the laws, the president executes them, and the Supreme Court acts as the interpreter of the U.S. Constitution. News reports, blogs, and editorials we read as adults add to this knowledge. Many of us can go further and explain some of the basic interactions among the branches. We know that the laws Congress passes are subject to the president’s veto power and the Supreme Court’s powers of judicial review; we understand that the president names the members of his Cabinet and nominates justices to the Supreme Court, but that the Senate has to confirm these nominations; and we can discuss how the Supreme Court, as the “caretaker” of the Constitution, can declare laws unconstitutional, but that it is up to the legislative and executive branches to enforce these rulings. We bandy around such terms as checks and balances and separation of powers. We talk about majority votes and filibusters in the Senate.

For most of us, however, this is about as far as our knowledge goes. According to newspaper accounts spanning decades, most Americans have trouble naming members of the Supreme Court, or key figures in the congressional leadership, or the members of the president’s Cabinet. Still fewer of us can explain in detail how a bill becomes a law, or the president’s authority in foreign affairs, or how the Supreme Court decides a case. If we ask about the historical development of these institutions and officials and their powers, the numbers of those who understand how our federal government works drops even further.

It is not surprising that most of us do not know a lot about the workings of our government. Government is a large and complex enterprise. It includes thousands of people working on subjects ranging from tax reform to national security, from voting rights to defining and enforcing environmental standards. Much of the work of government, although technically open to the public, is done out of sight and hence out of mind. We may know about those parts of the government that affect us directly—the Social Security Administration for the elderly, the Defense Department for those with family members in the military, or the Supreme Court when the news is filled with such controversial topics as abortion or the right to die or prayer in schools—but our understandings are generally limited to only those parts that directly affect us. Although this state [end page vii] of affairs is understandable, it is also dangerous. Our form of government is a democratic republic. This means that, although elected or appointed officials carry out the duties of government, “We the People of the United States” are the ultimate authority, and not just because we choose those who run the government (or those who appoint the men and women who run the day-to-day business of government). In the end, it is our choices that shape (or, at least, should shape) the scope and function of the federal government. As Abraham Lincoln gracefully puts it, ours is a government “of the people, by the people, for the people.”

Yet what sort of choices can we make if we do not understand the structures, workings, and powers of the federal government? Choices made in ignorance are dangerous choices. When a president goes on TV and claims a power not granted by the Constitution, we need to know that this claim is something new. It might be that what the president is asking for is a reasonable and necessary extension of the powers already held by the executive branch—but it might, on the other hand, be a radical expansion of his powers based on nothing more than his say-so. If we do not understand what is normal, how can we judge whether abnormal and exceptional proposals are necessary or proper? The same is true when pundits and politicians rant on about the dangers of “activist judges.” How can we know what an “activist judge” is if we do not even understand a “normal” judge’s job? What one person calls dangerous activism could be courageous defense of constitutional rights in other people’s eyes—or what one person praises as a creative reading of the Constitution, another person might denounce as an irresponsible and unwise judicial experiment.

This is the point: without knowledge of the way things are supposed to be, how can we judge when the powers of government are being underused, misused, or even abused? The need for this knowledge is the root from which the three volumes of the About Federal Government series have grown. Our goal is to present the federal government as a living, working system made up of real people doing jobs of real importance—not just in the abstract, but for all of us in our daily lives. Knowledge is power, and this is as true today as when Lord Francis Bacon wrote it about four hundred years ago. Understanding how our government works, and how each of its institutions works, and how they interact with one another and with “We the People” is not just something we might need to pass a civics test or a citizenship exam—it is a source of power for us as citizens. Knowing how a bill becomes a law and the many ways that a good idea can be derailed by the process of lawmaking is a source of power—for some day, there may be a bill that you want to see enacted into law, or that you want to prevent being made a law. Knowing the stress points at which a bill is most vulnerable to defeat can give you the opportunity to put pressure where it would do the most good. We can find similar examples for the other two branches as well.

One way of showing the living and evolving nature of the federal government is to place it into its historical context. Our government did not just come into being fully formed. The government we have today is the result of over two hundred years of [end page viii] growth and change, of choices made and laws passed. Much of what we hold to be gospel today, when it comes to the goals and methods and powers of the national government, resulted from our experiences—good and bad—in the past. How can one understand today’s civil rights laws, for example, without first understanding the impact of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction on the structure of our government? Forgetting the past leaves us powerless to deal with the present and the future. A second way to bring our government to life is to focus on the interactions among the three branches of the federal government, as well as between these three branches and the states. Most of the controversy shaping our governing structures grew out of conflicts among the various branches of the federal government, or between the federal government and the states. When Congress fights with the president over budgets or the Supreme Court overturns a popular law passed by Congress and signed by the president, or when a state defies a mandate issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and the president must put that state’s National Guard under his authority to enforce the Court’s decision, those crises clarify the actual working structures of our government. Like flexing a muscle to make it strong, these interactions define the actual impact of our government—not only today, but in the future as well. Finally, we can understand the living nature of the federal government by examining the people who make up that government. Government is not an abstract idea: it is people doing their jobs as best they can. If government can be said to have a personality, it is the direct reflection of the collective personalities of those who work in our government. Hence, when we talk about Congress, we are talking about the people who are elected to the House of Representatives and the Senate and whose values, views, beliefs, and prejudices shape the output of the national legislature. The About Federal Government series integrates all three of these approaches as it sets out the workings and structures of our national government. Written by historians with a keen understanding of the workings of government past and present, these volumes stress the ways in which each of the branches helps form part of a whole system—and the ways that each branch is unique as an institution. Finally, we have given special stress to bringing the people and the history of these branches to life, in the process making clear just how open to our own intervention our government really is. This is our government, and the more we understand how it works, the more real our “ownership” of it will be.

### Impact — Constructive Constraints

#### Absolute affirmative flexibility leaves the negative without meaningful ground to advance well-developed counter-arguments. Establishing boundaries is important because they spur imagination and innovation, improving the quality of debates.

Thomas and Brown 11 — Douglas Thomas, Associate Professor in the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California, founding member of the Critical and Cultural Studies division of the National Communication Association, holds a Ph. D. in Communication from the University of Minnesota, and John Seely Brown, Visiting Scholar and Adviser to the Provost at the University of Southern California, independent cochairman of the Deloitte Center for the Edge, former Chief Scientist and Director of the Palo Alto Research Center at Xerox, holds a Ph.D. in Computer and Communication Sciences from the University of Michigan, 2011 (“A Tale of Two Cultures,” *A New Culture of Learning: Cultivating the Imagination for a World of Constant Change*, Published by CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, ISBN 1456458884, p. 35)

Learning Environments

We believe, however, that learning should be viewed in terms of an environment—combined with the rich resources provided by the digital information network—where the context in which learning happens, the boundaries that define it, and the students, teachers, and information within it all coexist and shape each other in a mutually reinforcing way. Here, boundaries serve not only as constraints but also, oftentimes, as catalysts for innovation. Encountering boundaries spurs the imagination to become more active in figuring out novel situations within the constraints of the situation or context.

Environments with well-defined and carefully constructed boundaries are not usually thought of as standardized, nor are they tested and measured. Rather, they can be described as a set of pressures that nudge and guide change. They are substrates for evolution, and they move at varying rates of speed.

#### Their “topicality bad” arguments assume that boundaries constrain innovation. We critique this assumption. “Topicality not framework” is the best way to encourage creative imagination within the confines of a bounded environment. Prefer evidence from education and innovation experts.

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Inquiry

Conventional wisdom holds that different people learn in different ways. Something is missing from that idea, however, so we offer a corollary: Different people, when presented with exactly the same information in exactly the same way, will learn different things. Most models of education and learning have almost no tolerance for this kind of thing. As a result, teaching tends to focus on eliminating the source of the problem: the student’s imagination.

Imagine a situation where two students are learning to play the piano. The lesson for the day is a Bach prelude. The first student attacks the piano forcefully, banging out each note correctly but with a violent intensity that is uncharacteristic for the style of the piece. The second student seems to view the written score as a loose framework; he varies the rhythm, modifies the melody, and follows his own internal muse. In today’s classroom, the teacher will see two students “doing it wrong.” In the new culture of learning, the teacher will see a budding rock star and a jazz musician.

The story of these students illustrates a fundamental principle of the new culture of learning: Students learn best when they are able to follow their passion and operate within the constraints of a bounded environment. Both of those elements matter. Without the boundary set by the assignment of playing the prelude, there would be no medium for growth. But without the passion, there would be nothing to grow in the medium. Yet the process of discovering one’s passion can be complicated.

#### An “*anything goes*” approach doesn’t work. Clear boundaries are needed precisely because they are challenging.

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Questions and Answers

The new culture of learning is not about unchecked access [end page 80] to information and unbridled passion, however. Left to their own devices, there is no telling what students will do. If you give them a resource like the Internet and ask them to follow their passion, they will probably meander around finding bits and pieces of information that move them from topic to topic—and produce a very haphazard result.

Instead, the new culture of learning is about the kind of tension that develops when students with an interest or passion that they want to explore are faced with a set of constraints that allow them to act only within given boundaries.

### Impact — Simple Truth Thesis

#### Their refusal to affirm the resolution relies on the Simple Truth Thesis and the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis. From this perspective, no reasonable person could *ever* argue that the United States federal government should substantially increase its engagement with the PRC because the negative position on this question is so self-evident that there is no room for debate. We critique this assumption. The answers to Big Questions like “should the USFG substantially increase its engagement with the PRC” are *not* simple and self-evident — reasonable people *can* and *should* disagree.

Aikin and Talisse 14 — Scott F. Aikin, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Vanderbilt University, and Robert B. Talisse, Professor of Philosophy and Political Science at Vanderbilt University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the City University of New York, 2014 (“The Simple Truth Thesis,” *Why We Argue (And How We Should): A Guide To Political Disagreement*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 9780415859059, p. 61-62)

Both camps betray a commitment to the Simple Truth Thesis, the claim that Big Questions always admit simple, obvious, undeniable, and easily-stated answers. The Simple Truth Thesis encourages us to hold that a given truth is so simple and so obvious that only the ignorant, wicked, devious, or benighted could possibly deny it. On a recent occasion, an acquaintance of ours, in the midst of a political conversation, announced that opposing the flat tax was "stupid, evil, or both.” With this statement, she affirmed that, in her opinion, there is no room for reasoned disagreement about the merits of a flat tax. In another recent discussion, a professor of philosophy asserted that there is not even one intelligent defense of the death penalty. Not one, he said.

It's an odd phenomenon. Part of what makes Big Questions so important and, well, big, is precisely the fact that reasonable, sincere, informed, and intelligent persons can disagree over their answers. That is, the Simple Truth Thesis has the effect of deflating Big Questions. But as it does so by casting aspersions on one's opposition, it deflates the questions by inflaming those with whom one disagrees. Consequently, as our popular political commentary accepts the Simple Truth Thesis, there is a great deal of inflammatory rhetoric and righteous indignation, but in fact very little public debate over the issues that matter most. Thus the Big Questions over which we are divided remain unexamined, and our reasons for adopting our different answers are never brought to bear in public discussion. And, moreover, what passes for public argument is nothing like argument at all.

This should come as no surprise. It is clear that one of the direct corollaries to the Simple Truth Thesis is the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis. According to the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis, argument and debate with those with whom one disagrees is a pointless and futile endeavor. The reasoning driving No Reasonable Opposition is simple. [end page 61] If in fact the answer to a given Big Question is a Simple Truth, then there is no opponent of that answer who is not also woefully ignorant, misinformed, misguided, wicked, or worse. In other words, argument concerning a Big Question can be worthwhile only when there is more than one reasonable position regarding the question. And this is precisely what the Simple Truth Thesis denies.

One could argue that it would be a wonderful world were the Simple Truth Thesis true. Our political task would be simply to empower those who know the Simple Truths, and rebuke the fools who do not. But, alas, the Simple Truth Thesis is not true, and consequently the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis must be dismissed as well. In fact, the Simple Truth Thesis is a fairytale—soothing and satisfying, but ultimately unfit for a serious mind. We must recognize that for any Big Question, there are several defensible positions; indeed, as we said above, it is precisely this feature that makes them big questions rather than small or ordinary ones. Of course, to say that a position is defensible is not to say that it's true. One can acknowledge that there are multiple defensible positions in response to a Big Question, and still maintain that there is only one defensible position that is correct. To oppose the Simple Truth Thesis is not to embrace relativism, nor is it to give up on the idea that there are true answers to Big Questions. It is rather to give up on the view that the truth is always simple.

#### This outweighs and turns the case. Even if they are correct about their answer to the Big Question of the resolution, refusing to affirm the topic when assigned to be affirmative demonstrated that they were unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of other answers or perspectives. We must abandon the Simple Truth Thesis and the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis in order for productive debate to occur.

Aikin and Talisse 14 — Scott F. Aikin, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Vanderbilt University, and Robert B. Talisse, Professor of Philosophy and Political Science at Vanderbilt University, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the City University of New York, 2014 (“The Simple Truth Thesis,” *Why We Argue (And How We Should): A Guide To Political Disagreement*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 9780415859059, p. 64-66)

That's the quick and dirty case against relativism. Now notice that none of these arguments bear on the view that there are multiple reasonable answers to Big Questions. In affirming that there are many defensible responses to each Big Question, one claims only that there is a difference between being wrong and being stupid. It is to acknowledge that even smart people make mistakes. Take Plato. From the previous chapters, it should be pretty clear that we think Plato was wrong about a great many things. We already indicated that we think he was wrong about several matters concerning democracy, but that’s just the beginning of the story. We think that Plato was wrong about almost everything. But we also think it’s obvious that Plato was a great philosopher. In fact, we think he was a genius. We admire him, wrestle [end page 64] with his thought, try to criticize his views, and in general take him very, very seriously. But, on nearly every philosophical issue, we believe he was wrong, wrong, wrong.

Holding that there is reasonable opposition, in fact, is a condition for thinking that criticism is possible. Consider that if you think that those who you disagree with are simply stupid, benighted, or evil, you wouldn’t have any arguments to give to them. Criticism of them and their views would be impossible. You would need only to state that they are wrong. But notice that it's only when you take your opponents to be reasonable—people who care about evidence, can see relevant issues, and are able to understand what's at stake in a debate—that you can actually criticize them. Criticism depends upon the background thought that the person you're engaging with has the capacity to reason in good faith. That is not to say that in order to criticize another person, one must endorse or accept their reasons. It means only that you must acknowledge that reasoning (perhaps bad reasoning, or reasoning from false premises) is occurring, and that it's possible to assess and correct it. So to deny the Simple Truth and No Reasonable Opposition theses is not to capitulate to relativism at all. One can reject these theses and yet be committed to there being a single right answer to each Big Question; and one can still hold that those who deny what you believe are dead wrong. One who rejects these theses can still be committed to arguing earnestly with others, and to vigorously critiquing those who are wrong. But most importantly, the denial of the Simple Truth and No Reasonable Opposition theses actually delivers the kind of tolerance that relativism could only promise. Once you’re committed to seeing your opponents as reasonable, intelligent, and sincere, but mistaken, you're less likely to use force or violence to correct them. You're more likely to use arguments to change their minds.

Consequently, even if there is some Big Question whose true answer is p, there can nonetheless be formidable cases made in support of alternative, mistaken, answers. That's because when it comes to Big Questions, there are many different considerations that must be examined, and there will always be reasonable disagreements among intelligent and sincere people about the relative weight of considerations of different kinds. Again, Big Questions are big because they require that we take many, many kinds of consideration into account. Indeed, sometimes the answer to one Big Question depends on how we’ve answered [end page 65] other Big Questions. Things can get extremely complicated very quickly. Yet we are finite creatures with limited cognitive resources, and so it is sometimes hard for us to balance our philosophical checkbooks. Big Questions can dwarf our intelligence. Once we appreciate this, we must recognize that the No Reasonable Opposition Thesis must be abandoned. Even if we have the true answer to a Big Question, there will be room for intelligent, informed, and sincere people to disagree. In such cases, our opponents are mistaken or wrong, but not therefore unintelligent, wicked, untrustworthy, or ignorant. They deserve our attention, and we need to consider what they have to say.

### Impact — Government Heuristic Good

#### Governmentality should be used as a heuristic, not as a description. We can effectively advocate for policy reforms without identifying with the existing state. Arguing that the state is a bad actor in all circumstances overgeneralizes and stifles political agency. Instead of totalizing rejection, we should assess the practical effects of particular policies in specific contexts.

Zanotti 13 — Laura Zanotti, Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Florida International University, 2013 (“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 38, Issue 4, November, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 289-290)

In this article, I explore the ontological and epistemological assumptions of different versions of governmentality theory and highlight the importance of these assumptions for the conceptualization of political agency. I argue that some versions of governmentality remain trapped in the substantialist ontology they are set to criticize and that this ontological position stifles the possibility of reimagining political agency beyond liberal constraints.

While there are important variations in the way international relations scholars use governmentality theory, for the purpose of my argument I identify two broad trajectories.2 One body of scholarship uses governmentality as a heuristic tool to explore modalities of local and international government and to assess their effects in the contexts where they are deployed; the other adopts this notion as a descriptive tool to theorize the globally oppressive features of international liberalism. Scholars who use governmentality as a heuristic tool tend to conduct inquiries based upon analyses of practices of government and resistance. These scholars rely on ethnographic inquiries, emphasizes the multifarious ways government works in practice (to include its oppressive trajectories) and the ways uneven interactions of governmental strategies and resistance are contingently enacted. As examples, Didier Bigo, building upon Pierre Bourdieu, has encouraged a research methodology that privileges a relational approach and focuses on practice;3 William Walters has advocated considering governmentality as a research program rather than as a ‘‘depiction of discrete systems of power;’’4 and Michael Merlingen has criticized the downplaying of resistance and the use of ‘‘governmentality’’ as interchangeable with liberalism.5 Many other scholars have engaged in contextualized analyses of governmental tactics and resistance. Oded Lowenheim has shown how ‘‘responsibilization’’ has become an instrument for governing individual travelers through ‘‘travel warnings’’ as well as for ‘‘developing states’’ through performance indicators;6 Wendy Larner and William Walters have questioned accounts of globalization as an ontological dimension of the present and advocated less substantialized accounts that focus on studying the discourses, processes and practices through which globalization is made as a space and a political economy;7 Ronnie D. Lipschutz and James K. Rowe have looked at how localized practices of resistance may engage and transform power relations;8 and in my own work, I have studied the deployment of disciplinary and governmental tools for reforming governments in peacekeeping operations and how these practices were hijacked and resisted and by their targets. 9

Scholars who use governmentality as a descriptive tool focus instead on one particular trajectory of global liberalism, that is on the convergence of knowledge and scrutiny of life processes (or biopolitics) and violence and theorize global liberalism as an extremely effective formation, a coherent and powerful Leviathan, where biopolitical tools and violence come together to serve dominant classes or states’ political agendas. As I will show, Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and Sergei Prozorov tend to embrace this position.10

The distinction between governmentality as a heuristic and governmentality as a descriptive tool is central for debating political agency. I argue that, notwithstanding their critique of liberalism, scholars who use governmentality as a descriptive tool rely on the same ontological assumptions as the liberal order they criticize and do move away from Foucault’s focus on historical practices in order to privilege abstract theorizations. By using governmentality as a description of ‘‘liberalism’’ or ‘‘capitalism’’ instead of as a methodology of inquiry on power’s contingent modalities and technologies, these scholars tend to reify a substantialist ontology that ultimately reinforces a liberal conceptualization of subjects and power as standing in a relation of externality and stifles the possibility of reimagining political agency on different grounds. ‘‘Descriptive governmentality’’ constructs a critique of the liberal international order based upon an ontological framework that presupposes that power and subjects are entities possessing qualities that preexist relations. Power [end page 289] is imagined as a ‘‘mighty totality,’’ and subjects as monads endowed with potentia. As a result, the problematique of political agency is portrayed as a quest for the ‘‘liberation’’ of a subject ontologically gifted with a freedom that power inevitably oppresses. In this way, the conceptualization of political agency remains confined within the liberal struggle of ‘‘freedom’’ and ‘‘oppression.’’ Even researchers who adopt a Foucauldian vocabulary end up falling into what Bigo has identified as ‘‘traps’’ of political science and international relations theorizing, specifically essentialization and ahistoricism.11

I argue here that in order to reimagine political agency an ontological and epistemological turn is necessary, one that relies upon a relational ontology. Relational ontological positions question adopting abstract stable entities, such as ‘‘structures,’’ ‘‘power,’’ or ‘‘subjects,’’ as explanations for what happens. Instead, they explore how these pillar concepts of the Western political thought came to being, what kind of practices they facilitate, consolidate and result from, what ambiguities and aporias they contain, and how they are transformed.12 Relational ontologies nurture ‘‘modest’’ conceptualizations of political agency and also question the overwhelming stability of ‘‘mighty totalities,’’ such as for instance the international liberal order or the state. In this framework, political action has more to do with playing with the cards that are dealt to us to produce practical effects in specific contexts than with building idealized ‘‘new totalities’’ where perfect conditions might exist. The political ethics that results from non-substantialist ontological positions is one that privileges ‘‘modest’’ engagements and weights political choices with regard to the consequences and distributive effects they may produce in the context where they are made rather than based upon their universal normative aspirations.13

#### Debating about government policies is a valuable heuristic — we can learn about the state without *being* it. Their radical framework eliminates the potential for political agency and oversimplifies complex, contingent relationships. Instead of rejecting government policies *in general*, we should analyze particular policies.

Zanotti 13 — Laura Zanotti, Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Florida International University, 2013 (“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 38, Issue 4, November, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 299-300)

Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that, notwithstanding their critical stance, scholars who use governmentality as a descriptive tool remain rooted in substantialist ontologies that see power and subjects as standing in a relation of externality. They also downplay processes of coconstitution and the importance of indeterminacy and ambiguity as the very space where political agency can thrive. In this [end page 299] way, they drastically limit the possibility for imagining political agency outside the liberal straightjacket. They represent international liberal biopolitical and governmental power as a homogenous and totalizing formation whose scripts effectively oppress ‘‘subjects,’’ that are in turn imagined as free ‘‘by nature.’’ Transformations of power modalities through multifarious tactics of hybridization and redescriptions are not considered as options. The complexity of politics is reduced to homogenizing and/or romanticizing narratives and political engagements are reduced to total heroic rejections or to revolutionary moments.

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with.

Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.’’84

### Impact — Switch-Side Format Good

#### Switch-side debating prepares students to challenge dominant ideologies, not mindlessly accept them.

English et al. 7 — Eric English, Graduate Student in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, et al., part of the Schenley Park Debate Authors Working Group (DAWG)—a consortium of public argument scholars at University of Pittsburgh that includes Gordon R. Mitchell—Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, Stephen Llano, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief, and Carly Woods—Graduate Students in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 2007 (“Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, Volume 4, Number 2, June, Available Online at http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf, Accessed 01-19-2010, p. 223-225)

Second, while the pedagogical benefits of switch-side debating for participants are compelling,10 some worry that the technique may perversely and unwittingly serve the ends of an aggressively militaristic foreign policy. In the context of the 1954 controversy, Ronald Walter Greene and Darrin Hicks suggest that the articulation of the debate community as a zone of dissent against McCarthyist tendencies developed into a larger and somewhat uncritical affirmation of switch-side debate as a [end page 223] "technology" of liberal participatory democracy. This technology is part and parcel of the post-McCarthy ethical citizen, prepared to discuss issues from multiple viewpoints. The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, "The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time."11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence.

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13

Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. "I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy." As Katyal recounts, "the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team."14

The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as "with us or against us," the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be [end page 224] apparent—the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a "weapon of mass destruction."

#### Switch-side debating facilitates informed deliberation, not American exceptionalism.

Stannard 6 — Matt Stannard, Director of Forensics and Associate Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming, 2006 (“Deliberation, Debate, and Democracy in the Academy and Beyond,” *The Underview*, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, Available Online at http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html, Accessed 06-26-2007)

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students' confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene's critique has several problems: First, as J.P. Lacy once pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism."

Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe.

Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas.

### 2AC — Topicality

#### 1. We Meet — we are *in the direction of* the topic. The 1AC engages China by studying the study of China. It’s close enough to facilitate a productive debate.

#### 2. Imperialism DA — engagement plans necessarily deny China its agency and attempt to convert China in the Western image. It’s *impossible* to defend a topical plan without defending this imperial project — that’s Pan.

#### 3. Counter-interpretation: the topic is the *subject* of the discussion, but it doesn’t *control* the discussion. “Affirmative” means the team that speaks first and last, not the team that advocates “*for* the topic.” We are a discussion of the topic even if we don’t advocate a topical policy.

#### 4. China Studies DA —

#### A. Their interpretation requires us to embrace a positivist epistemology.

Pan 4 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Australian National University, 2004 (“The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 29, Issue 3, June/July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 305)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."3

#### B. This reproduces flawed scholarship about China — turns “*topic education*” impacts.

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“China watching: towards reflection and dialogue,” *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1782544240, p. 150)

China Knowledge and Self-Reflection

Until now, my focus seems to have been mainly on how not to understand China's rise. While deconstruction is all well and good, one cannot help but wonder: How to study China? If those paradigms are problematic or less than adequate, what are the alternative ways of knowing this important country?

These questions sound reasonable enough. Be it scholars or practitioners, when faced with an apparently unprecedented transition from a transatlantic century to a transpacific century led by the 'rise' of China (and India), one is naturally anxious to know what China is up to and how to best respond to it. Yet, however understandable this desire may be, this book has hesitated to directly volunteer answers to those questions, or at least its implicit answers would be unlikely to satisfy those demands on their own terms. There are several reasons for this. To begin with, I am sceptical of some of their underlying ontological and epistemological premises about what China is and what China knowledge should mean. For example, those questions seem to assume that this book is merely a study of China studies (or a particular section of China studies), rather than a study of China per se. Hence their insistence on knowing how we might go about studying China proper. Yet, from the beginning, this knowledge/reality dichotomy has been problematised. Since there is no China-in-itself outside knowledge, representation or discourse, what we refer to as 'China' must already be coloured by such representations. Without reference to representations we cannot for a moment speak of China or do China studies. Given that China does not exist independently of discourse and that any study becomes part of its object of study, I should say that this analysis of Western discourses of China is already a study of China in the proper sense of the word.

#### 5. No “Deliberation Skills” Impact — students already learn decision-making skills in school, through life experience, and in other debates. Reading a topical plan *in a particular debate* doesn’t matter.

#### 6. Self-Fulfilling Prophecy DA —

#### A. Their interpretation makes it inevitable.

Pan 4 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Australian National University, 2004 (“The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 29, Issue 3, June/July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 306)

More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.

#### B. This outweighs — treating China as an object of study relies on the projection of fear and fantasy. This creates mutual suspicion and a tit-for-tat spiral. War is unlikely unless we embrace these representations — that’s Pan.

#### 7. No Predictability Impact. “USFG bad” is a stock issue. If they believe in “switching sides,” they should be prepared to defend the USFG and engagement with China.

#### 8. Knowledge Overload DA — we already have *too much* knowledge about China. Topical debates make this worse because they create more knowledge without challenging the flawed method used to produce it.

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“China watching: towards reflection and dialogue,” *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise*, Published by Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1782544240, p. 147-148)

Amid the ever-growing literature on the rise of China, one paradox can hardly escape our attention. That is, evocative of the amusing saying on the Oxford postcard, the more we write and debate about China, the less we seem to know it for sure. Over the years and after so many dedicated conferences, forums and publications, we do not seem to have come any closer to settling the perplexing questions such as what China really is and what its rise means for the rest of the world. The continuing China debate testifies to this lack of consensus. The editors of a book on China watching admit that as a result of the country's growing complexity, it is increasingly difficult to 'offer assured conclusions about "China" writ large'.3 Even William Kristol, a neoconservative authority on everything to do with international relations, once noted that 'I cannot forecast to you the action of China. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma'.4

For some this lack of certainty is all the more reason to keep on deciphering the China puzzle, but to me it is time to reflect on the ways China knowledge has been produced. As Karl Mannheim reminded us, when people face a bewildering array of divergent conceptions of things and situations, they need to 'turn[s] from the direct observation of things to the consideration of ways of thinking'.5 Throughout these pages, the book has sought to do just that, [end page 147] beginning with a deconstruction of the very dichotomies between things and thinking, reality and representation. It has explored a different set of issues that may come under the rubric of sociology of knowledge: How what we assume we already know about 'China' is not objective knowledge, but contingent representations; how those representations are themselves discursively constructed and worldly situated; and what implications they may have for Sino-Western relations in general and US-China relations in particular.

#### 9. “United States” DA —

#### A. Their interpretation requires us to take for granted the *existence* and *meaning* of “the United States.”

Pan 4 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Australian National University, 2004 (“The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 29, Issue 3, June/July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 305-306)

Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" [end page 305] and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt.

#### B. This reproduces the violence of American exceptionalism. So does switch-sides debating. The impact is millions of deaths.

Spanos 16 — William V. Spanos, Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Binghamton, 2016 (Written Comments Delivered at the National Debate Tournament, March 31st, Available Online at http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,6851.msg14853.html#msg14853, Accessed 07-12-2016)

I am deeply honored and gratified by this invitation by Joe S[ch]atz, the director of the Binghamton debate team, to address the national debate conference at Binghamton University this year. I wish I could be here with you in person, but since that is impossible, this indirect format will have to do,

I am honored and gratified by this invitation primarily because, despite the fact that my intellectual work has been severely critical of the protocols of debating, it has nevertheless become increasingly a presence in the debate world. And this is evidence that the old system of debate, which privileges disinterest inquiry, has been self-destructing ever since the Vietnam War and, most dramatically, in the wake of the United States' inauguration of it unending global war on terror after 9/11/01.

As I told Christopher Spurlock in the controversial interview we did a few years ago, the debate world is the major source of the American administrative and political class. I meant by this a ruling class whose thinking, despite the antagonist labels—Republican, Democrat; Conservative, Liberal—is determined by a system of argument that, as in the debate world, views the agonizing oppositions of the actual, existential, world in which we live as fundamentally equal, whereas, in obvious fact, they are always unequal. The world implied by the essential debate protocols is, as the protocol that allows debaters to switch sides makes clear, a worldless world, a world devoid of the existential differences that make a difference. The debate happens nowhere. If a debater defies this fundamental protocol in the name of this actual world, he or she is condemned as being a subverter of the democratic community. This worldless world, where, for example, the positions of whites and blacks, or men and women, or the world's minorities and the neoimperial powers have equal weight is also the worldless world of the administrative political class it largely produces.

This alienation and silencing of a voice that refuses to play by the rules of the debate system became tellingly manifest in the notorious recent case of Steven Salaita, an American of Palestinian origins, who, after being hired by the University of Illinois, was dismissed by the university president for his public criticism of the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2014 as a manifestation of criticism against the Israeli government and antisemitism, a dismissal that was also approved even by a prominent liberal Illinois professor who stated that Salieta's engaged criticism of Zionism was "uncollegial," that is, did not conform to the protocols of disinterested debate.

The United States, particularly in the post 9/11 era, has wreaked havoc in the world in name of its Exceptionalism, which, practically speaking, means the disinterested inquiry it has always privileged to oppose to totalitarianism. This havoc is especially manifested in the horrendous destabilization of the Middle East and the damaged lives of the millions of refugees its spectacular "shock and awe" military tactics produced. The topic of this year's national debate concerns the question of decreasing American military presence in the world. To me, this is not a debatable issue, one that implies the equal authority of both sides of it. And that is because, as the modern history of the planet bears incontrovertible witness, Western and, more recently, American military force has exacerbated violence rather than reduced it in that fraught part of the world. The recent terrorist attacks in Paris are exemplary of this.

This is not to say that the US should isolate itself from the urgent problems that face the globe; it is to say, that the solution will require a radically different orientation to them, one that abandons the arrogant Exceptionalism enabled by its democratic/totalitarian binary and acknowledges that it was the West's relentless imperial project in the name of its superiority that by and large produced not only the destabilization of the planet, particularly in the Middle East, but also the fanatic terrorism that a certain segment of that ravaged world has adopted to combat that Western domination. To put this negative positively — and in keeping with my initial remarks about the debate world — the US's interest resides in taking part with the global community of peoples in behalf of transforming the friend/foe or war- to-the-end mentality it has always fostered in the name of the nation state. I mean a community of identityless identities in which, as the late Edward Said put it, "'the complete consort dances together' contrapuntally." Or, in the language of the great Afro-Caribbean poet Aime Cesaire, in qhich

no race possesses the

monopoly of beauty,

of intelligence, of force, and

there is room for everyone at the

rendezvous of victory

## #2 — Space DA/CP

### Format/Explanation

Assume the Space Cooperation 1AC (below). Assume the neg read the Espionage DA and the PPWT advantage CP (also below). The neg has six minutes to extend the DA and the CP vs. the 2AC frontlines included below. Yes, the neg may choose to kick the CP.

### 1AC — Plan

#### Plan: The United States Federal Government should increase its diplomatic engagement with the People's Republic of China by offering a joint space exploration program, including removing the Wolf Amendment and increasing Mars colonization efforts.

### 1AC — Colonization Advantage

#### Contention 1 is exploration:

#### Every second we don’t colonize another planet ends 1029 future human lives – outweighs any other impact

Bostrom 3— Nick Bostrom, Nick Bostrom is a Swedish philosopher at the University of Oxford known for his work on existential risk, the anthropic principle, human enhancement ethics, superintelligence risks, the reversal test, and consequentialism. ("Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development", Utilitas, 2003, Available Online at http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

As I write these words, suns are illuminating and heating empty rooms, unused energy is being flushed down black holes, and our great common endowment of negentropy is being irreversibly degraded into entropy on a cosmic scale. These are resources that an advanced civilization could have used to create value-structures, such as sentient beings living worthwhile lives.

The rate of this loss boggles the mind. One recent paper speculates, using loose theoretical considerations based on the rate of increase of entropy, that the loss of potential human lives in our own galactic supercluster is at least ~10^46 per century of delayed colonization.[1] This estimate assumes that all the lost entropy could have been used for productive purposes, although no currently known technological mechanisms are even remotely capable of doing that. Since the estimate is meant to be a lower bound, this radically unconservative assumption is undesirable.

We can, however, get a lower bound more straightforwardly by simply counting the number or stars in our galactic supercluster and multiplying this number with the amount of computing power that the resources of each star could be used to generate using technologies for whose feasibility a strong case has already been made. We can then divide this total with the estimated amount of computing power needed to simulate one human life.

As a rough approximation, let us say the Virgo Supercluster contains 10^13 stars. One estimate of the computing power extractable from a star and with an associated planet-sized computational structure, using advanced molecular nanotechnology[2], is 10^42 operations per second.[3] A typical estimate of the human brain’s processing power is roughly 10^17 operations per second or less.[4] Not much more seems to be needed to simulate the relevant parts of the environment in sufficient detail to enable the simulated minds to have experiences indistinguishable from typical current human experiences.[5] Given these estimates, it follows that the potential for approximately 10^38 human lives is lost every century that colonization of our local supercluster is delayed; or equivalently, about 10^29 potential human lives per second.

While this estimate is conservative in that it assumes only computational mechanisms whose implementation has been at least outlined in the literature, it is useful to have an even more conservative estimate that does not assume a non-biological instantiation of the potential persons. Suppose that about 10^10 biological humans could be sustained around an average star. Then the Virgo Supercluster could contain 10^23 biological humans. This corresponds to a loss of potential equal to about 10^14 potential human lives per second of delayed colonization.

What matters for present purposes is not the exact numbers but the fact that they are huge. Even with the most conservative estimate, assuming a biological implementation of all persons, the potential for one hundred trillion potential human beings is lost for every second of postponement of colonization of our supercluster.[6]

#### Mars colonization is possible – resources and power generation

Zubrin 11 — Robert Zubrin, Robert Zubrin is President of Pioneer Astronautics, an aerospace R&D company located in Lakewood, Colorado. He is also the founder and President of the Mars Society, an international organization dedicated to furthering the exploration and settlement of Mars by both public and private means. Formerly a Staff Engineer at Lockheed Martin Astronautics in Denver, he holds a Masters degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington. ("Victory From Mars", Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, 3-7-2011, Available Online at https://books.google.com/books?id=fF8Lql4ZTqYC, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

Among extraterrestrial bodies in our solar system, Mars is singular in that it possesses all the raw materials required to support not only life, but also a new branch of human civilization. This uniqueness is illustrated most clearly if Mars is contrasted with the Earth's Moon, the most frequently cited alternative location for extraterrestrial human colonization.

Unlike the Moon, Mars is rich in carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen, all in biologically readily accessible forms such as carbon dioxide gas, nitrogen gas, water ice, and permafrost.2 Carbon, nitrogen, and hydrogen are only present on the Moon in parts per million quantities. Oxygen is abundant on the Moon, but only in tightly bound oxides such as silicon dioxide, ferrous oxide, magnesium oxide, and alumina oxide, which require very high-energy processes to reduce.' Current knowledge indicates that if Mars were smooth and all its ice and permafrost melted into liquid water, the entire planet would be covered with an ocean over 200 meters deep.' This scenario contrasts strongly with the Moon, which is so dry that if concrete were found there, lunar colonists would mine it to get the water out. Thus, if plants could be grown in greenhouses on the Moon (an unlikely proposition, as the Moon's 2-week-long dark spell is unsuitable for most plants, and the absence of any atmosphere would make necessary very thick glass for solar flare shielding), most of their biomass material would have to be imported.

The Moon is also deficient in about half the metals of interest to industrial society (copper, for example), as well as many other elements of interest such as sulfur and phosphorus. Mars has every required element in abundance. Moreover, on Mars, as on Earth, hydrologic and volcanic processes have occurred that are likely to have consolidated various elements into local concentrations of high-grade mineral ore. Indeed, the geologic history of Mars has been compared to that of Africa, with very optimistic inferences as to its mineral wealth implied as a corollary.' In contrast, the Moon has almost no history of water or volcanic action, with the result that it is basically composed of trash rocks with little differentiation into ores that represent useful concentrations of anything interesting.

Power could be generated on either the Moon or Mars with solar panels, and here the advantages of the Moon's clearer skies and closer proximity to the Sun than Mars roughly balance the disadvantage of large energy storage requirements created by the Moon's 28-day light/dark cycle. But if the desire was to manufacture solar panels so as to create a self-expanding power base, Mars holds an enormous advantage, as only Mars possesses the large supplies of carbon and hydrogen needed to produce the pure silicon required for making photovoltaic panels and other electronics. Also, there is no geologically purified source of silicon dioxide, such as sand, on the Moon. In addition, Mars has the potential for wind-generated power, while the Moon clearly does not. But both the Sun and wind offer relatively modest power potential—tens or at most hundreds of kilowatts here or there. To create a vibrant civilization, a richer power base is needed, and Mars has this both in the short and medium term in the form of its geothermal power resources, which offer the potential for large numbers of locally created electricity-generating stations in the 10 megawatt (10,000 kilowatt) class. In the long term, Mars will enjoy a power-rich economy based upon exploitation of its large domestic resources of deuterium fuel for fusion reactors. Deuterium is five times more common on Mars than it is on Earth, and tens of thousands of times more common on Mars than on the Moon.'

But the biggest problem with the Moon, as with all other airless planetary bodies and proposed artificial free-space colonies, is that sunlight is not available in a form useful for growing crops. A single acre of plants on Earth requires 4 megawatts (MW) of sunlight power; a square kilometer needs 1,000 MW. The entire world put together would not produce enough electric power to illuminate the farms of the state of Rhode Island. Growing crops with electrically generated light is economically hopeless. But natural sunlight cannot be used on the Moon or any other airless body in space unless the walls on the greenhouse are thick enough to shield out solar flares, a requirement that enormously increases the expense of creating crop land. Even accomplishing this requirement would do no good on the Moon, because plants will not grow in a light/dark cycle lasting 28 days.

But Mars has an atmosphere thick enough to protect crops grown on the surface from solar flares. Therefore, thin-walled inflatable plastic greenhouses protected by unpressurized ultraviolet-resistant hard-plastic shield domes can be used to rapidly create crop land on the surface. Even without the problems of solar flares and a month-long diurnal cycle, such simple greenhouses would be impractical on the Moon as they would create unbearably high temperatures. On Mars, in contrast, the strong greenhouse effect created by such domes would be precisely what is necessary to produce a temperate climate inside. Such domes up to 50 meters in diameter are light enough to be transported from Earth initially, and they eventually could be manufactured on Mars out of indigenous materials. Because all the resources to make plastics exist on Mars, networks of such 50- to 100-meter domes could be manufactured and deployed rapidly, opening up large areas of the surface to both shirtsleeve human habitation and agriculture. Looking further into the future, it will eventually be possible for humans to thicken Mars' atmosphere substantially by forcing the regolith to outgas its contents through a deliberate program of artificially induced global warming. Once that has been accomplished, the habitation domes could be almost any size, as they would not have to sustain a pressure differential between their interior and exterior. In fact, once that has been done, it will be possible to raise specially bred crops outside the domes.

The point is that unlike colonists on any other known extraterrestrial body, Martian colonists will be able to live on the surface, not in tunnels, and move about freely and grow crops in the light of day. Mars is a place where humans can live and multiply to large numbers, supporting themselves with products of every description made out of indigenous materials. Mars is thus a place where an actual civilization, not just a mining or scientific outpost, can be developed. And it is this civilization, grown in size and technological potency on a frontier planet with a surface area as large as all the continents of Earth put together, that will both radically tip the balance among those who remain behind on Earth and provide the pioneers with the craft and outlook required to push the human reach much further.

Thus, for our generation and those soon to follow, Mars is the new world. The nation that settles it is one whose culture, values, social forms, and ideas will provide the point of departure for the further development of human civilization as our species expands outward from its planet of origin to the innumerable others awaiting us in the infinite reaches of space.

#### Humans will be able to survive—terraforming creates access to frozen water, we can alter the soil to grow food, and spacesuits help avoid radiation poisoning

Williams 14 (Matt, is a frequent author for the website universetoday.com. http://www.universetoday.com/111462/how-can-we-live-on-mars/#//MTB)

In order to survive the lack of air pressure and the cold, humans will need pressurized and heated habitats. Martians, the terrestrial kind, will also need a spacesuit whenever they go outside. Every hour they spend outside will add to their radiation exposure, not to mention all the complications that exposure to radiation brings. For the long term, we’ll need to figure out how to extract water from underground supplies, and use that to generate breathable air and rocket fuel. And once we’ve reduced the risk of suffocation or dying of dehydration, we’ll need to consider food sources, as we’ll be outside the delivery area of everyone except Planet Express. Care packages could be shipped up from Earth, but that’s going to come with a hefty price tag. We’ll need to produce our own food too, since we can’t possible hope to ship it all in on a regular basis. Interestingly, although toxic, Martian soil can be used to grow plants once you supplement it and remove some of the harsher chemicals. NASA’s extensive experience in hydroponics will help. To thrive on Mars, the brave adventurers may want to change themselves, or possibly their offspring. This could lead to genetic engineering to help future generations adapt to the low gravity, higher radiation and lower air pressure. And why stop at humans? Human colonists could also adapt their plants and animals to live there as well. Finally, to take things to the next level, humanity could make a few planetary renovations. Basically, we could change Mars itself through the process of terraforming. To do this, we’ll need to release megatons of greenhouse gasses to warm the planet, unleashing the frozen water reserves.

#### International cooperation is key to exploration and China will say yes

China Daily 4-25 (Chinese national newspaper, "China open to Sino-US space cooperation", China Daily, 4/25/2016, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-04/25/content\_24814214.htm)

BEIJING -- China is open to space cooperation with all nations including the United States, the heavyweights of China's space program said on Sunday, the anniversary of China's first satellite launch 46 years ago.¶ "China will not rule out cooperating with any country, and that includes the United States," said Yang Liwei, China's first astronaut.¶ Payload has been reserved in the Chinese space station, due to enter service around 2022, for international projects and foreign astronauts, said Yang on the occasion of the first China Space Day, an annual celebration newly designated by the government.¶ Upon request, China will also train astronauts for other countries, and jointly train astronauts with the European space station, Yang said.¶ "The future of space exploration lies in international cooperation. It's true for us, and for the United States too," according to the senior astronaut.¶ His words were echoed by Zhou Jianping, chief engineer of China's manned space program. Zhou said, "It is well understood that the United States is a global leader in space technology. But China is no less ambitious in contributing to human development."¶ "Cooperation between major space players will be conducive to the development of all mankind," Zhou added.¶ Citing security reasons, the U.S. Congress passed a law in 2011 to prohibit NASA from hosting Chinese visitors at its facilities and working with researchers affiliated to any Chinese government entity or enterprise.¶ The ban remains in effect.¶ The U.S.-dominated International Space Station, which unsurprisingly blocks China, is scheduled to end its service in 2024. China's space station could be the only operational one in outer space, at least for a while.¶ Commenting on Sino-U.S. space relations earlier this week, Xu Dazhe, the head of China's National Space Administration, cites Hollywood sci-fi blockbuster "The Martian," in which a U.S. astronaut gets stranded on Mars and is eventually brought back to Earth by NASA, with help from China.¶ Xu Dazhe noted that China and the United States established a special dialogue mechanism last year and talks would continue this year.¶ For chief engineer Zhou, the movie simply reflects what most people want. "Many American astronauts and scientists that I have met said they would like to work with us, if given the freedom of choice."¶ The China Space Day was designated to mark the launch of China's first satellite on April 24, 1970.

#### China is crucial – other international cooperation already exists but Chinese capabilities offer the missing piece of the puzzle

NRC 14 (other authors: Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board; Space Studies Board; Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences; Committee on National Statistics; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Committee on Human Spaceflight; "Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration", http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18801/pathways-to-exploration-rationales-and-approaches-for-a-us-program)

International collaboration has become an integral part of the space policy of essentially all nations that participate in space activities around the world. Most countries now rarely initiate and carry out substantial space projects without some foreign participation. The reasons for collaboration are multiple, but countries, including the United States, cooperate principally when they benefit from it.¶ It is evident that near-term U.S. goals for human exploration are not aligned with those of our traditional international partners. Although most major spacefaring nations and agencies are looking toward the Moon, specifically the lunar surface, U.S. plans are focused on redirection of an asteroid into a retrograde lunar orbit where astronauts would conduct operations with it. It is also evident that given the rapid development of China’s capabilities in space, it is in the best interests of the United States to be open to its inclusion in future international partnerships. In particular, current federal law that prevents NASA from participating in bilateral activities with the Chinese serves only to hinder U.S. ability to bring China into its sphere of international partnerships and substantially reduces the potential international capability that might be pooled to reach Mars. Also, given the scale of the endeavor of a mission to Mars, contributions by international partners would have to be of unprecedented magnitude to defray a significant portion of the cost. This assessment follows from the detailed discussion in Chapter 4 of what is required for human missions to Mars.

#### Even if cooperation with other countries *could* be good, bans on US-China cooperation causes a focus on copycat research that collapses the budget and stunts innovation to get to space – the plan enables a new generation of tech to get to Mars

Dickerson 15 “Here's why NASA won't work with China to explore space” Kelly Dickerson - science reporter at Tech Insider, covering space and physics. graduated from the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism with an M.A. in science and health reporting. B.S. degree in biology and a B.A. degree in communication from Berry College. previously written for Live Science, Space.com, and Psychology Today, Oct. 19, 2015, http://www.techinsider.io/nasa-china-collaboration-illegal-2015-10

NASA could have much to gain in the future in working with China. China became the third country ever to successfully launch humans into space, behind Russia and the US, and it's made much progress since. Two years ago, CNSA landed a small telescope on the moon, which is still up there taking crystal-clear images of the cosmos (because Earth's dirty atmosphere isn't in the way). The agency also operates its own space lab called Tiangong 1, is testing powerful new rockets, and has ambitious plans to land more probes on the moon and perhaps a colony there one day. If CNSA's progress in space exploration and tech development isn't a compelling enough reason to work with China, then NASA's stunted budget offers another. More international collaboration could only be positive for a space agency that has faced budget cut after budget cut. President John F. Kennedy committed to a moon landing by the end of the 1960s, then Nixon took the helm and slammed on the brakes after a handful of crewed lunar missions. As Logsdon writes in an article for NASA: "Nixon rejected NASA's ambitious post-Apollo plans, which included developing a series of large space stations, continued missions to the moon, and an initial mission to Mars in the 1980s," Logsdon writes. "By the time Nixon left the White House, the NASA budget had fallen from its peak of almost 4% of the total federal budget to less than 1%." Some argue that we would already have sent humans to Mars if NASA had kept its momentum. More collaboration could help get NASA back on track. NASA administrator Charles Bolden event wrote in a recent blog post that he thinks more collaboration will help get us get boots on Mars: A Journey such as this is something that no one person, crew, or Agency can undertake alone. [...] A mission of this magnitude is made stronger with international partnership – the sort of spirit and cooperation that is demonstrated so vividly by the tens of thousands of people across 15 countries who have been involved in the development and operation of the International Space Station. In fact, NASA just announced a partnership with the Israel Space Agency that will allow the two agencies to conduct joint missions and share research facilities. I personally think it would be great to see a similar agreement with China some day soon — especially since the nation announced it's seeking international partners to help build another space station in the 2020s (and the station sounds really cool). But again, current US law forbids NASA from helping out or getting involved at all. Russia will only support the $100 billion space station until 2024, and that's a huge problem because, right now, NASA relies on Russia's rockets to get its astronauts into space. It's unclear what NASA will do once Russia pulls out. Working with China and other nations to build a bigger and better space station would be a great option. Instead of two space stations, we could have one truly international station with the most brilliant scientists around the world working together. That kind of collaboration would speed up tech development; instead of space stations just copying each other's rockets and space probes, we could start working together to advance technology at a much faster pace than we are right now. We'll need a new generation of space tech if we ever hope to get to Mars. It already seems like the two agencies do want to collaborate, since discussion of that possibility has reached the White House several times. US scientists have also openly criticized policy makers in the past for preventing Chinese scientists from attending space conferences. It seems like politics shouldn't get in the way of pure scientific pursuit, but the reality is US lawmakers won't allow collaboration with China because they are worried about national security and protecting state secrets. But who knows, if the two space agencies started working together, it might open up enough lines of communication between the US and China for the two nations to defrost their icy relationship. In the meantime China will continue to expand its space exploration efforts. Unless a big policy shift happens, NASA might have to sit on the sidelines while an incredible new chapter of space exploration begins.

#### Other countries say no or are insufficient – Chinese cooperation causes international follow on

Tiezzi 14 (June 5, 2014; Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum; “Report: To Reach Mars, NASA Must Work With China”; <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/report-to-reach-mars-nasa-must-work-with-china/> )

The U.S. space program should seek to expand its cooperation with China, a new report has found. The report by the National Research Council, titled “Pathways to Exploration – Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration,” laid out recommendations for the future of U.S. space agency NASA. Congress ordered the report in 2010; the results of the four-year investigation were released Wednesday. NASA is banned from cooperating with China on projects under a 2011 appropriations law that states: None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act. The ban reflects congressional unease about high-tech cooperation with China in any field. There are also restrictions limiting the extent of mil-to-mil cooperation with China as well as a ban on certain high-tech exports. Frank Wolf, the Representative behind the anti-China clause, explained his reasoning. “We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them,” he said back in 2011. He also cited moral concerns over working with the Chinese government: “Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin?” Scientists, however, have been far less supportive of the ban. Last October, when it came to light that Chinese scientists had been banned from attending a NASA conference, the news sparked outrage and boycotts among American scientists. Geoff Marcy, a U.S. scientist considered to have been on the short-list for the 2013 Nobel Prize in physics, called the ban “completely shameful and unethical.” NASA eventually backtracked and re-invited the Chinese scientists, in part after Rep. Wolf said that NASA was not prohibited by law from interacting with individual Chinese citizens. Though Wolf argued the law had been misinterpreted, he stood firm behind the blanket ban on cooperation between NASA and Chinese government entities. However, the backlash over the conference drew new attention to the ban, with many speaking out against it. Since then, there have been signs NASA is seeking a change. And such a change may be possible: with Rep. Wolf announcing he will not seek reelection this year, the ban on NASA-China cooperation will lose its strongest supporter. In January, officials from China’s National Space Administration were included in an international meeting hosted by the U.S. State Department. Because funding was provided by State, not NASA, it did not violate the 2011 law. The meeting was a rare opportunity for U.S. and Chinese officials to talk about potential space cooperation. Still, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden cautioned against too much optimism: “Human spaceflight is not something that’s going to happen with [the] U.S. [and] China in the foreseeable future, because we are forbidden from doing that by law,” he reminded reporters. Now, the NRC’s report officially calls for a reexamination of the 2011 ban. “This policy, while driven by congressional sentiment, denies the U.S. partnership with a nation that will probably be capable of making truly significant contributions to international collaborative missions,” the report said. “Given the rapid development of China’s capabilities in space, it is in the best interests of the United States to be open to its inclusion in future international partnerships,” it continued. The report also recommended that NASA turn its focus to sending a manned mission to Mars, calling the red planet “the horizon goal for human space exploration.” Yet the NRC cautioned that this goal could not be reached without more extensive international cooperation. “We’re really talking about international collaboration of a different scale than what has been conducted in the past,” Jonathan Lunine, co-chair of the NRC panel, told reporters. Even while the NRC highlighted the need for international efforts, Russia is drastically scaling back its space cooperation with the U.S. in response to Western sanctions stemming from the Ukraine crisis. Russia has announced that it will withdraw from the International Space Station in 2020, and will cease selling the RD-180 engine that currently powers the U.S. Atlas 5 rocket. With Russia withdrawing (at least temporarily) from space cooperation with the U.S., cooperation with China becomes all the more vital. “Current federal law preventing NASA from participating in bilateral activities with the Chinese … reduces substantially the potential international capability that might be pooled to reach Mars,” the report found.

### 1AC — Multilateralism Advantage

#### Contention 2 is Multilateralism:

#### The Wolf Amendment stalls international cooperation in space—prevents any bilateral cooperation with China

Kohler 15 (Hannah Kohler, Research Assistant, Edward Bennett Williams Law Library at Georgetown University Law Center, March 2015, “The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.–Chinese Relations, the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of International Cooperation in Space,” [http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf //](http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf%20//) MH)

Although the 2011–2013 Wolf Amendments severely constricted NASA’s ability to interact with other spacefaring nations (there are so few, after all), at the very least their application evinced careful consideration of a policy balance between national security, morality, international cooperation, and practicality. That may have changed in 2014. Public Law 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2014 (2014 Appropriations Act), was signed by the President in January 2014 113 and contained a slight deviation from the core text of its three predecessors—a change so seemingly insignificant that it might not seem worth the effort to mention it. However, the potential repercussions are staggering. The relevant text in Sections 532(a), (c), and (d) is identical to Sections 535(a), (c) and (d) in the 2013 Appropriations Act. 114 However, the newly amended Section 532(b) states that “ [n]one of the funds made available by this Act may be used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by NASA.” 115 Considering that the annual appropriations act dictates the spending of NASA’s entire governmental budget, this change appears to categorically bar official Chinese visitors from NASA facilities (or even facilities “used” by NASA!) where any government-granted money is involved, whether the forum is a bilateral one or not. This could reasonably be read to exclude Chinese citizens from all multinational conventions or events with NASA, unless the events could be certified by the House Appropriations Committee as posing no national- or economic-security risk; that is, the 2014 Appropriations Act could conceivably be enacting the very restrictions that Congressman Wolf protested so vehemently in the wake of the 2013 Ames Conference debacle.

#### Absent a change in law, a space race is inevitable

Weeden and He 4/26 (Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation, and Xiao He, Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 4/26/16, “Use Outer Space to Strengthen U.S.-China Ties,” <http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/> // MH)

The United States and China have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national interests and development. Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as either a source of instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship. The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S. — and the global — economy. China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power. From China’s perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions — particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on “active defense” have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression., Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities. Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the United States and China should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges.

#### No tech sharing DA – cooperation is mutually beneficial and builds trust

Listner and Johnson-Freese 14 (Michael, is a an attorney and the founder and principal of Space Law & Policy Solutions, a legal and policy think tank that identifies issues and offers practical solutions on matters related to outer space security, national security and outer space development, and Joan is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. //MTB)

The National Research Council (NRC) recently released a report on the future of U.S. human spaceflight. Besides advocating a Mars mission the report also advocated pursuing more international collaboration, specifically to include China. That would require a distinct change in U.S. policy. There will likely be resistance to that recommendation from the small but powerful congressional enclave behind the legislatively imposed restrictions on U.S-Sino cooperation since 2011. But the realist approach advocated by the NRC report has a much better chance of serving U.S. security interests than the current ineffectual policy that attempts to isolate and “punish” China for domestic policies. President Barack Obama met with then-Chinese President Hu Jintao in January 2011. Part of their joint statement addressed the desire for deepened dialogue and interaction in space, which many people interpreted as a new willingness on the part of the United States to work with China, perhaps leading to a cooperative program. U.S.-Sino relations had basically been moribund since the sensationalist 1999 Cox Committee report alleging theft of information on American thermonuclear weapons and transfer of sensitive missile technology by profit-hungry American aerospace companies. Though nonpoliticized analysis from experts at institutions such as Stanford University largely discredited the report, congressional caterwauling successfully pushed the United States into the impossible position of trying to isolate Chinese space activities in a globalized world, and ended up primarily hurting U.S. aerospace companies through the draconian export control measures issued consequent to the Cox Committee report. But cooperation was not to be. In April 2011, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee overseeing NASA and a long-time China hardliner, especially regarding freedom of religion issues, inserted two sentences into funding legislation that prohibits any joint scientific activity between the United States and China that involves NASA or is coordinated by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). That legislation has endured. NASA and OSTP remain banned from bilateral activity with China. Though Wolf is retiring in January 2015, speculation regarding potential successors includes individuals with views similar to his. Wolf’s rationale for banning bilateral U.S.-China relations, given in a 2011 interview, includes three key points. “We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them,” Wolf said. “And frankly, it boils down to a moral issue. … Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin?” The three assumptions in that statement are, quite simply, wrong, and counterproductive to U.S. interests. First, it assumes that working with the United States would give China opportunities not otherwise available and implies that the United States would be doing China a favor. Though China has wanted to participate on the international space station program and was banned from doing so by the United States, it will have its own space station soon. In fact, when China’s space station becomes operational around 2022, it could quickly become the de facto international space station, given that the ISS is currently funded only through 2024, and that China has already invited other countries to visit its facility. In terms of the U.S. doing China a favor, Chinese politicians are still interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons, specifically, being accepted as part of the international family of spacefaring nations. But many Chinese space professionals fear that cooperation with the United States would just slow them down. American politicians are viewed as fickle and without the political will to see programs to completion, a view not exclusive to China. Further, other countries, including U.S. allies, regularly work with and sell aerospace technology to China. China has not been isolated. Second, Wolf’s rationale assumes the United States has nothing to gain by working with the Chinese. On the contrary, the United States could learn about how they work — their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating procedures. This is valuable information in accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S. analysis. Working together on an actual project where people confront and solve problems together, perhaps beginning with a space science or space debris project where both parties can contribute something of value, builds trust on both sides, trust that is currently severely lacking. It also allows each side to understand the other’s cultural proclivities, reasoning and institutional constraints with minimal risk of technology sharing. From a practical perspective, working with China could diversify U.S. options for reaching the ISS. The need for diversification has become painfully apparent consequent to Vladimir Putin’s expansionist actions in Ukraine resulting in U.S. sanctions. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin subsequently stated, “I propose that the United States delivers its astronauts to the ISS with the help of a trampoline.” And finally, Wolf stated that the United States should not work with China based on moral grounds. While clearly the United States would prefer not to work with authoritarian regimes, it has done so in war and in peacetime when it has served American interests. That is the basis of realism: Serve American interests first. While the United States would prefer not to work with Stalin, we continue to work with Putin when it benefits us to do so. Were the U.S. not to work with authoritarian regimes, it would have few to work with at all in the Middle East. We live in a globalized world. Attempting to isolate Chinese space activities has proved futile, and in fact pushed China and other countries into developing indigenous space industries — totally beyond any U.S. control — that they might have done otherwise. High fences around areas of technology where the United States has a monopoly — and there are few of those left — combined with a realist approach to working with China when and were we can, will allow the U.S. to lead rather futilely playing whack-a-mole, trying to beat back anticipated Chinese space achievements.

#### That ban creates a space rivalry – cooperation leads to a space code of conduct that solves war and space debris

Zhao 14 (Zhao Weibin, Research Fellow for the Center on China-America Defense Relations (CCADR) at the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), 7/9/14, “Sino-US Competition and Cooperation in Outer Space,” <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/sino-us-competition-and-cooperation-in-outer-space/> // MH)

Unfortunately, there is competition between China and the U.S. in outer space at the legal, military and diplomatic levels. At the legal level, negotiation and bargaining on the establishment of an international code of conduct to govern behavior in space is now the focus of Sino-U.S. competition. In February 2008, China and Russia proposed a draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT). The EU has also put forward three versions of a code of conduct for behavior in space. For fear of restrictions and concessions on military uses of space, the U.S. has refused to accept both the EU and the China-Russia versions. At the military level, control and the ability to counter control space will be the key to future Sino-U.S. confrontation. In the 14 versions of U.S. DoD annual reports on China’s military strength, the U.S. DoD has maintained consistent concern over the PLA’s space and counter-space capabilities. As mentioned in the Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations released on May 29, 2013, the U.S. has decided to negate adversary space capabilities through deception, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction, thus targeting an adversary’s space-related capabilities and forces by use of both lethal and nonlethal means. At the diplomatic level, winning international support is the hot point of Sino-U.S. competition. Due to U.S. obstruction, China now can only have limited international exchanges and cooperation on space technologies and activities. Nevertheless, both China and the U.S. can gain benefits from space cooperation. For example, joint promotion of establishing a fair and reasonable space code of conduct can guarantee the peaceful, stable and sustainable development of outer space. Both countries should join hands to deal with common threats such as space debris. Furthermore, against the background of a U.S. rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, space cooperation can help reduce suspicion, increase trust, and maintain strategic stability between the two countries. Possible areas for Sino-U.S. space cooperation may include an invitation by the U.S. for China to join efforts in international space exploration (as suggested by the NRC report), the sharing of space situation awareness (SSA) information, relief of a space technology blockade against China, establishing crisis management mechanisms to guard against miscalculations, as well as the beginning of bilateral and multilateral dialogues on sensitive issues such as space weaponization.

#### Space debris causes miscalculation and escalates to nuclear war

**Tyson 7** — Program Officer of the Global Security Institute (Rhianna, “Advancing a Cooperative Security Regime in Outer Space”, Global Security Institute, May 2007, [http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/05\_07\_space\_brief.pdf)](http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/05_07_space_brief.pdf)" \t "_blank)

Threats to space assets grow with our ever-increasing uses of outer space. At present, there are over 800 commercially used satellites in orbit.2 Orbital paths are further cluttered by deserted spacecraft, discarded rocket debris and other “space junk” shed from hardware. A piece of space debris, with an average impact speed of 36,000 kilometers per hour,3 could destroy a satellite. While a collision of two operating satellites is predictable (yet nonetheless worrisome), the overcrowding of orbital paths heightens the risk of radio frequency interference, causing harmful disruptions in communication. Beyond the severe economic repercussions resulting from disrupted commercial satellite communications, hostile actions in space can result in grave security threats, especially in times of war. Militaries rely on satellites for monitoring of and communication with troops on the ground. If a military satellite was deceived, disrupted, denied, degraded or destroyed, commanders lose their communication capabilities, resulting in mounting tensions and an escalation of conflict. A worst-case scenario could involve inadvertent use of nuclear weapons; without satellite-enabled monitoring capability in a time of tension, or, if early warning systems give a false reading of an attack, governments may resort to using nuclear weapons.

#### Anti-satellite attacks inevitable without cooperation—that causes nuclear retaliation and collapses power projection—testing is sufficient to trigger our impacts

Gallagher 15 “Antisatellite warfare without nuclear risk: A mirage,” Nancy, interim director of the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland, previous Executive Director of the Clinton Administration’s CTBT Treaty Committee, an arms control specialist at the State Dept., and a faculty member at Wesleyan, May 29, 2015, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, <http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346> \*modified

In recent decades, however, as space-based reconnaissance, communication, and targeting capabilities have become integral elements of modern military operations, strategists and policy makers have explored whether carrying out antisatellite attacks could confer major military advantages without increasing the risk of nuclear war. In theory, the answer might be yes. In practice, it is almost certainly no. Hyping threats. No country has ever deliberately and destructively attacked a satellite belonging to another country (though nations have sometimes interfered with satellites' radio transmissions). But the United States, Russia, and China have all tested advanced kinetic antisatellite weapons, and the United States has demonstrated that it can modify a missile-defense interceptor for use in antisatellite mode. Any nation that can launch nuclear weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles has the latent capability to attack satellites in low Earth orbit. Because the United States depends heavily on space for its terrestrial military superiority, some US strategists have predicted that potential adversaries will try to neutralize US advantages by attacking satellites. They have also recommended that the US military do everything it can to protect its own space assets while maintaining a capability to disable or destroy satellites that adversaries use for intelligence, communication, navigation, or targeting. Analysis of this sort often exaggerates both potential adversaries’ ability to destroy US space assets and the military advantages that either side would gain from antisatellite attacks. Nonetheless, some observers are once again advancing worst-case scenarios to support arguments for offensive counterspace capabilities. In some other countries, interest in space warfare may be increasing because of these arguments. If any nation, for whatever reason, launched an attack on a second nation's satellites, nuclear retaliation against terrestrial targets would be [the] an irrational response. But powerful countries do sometimes respond irrationally when attacked. Moreover, disproportionate retaliation following a deliberate antisatellite attack is not the only way in which antisatellite weapons could contribute to nuclear war. It is not even the likeliest way. As was clearly understood by the countries that negotiated the Outer Space Treaty, crisis management would become more difficult, and the risk of inadvertent deterrence failure would increase, if satellites used for reconnaissance and communication were disabled or destroyed. But even if the norm against attacking another country’s satellites is never broken, developing and testing antisatellite weapons still increase the risk of nuclear war. If, for instance, US military leaders became seriously concerned that China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack, pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack against Chinese or Russian strategic forces. Should a satellite be struck by a piece of space debris during a crisis or a low-level terrestrial conflict, leaders might mistakenly assume that a space war had begun and retaliate before they knew what had actually happened. Such scenarios may seem improbable, but they are no more implausible than the scenarios that are used to justify the development and use of antisatellite weapons.

### 1NC — Espionage DA

#### Current ban on Sino-American space research prevents espionage

Dickerson ’15 (Kelly Dickerson was a science reporter for Tech Insider, covering space and physics news. “Here's why NASA won't work with China to explore space,” Tech Insider, 19 Oct 2015, http://www.techinsider.io/nasa-china-collaboration-illegal-2015-10 – SY)

The reason is because, in 2011, Congress passed a spending bill that expressly forbids NASA from working with China, citing a high risk of espionage.¶ What's more, it doesn't sound like the attitudes of US lawmakers toward the People's Republic of China are changing anytime soon.¶ A 2015 report from the University of California called "China Dream, Space Dream" concludes that: "China's efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership and has serious implications for U.S. interests."¶ It will take a big policy shift to change that sentiment and foster collaboration between NASA and the China National Space Administration (CNSA).¶ One of the biggest collaborative projects in which NASA is involved is the International Space Station (ISS). It's a space station built and maintained by the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, and Canada.¶ China, however, is banned from involvement in the ISS, thanks to US lawmakers.¶ But CNSA seems to be doing just fine on its own. Since its founding in 1993, the Chinese space agency has launched 10 people and a small space station into orbit, among other missions.

#### China is lagging behind the US in space power – espionage allows it to get ahead and kill US hegemony

Pollpeter et al 15 [Kevin Pollpeter¶ Eric Anderson¶ Jordan Wilson¶ Fan Yang; A report prepared for theU.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; Monday, March 2, 2015; China Dream, Space Dream¶ China’s Progress in Space Technologies¶ and Implications for the United States; http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream\_Report.pdf//TPB]

China’s position in the world has been evolving. It seeks increased influence and independence from¶ foreign powers with the ultimate goal of preserving China’s sovereignty, independence, territorial¶ integrity, and political system. Over the long term, China seeks to transform the international system to¶ better suit its interests, but seeks to integrate itself into the existing international system over the short¶ term with the goal of reshaping the Asia-Pacific political environment into one in which its interests must¶ be given greater attention.¶ China’s pursuit of space power is intended to support this strategy. China views the development of space¶ power as a necessary move for a country that wants to strengthen its national power. Indeed, China’s goal¶ is to become a space power on par with the United States and to foster a space industry that is the equal¶ of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia. China takes a comprehensive, long-term approach to¶ this goal that emphasizes the accrual of the military, economic, and political benefits space can provide.¶ By placing much of its space program in a 15-year development program and providing ample funding,¶ the Chinese government provides a stable environment in which its space program can prosper. Although¶ China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent¶ of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive¶ as the United States is in space.¶ For China’s military, the use of space power can facilitate long-range strikes, guide munitions with¶ precision, improve connectivity, and lead to greater jointness across its armed forces. Economically, space¶ technologies can create markets for new technologies and result in “spin-off” technologies for commercial¶ uses that will make its industry more competitive. Politically, space power provides “carrots and sticks”¶ that China can use to influence the international situation. Internally, China’s rise as a space power is¶ designed to demonstrate to the Chinese people that the Chinese Communist Party is the best organization¶ to lead the country.¶ In examining China’s use of its space program to advance its national security, economic, and diplomatic¶ interests, this study finds that China has made much progress, particularly in serving its national security¶ interests, but that its goals of using space to advance its economic and diplomatic interests remain¶ underdeveloped. As a result, China is a “partial space power”; that is, a global actor that has yet to¶ translate its power into comprehensive influence.¶ This conclusion should not be unexpected, however. China is a latecomer as a serious space power.¶ China’s rapid progress in space technology, although impressive, is also the result of starting from a low¶ base and a reliance on the pioneering work of the United States and Russia. The United States remains¶ the world’s leading space power, and Chinese space technologies still lag behind the United States.¶ Nevertheless, China’s efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and¶ technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership and has serious implications for U.S.¶ interests. Even if U.S. space power continues to improve in absolute terms, China’s rapid advance in space¶ technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. At its current trajectory,¶ China’s space program, even if not the equal of the U.S. space program, will at some point be good enough¶ to adequately support modern military operations, compete commercially, and deliver political gains that¶ will serve its broader strategic interest of again being a major power more in control of its own destiny.

#### Leads to a domino effect ending in the apocalypse

Andrea E. **Varisco 13**, Ph.D. candidate at the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit of the University of York, holds a Master in International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies specialisation from the Australian National University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo and a Master in Politics and Comparative Institutions from the University of Milano, 6/3/13, “Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/>

A return to multi-polarity will therefore imply more instability among great powers. But great power rivalry will not be the only source of possible instability for the future multi-polar world. The current distribution of power allows not only great powers but also middle, small powers and non-state actors to have military capabilities that could threaten the global security. In particular, the presence of nuclear weapons constitutes a further reason of concern and implies that the future world could carry not only the potential instability of multi-polarity and great powers rivalry, but also the dangers entailed in nuclear proliferation. The future multi-polar world will thus be potentially more unstable than all the other multi-polar periods history has experienced until nowadays: for the first time in history, the world could become both multi-polar and nuclear. While some scholars argue that nuclear deterrence “could reduce the war-proneness of the coming multi-polar system” (Layne, 44-45), the majority of them consider the presence of nuclear weapons as a source of instability (McNamara; Rosen; Allison). In particular, regional powers and states that are not great powers armed with nuclear capabilities could represent a cause of concern for global security. A nuclear Iran could for example attack – or be attacked – by Israel and easily involve in this war the rest of the world (Sultan; Huntley). A war between Pakistan and India, both nuclear states, could result in an Armageddon for the whole Asia. An attack from the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) on Japan or South Korea will trigger an immediate reaction from the US and “a nuclear proliferation ‘domino effect’ in East Asia” (Huntley, 725). Terrorists armed with nuclear weapons could wreak havoc and target the heart of the most powerful countries of the world (Bunn and Wier). Iran, Pakistan, DPRK, terrorist groups will rarely be great powers or poles in a future multi-polar world. Nevertheless, the effects of their actions could easily reverberate all over the globe and represent another cause of potential instability. For the first time in history, the stability of the future world will therefore depend not only on the unpredictable effects of the rivalry among great powers, but also on the dangerous potential of middle and small powers and non-state actors armed with nuclear weapons.

### 1NC — PPWT Advantage CP

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should ratify the draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT).

#### Solves space weaponization

Jaramillo 9 (Cesar Jaramillo, graduated with a BA and an MA in political science and global governance, 12/1/09, “In Defence of the PPWT Treaty: Toward a Space Weapons Ban” Space Security, Volume 30, Issue 4, http://ploughshares.ca/pl\_publications/in-defence-of-the-ppwt-treaty-toward-a-space-weapons-ban/, JSO)

The existing legal regime that tackles the potential weaponization of outer space is outdated, inadequate, and insufficient. Moreover, the rapidity with which space-related technologies are being developed seems to be widening the gap between military applications that may affect space assets and the precarious normative architecture that should regulate them. The fact that space will inevitably become more complex and congested each year underscores the need for a comprehensive space security treaty that builds on what little international law exists in this realm and not only reflects current threats to space security, but also tackles the emerging legal questions that inevitably arise as space becomes a more convoluted domain.

The PPWT—while not perfect and subject to revisions—represents what is undoubtedly the most substantive effort thus far to embed the oft-expressed desire to maintain a weapons-free outer space in international treaty law. It is true that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty specifically bans signatory states from placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit and calls for the peaceful exploration of outer space. However, it does not explicitly refer to the placement or use of other types of weapons in outer space or the use of earth-based weapons against space targets—activities which clearly need regulation, if not outright prohibition.

It is often said that the perils inherent to the indiscriminate weaponization of space are perhaps only comparable to those posed by nuclear weapons, although much of this assessment rests on speculation, since outer space has not yet seen a scenario of direct military confrontation. Indeed, it is assumed that there have been no weapons placed in space to date as there have been neither claims nor denunciations of such behaviour by any state, and considerable efforts are being made in diverse governmental and nongovernmental circles to ensure that this delicate threshold is preserved. To be sure, a distinction must be made between militarization and weaponization: while the former has arguably already happened, given the widespread use of satellites for military applications such as reconnaissance and intelligence, it is the latter that is the primary focus of proponents of a space security treaty.

### 2AC — Espionage DA

#### 1. Wolf Amendment in SQ is useless

Beldavs 15 (Vid Beldavs, Founding Member at International Lunar Decade Working Group (ILDWG), 12/7/15, “Prospects for US-China space cooperation,” [http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1 //](http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1%20//) MH)

Clearly sensitive technologies need to be protected. But, protecting US intellectual property is not known to be a domain where the House Appropriations Committee of the US Congress has recognized expertise or where it has been invested with any specific authority. Additionally, NASA is a relatively tiny domain in the vast territory of advanced technology under development by the US. The Wolf Amendment, in fact, offers no protection of American technology but instead empowers members of a Congressional committee with no relevant expertise or authority to play a foreign policy role. Congressman Culbertson clearly recognizes that space technology is key to addressing major challenges facing not only the US, but the entire world community. To bar the United States from participation in global initiatives in the peaceful uses of outer space because China is also involved is, at best, is an overemotional response to the potential for illicit technology transfer with a totally inappropriate instrument. Far more relevant to US national interests would be for Rep. Culbertson to support developing more effective strategies to advance US commercial interests in space. Otherwise, the Chinese, not bounded by ineffective legislation, will eat our lunch. No one has yet developed the technologies for ISRU whether on the Moon, the asteroids, Mars, or beyond. Yet ISRU technologies are central to the whole idea of asteroid and lunar mining. If the Chinese can work with everyone else on the planet, but the US can only work with a short list as approved by the Appropriations Committee, it should be expected that the Chinese, drawing on the knowledge base of the entire world, will advance more quickly. We have no lead in ISRU, and our lead in other domains of space technology may not be particularly relevant to this challenge. It is time for Congress to wake up to the emerging commercial space future and work to fully unleash our commercial space potential rather than complaining about a very high level meeting in Beijing where common challenges in the peaceful uses of outer space were discussed with NASA experts present.

#### 2. No espionage – if the impact were true, then economic or cyber espionage would have already triggered China’s rise.

#### 3. International efforts check Chinese military espionage

**Puglises 16** (David, military specialist correspondence for Ottawa Citizen. “Owner of B.C. aerospace firm gets prison sentence for stealing information on F-35 fighter” 7/14/16 The National Post http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/owner-of-b-c-aerospace-firm-gets-prison-sentence-for-stealing-information-on-f-35-fighter)

A Chinese man who ran an aerospace firm with offices in British Columbia has been sentenced to nearly four years in jail for stealing confidential information on a U.S. military transport aircraft and the F-35 stealth fighter. Su Bin had pled guilty in federal court in Los Angeles to helping two Chinese military hackers. Among the targets of the hacking efforts was information on the U.S. F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters as well as Boeing’s C-17 transport aircraft, which is also used by the Canadian air force. In a plea agreement, Su admitted to conspiring with the two hackers in China to gain unauthorized access to computer networks in the U.S. between October 2008 and March 2014. Su travelled to the U.S. on 10 occasions during that period, according to court documents. .A Canadian Forces members look at the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter, F-35 Lighting II in a hanger in Ottawa Friday July 16, 2010. He was arrested in Richmond, B.C., in June 2014 and a Canadian court ordered Su’s extradition to the U.S. in September 2015. The 51-year-old has been sentenced to three years and ten months in jail. He was also fined $10,000. Su, also known as Stephen Su and Steven Subin, is the owner of the aviation firm Lode Technology. Besides the office in Canada, it also had locations throughout China. His firm did business with companies in Canada, Switzerland, Germany, the U.S. and France. “Over the course of years, this defendant sought to undermine the national security of the United States by seeking out information that would benefit a foreign government and providing that country with information it had never before seen,” U.S. prosecutor Eileen Decker said in a statement. Ian Kucerak Ian KucerakA Royal Canadian Air Force C-177 Globemaster III cargo aircraft flies over the city's Glenora neighbourhood in Edmonton, Alta., on Wednesday March 16, 2016. Su did not carry out the actual hacking, which was done by his two co-conspirators, both members of the People’s Liberation Army in China. Instead, Su’s role was to identify technical data that the hackers could target, according to the charges filed by Decker. Su also admitted translating the stolen information, which was then offered to Chinese aviation firms. The theft of information on the C-17 aircraft made “important contributions to our national defense scientific research development,” one of the Chinese military officers wrote in an email intercepted by the U.S. Another email, sent by Su in 2009, outlined the names of U.S. aerospace executives that the hackers could target. Some in China have hailed Su as a hero. In March, the Global Times newspaper, which has close ties to China’s government, published an editorial highlighting Su’s role as a special agent. “We are willing to show our gratitude and respect for his service to our country,” the editorial said. “On the secret battlefield without gunpowder, China needs special agents to gather secrets from the U.S..” The hackers did not confine their activities to U.S. firms. One of Su’s emails noted an attempt to collect data on a missile being developed jointly by Russia and India. The U.S. also alleged he focused on military technology being developed by Taiwan as well as information held by groups promoting democracy in China and independence in Tibet. Last year the Chinese government vowed it would crack down on cyber espionage aimed at U.S. businesses, after the U.S. government warned it would consider sanctions if China’s economic spying didn’t stop. American intelligence officials have nonetheless expressed doubt that China will ease up on its activities. The U.S. isn’t the only nation that has faced such Chinese-directed cyber operations. The computer systems of Canada’s National Research Council have been hacked a number of times, although the Chinese denied they were involved.

#### 4. Mlat advantage solves – China would only steal space tech because they cant work with the US – removing barriers solves by creating sustainable relations

#### 5. China lacks motive to steal US space technology

David ‘14 (Leonard David is a space journalist, reporting on space activities for over 50 years. He is co-author with Apollo 11’s Buzz Aldrin of Mission to Mars – My Vision for Space Exploration released in May 2013 and published by the National Geographic Society. Leonard is the first recipient of the American Astronautical Society’s (AAS) “Ordway Award for Sustained Excellence in Spaceflight History” in the category of journalism, to be presented in October 2015 in connection with the 8th AAS Wernher von Braun Memorial Symposium held in Huntsville, Alabama. Mr. David is the 2010 winner of the prestigious National Space Club Press Award, presented this honor during the Club’s annual Robert H. Goddard Memorial Dinner in April 2011 that was held in Washington, D.C. Currently, Leonard is SPACE.com’s Space Insider Columnist, as well as a correspondent for Space News newspaper and a contributing writer for several magazines. “China Has Big Plans to Explore the Moon and Mars,” 3 Dec 2014, http://www.space.com/27893-china-space-program-moon-mars.html – SY)

"China is continuing to pursue a number of goals it decided upon decades ago," said Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China project manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), based in Cambridge, Mass.¶ Like Cheng, Kulacki believes the launch facility on the island of Hainan is a key new capability.¶ "It has been on the drawing board for quite a long time, and has experienced numerous delays, but is now prepared to serve as the home space port for China's new generation of wider-bodied launch vehicles that can carry larger payloads," Kulacki told Space.com. "These new vehicles have also experienced some delays, but China has no fixed deadlines to meet."¶ "As these major new pieces of China's space infrastructure come online, including new satellite manufacturing facilities in Tianjin, the pace and scale of its activities in space will continue to grow," Kulacki said. "China already has considerable space assets on orbit, and its investment in space will continue to increase significantly over the next several decades."¶ People who claim China is pursuing an asymmetric space warfare strategy misread the nation's intentions, Kulacki said. Rather, "the strategic objective of Chinese space policy is not to exploit asymmetry between China and the United States, but to end it," he said.

#### 6. Colonization o/w – global extinction should come first – countries wont care about espionage when its necessary to get off the planet

#### 7. Hegemony isn’t key to peace

**Fettweis 11** – Christopher Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is **no evidence** to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and **international stability**. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U**nited** S**tates** cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced** to address power vacuums, **no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races**, and **no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The **incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined** while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### 8. U.S. primacy isn’t key to peace – their data is flawed

**Preble 10** – Christopher Preble, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, August 3, 2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?,” online: <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, **questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory** from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and **resilient**. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. **Many factors** have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is **unrealistic** to expect that a new **spasm of global conflict** would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, **draw down its military power**, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are **credible alternatives** to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

### 2AC — PPWT Advantage CP

#### 1. Perm: do both

#### 2. CP can’t solve space debris: PPWT still allows for ASAT tech

Max M. Mutschler 21 October 2014 “Security Cooperation in Space and International Relations Theory” (Joined BICC as a Researcher in January 2015. Key expertise Arms control, the militarisation and weaponisation of outer space, missile defence, arms exports, international arms trade.) JM

There is a wide consensus in the literature that the United States is unequivocally ahead of other countries in the field of space technology. Other space-faring countries such as China have the capability to develop and procure comparatively simple ASAT weapons but they cannot match the technological base of the United States. Taking this into account, it makes perfect sense for Russia and China to make a proposal like the PPWT, which would ban the deployment of sophisticated, space-based weapons while allowing the development of ground-based ASAT technology. It certainly also makes sense for the United States to oppose such an agreement (Hansel 2010, p. 97). We have already seen similar patterns of behavior during the Cold War when the Soviet Union proposed arms control measures that would have left existing Soviet ASAT capabilities untouched while eventually placing limits on the space shuttle program of the United States.

#### 3. CP doesn’t solve mlat adv – there are still bars against US-China coop which is key – no effort can be truly international with out this base relationship

#### 4. CP has a litany of problems – it’s definitionally imprecise and that means that there are loopholes and that China and Russia will cheat – leads to an EMP attack

Gertz 14 — Bill Gertz, Bill Gertz is the senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. ("U.S. Opposes New Draft Treaty from China and Russia Banning Space Weapons", Washington Free Beacon, 6-19-2014, Available Online at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-opposes-new-draft-treaty-from-china-and-russia-banning-space-weapons/, accessed 7-13-2016, JSO)

The United States believes that arms control proposals and concepts should only be considered by the international community if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of all,” Rose told a June 10 session in Geneva of the U.N. Conference on Disarmament.∂ The Chinese-Russian draft treaty “does not meet the necessary criteria,” Rose said, adding that the U.S. opposition is based on a preliminary assessment that the new draft fails to address “significant flaws” in the 2008 draft.∂ “Namely, there is no effective verification regime to monitor compliance, and terrestrially based anti-satellite systems posing the greatest and most imminent threat to space systems are not captured,” Rose said.∂ Rose instead said the United States favors a less formal “code of conduct” for space being promoted by the European Union. The code has come under fire from the Pentagon’s Joint Staff that stated in a 2012 assessment that the code would harm U.S. military space activities.∂ A U.S. official said the Chinese-Russian treaty proposal would effectively kill international efforts on a code of conduct for space.∂ China is engaged in a major space weapons development program that includes ground-based anti-satellite missiles, lasers and electronic jammers, and small maneuvering satellites that can attack orbiting satellites.∂ Beijing’s January 2007 test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile to blast an orbiting weather satellite left tens of thousands of pieces of debris orbiting the earth. The debris threatens both manned and unmanned spacecraft with destructive high-speed collisions.∂ Russia also is developing space warfare weapons.∂ Mark Schneider, a former Pentagon strategic analyst, said the administration’s opposition to the new space weapons treaty is one of the few times he has agreed with the administration on an arms control issue.∂ “All U.S. administrations have rejected space control because there are serious definitional problems, such as what is a space weapon,” Schneider said. “And there are serious verification problems associated with it.∂ Additionally, the space arms ban treaty is part of Russian and Chinese efforts to attack U.S. and allied missile defenses, which are heavily reliant on space sensors and weapons.∂ “At some point I believe we should put missile defense into space,” said Schneider who worked in the Pentagon on strategic defense, space, and verification policies.∂ Additionally, “Russia is certain to cheat on any space treaty,” Schneider said. “They have announced that they are developing ASAT weapons. Moreover, they may be developing space offensive weapons.”∂ The Soviet Union in the 1960s deployed a nuclear space weapon system called the fractional orbital bombardment system. It used an orbiting strategic missile in low earth orbit that was designed to de-orbit and attack the United States by transiting southward from the South Pole to avoid radar detection.∂ Russian military writings have indicated recently that Moscow may revive the orbiting southern polar missile attack system. Analysts have said that in addition to providing Moscow with a first-strike space nuclear weapon, the system could also be used in a devastating electro-magnetic pulse attack over U.S. territory that would destroy all electronics over a large area.∂ A State Department spokesman referred questions about the U.S. position on the space arms treaty to Rose’s statement.∂

#### 5. EMP attack causes extinction

Pry 10 — Peter Vincent Pry, Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is Executive Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, both Congressional Advisory Boards, and served on the Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA. ("What America Needs to Know About EMPs", Foreign Policy, 3-17-2010, Available Online at http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/17/what-america-needs-to-know-about-emps/, accessed 7-13-2016, JSO)

EMP is not just a threat to computers and electronic gadgets, but to all the critical infrastructures that depend on electronics and electricity -- communications, transportation, banking and finance, food and water -- and that sustain modern civilization and the lives of the American people.

In 2008, the congressionally mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack delivered its final report to Congress, the Defense Department, and the Department of Homeland Security. The commission concluded that terrorist groups, rogue states, China, and Russia are theoretically capable of launching a catastrophic EMP attack against the United States and either had contingency plans to do so or were actively pursuing the ability. Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia have scientific and military research programs dedicated to or supportive of EMP capability, and their military doctrinal writings explicitly describe EMP attacks against the United States.

Based on eight years of research and analysis, 50 years of data from nuclear tests and EMP simulators, and never-before-attempted EMP tests, the commission found that any nuclear weapon, even a low-yield one, could potentially pose a catastrophic EMP threat to the United States, mainly because of the great fragility of the electric grid. One scenario of particular concern is a nuclear-armed Iran transferring a short- or medium-range nuclear missile to terrorist groups that could perform a ship-launched "anonymous" EMP attack against the United States. Iranian military strategists have written about EMP attacks against the United States, and Iran has successfully practiced launching a ballistic missile off a ship and flight-tested its Shahab-3 medium-range missile to detonate at high altitude, as if practicing an EMP attack.

The commission also noted credible Russian claims that they had developed what the Russians call "super-EMP" weapons -- low-yield nuclear weapons specially designed to generate extraordinarily powerful EMP fields -- and that the Russian Duma had raised the prospect of a disabling EMP attack against the United States during NATO's bombing of Serbia in May 1999.

#### 6. Perm: do the CP then the aff – the CP solves Space Debris and cooperation but doesn’t cooperate in space – the aff is key to reap the benefits of space cooperation

## #3 — Pakistan DA/CP

### Format/Explanation

Assume the Pakistan aff with the Stability and Cooperation advantages (below). Assume the 1NC read the India DA and U.S. Pressure CP (also below). The neg has six minutes to extend the DA and the CP vs. the 2AC frontlines included below. Yes, the neg may choose to kick the CP.

### 1AC — Plan

#### The United States federal government should support economically viable infrastructure projects in Pakistan if and only if the People’s Republic of China substantially increases pressure on Pakistan to reduce extremist organization presence in Pakistan.

### 1AC — Stability Advantage

#### Quadrilateral Afghan peace talks going nowhere – Taliban leaders won’t cooperate

Panda 16—Ankit Panda is an editor at the Diplomat, 2016 (“Road to Quadrilateral-Backed Peace Talks Uncertain as Taliban Refuse to Participate”, March 7th, Accessed 7/7/16, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/road-to-quadrilateral-backed-peace-talks-uncertain-as-taliban-refuse-to-participate/>, JRR)

A resumption of long-stalled peace talks between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban may be in jeopardy. The Taliban issued a statement noting that Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the leader of the group since Mullah Mohammed Omar’s death was revealed last summer, had not accepted any invitation to return to peace talks. “We unequivocally state that the leader of Islamic Emirate has not authorised anyone to participate in this meeting,” the Taliban noted in a statement. Mansour, like Omar before him, has largely kept silent and remained in the shadows since prevailing in a power struggle to lead the Taliban after Omar. While Mansour controls a large portion of the Afghan Taliban, a splinter group has rallied around Mullah Mohammad Rassoul in western Afghanistan. Given Mansour’s apparent lack of interest in peace talks and splits within Taliban ranks, the prospect of a return to productive peace talks appears remote, despite efforts by regional powers and the Afghan government. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group, which comprises the United States, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and met officially for the first time in January 2016, was aiming for a resumption of peace talks in March. The Afghan government, for practical purposes, recognize the Mansour-led Taliban faction as the group’s “legitimate interlocutor.” Crucially, Mansour’s faction is represented by the Taliban’s political office in Qatar. According to Dawn, Pakistan’s powerful chief of army staff, General Raheel Sharif, had traveled to Doha in February to encourage the Taliban to participate in the QCG-backed talks. The Pakistani military is thought to exercise the most influence over the Afghan Taliban of any state group in the region. With the Taliban’s refusal to participate, the QCG’s efforts at resuming reconciliation and peace talks have been scuttled once again. The group initially had set a deadline to resume the talks in February, but the Taliban’s inflexibility and lack of interest delayed matters. With this second round of failure, Pakistan’s ability to exercise influence over Mansour’s Taliban will likely come under question. Recently, Sartaj Aziz, adviser on foreign affairs to Pakistan’s prime minister, acknowledged publicly that the leadership of the Afghan Taliban live in Pakistan, giving the Pakistan government influence over their decision-making. “We have some influence on them because their leadership is in Pakistan, and they get some medical facilities, their families are here. So we can use those levers to pressurise them to say, ‘come to the table’,” he said. While Aziz’s statement reflects much of the conventional wisdom on how Pakistan used to exercise influence over the Taliban, at least in the days when the group was still thought to be a fairly unitary organization under Mullah Omar’s thumb, the repeated failures of Pakistan-led efforts to realize the QCG-backed talks suggest that influence may have waned with last year’s turbulent leadership transition within the group. Despite these setbacks, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group will likely meet soon to assess a path forward for the talks.

#### Security is key to CPEC implementation

Abid and Ashfaq, 2015 (Massarrat, Professor and Dean of Pakistan Studies Centre @ University of the Punjab and Ayesha, Assistant Professor of Communication @ University of the Punjab “CPEC: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan” Pakistan Vision 16.2 Accessed 7/8/16 <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-7_v16_2_2015.pdf> JJH)

Security concerns have been the most critical challenge to the CPEC and both Pakistan and China have been trying to meet these. An arc of militancy stretches from Xinjiang to Gwadar consisting of groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Daesh (ISIS),Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and the militant wings of some political parties. Most of these groups may not have an enmity with China itself but rather intend to attacks the Chinese interests like the CPEC as a means to deal with the Pakistani state.37 Gwadar is the tail of the Silk belt, which will connect at Kashgar through different communication networks. The security of the whole corridor and Gwadar is a real concern for China. After the military operation in different parts of Pakistan, the terrorist infrastructure still exists inside and outside of the borders which will continue to pose a threat.38 The support of American CIA, Israeli Mossad and Indian RAW has continuously been assisting the militant groups and Sub-Nationalists in all the provinces to conduct subversive acts-and using terrorist elements in the whole country to threaten the Pak-Chinese plans of developing the CPEC. In the past few years, they kidnapped and killed many Chinese nationals in Pakistan despite Pakistan’s efforts to provide best possible security. The army has announced the creation of 10,000 man special force for protecting the development projects. The new force, named the Special Security Division, will comprise nine army battalion and six wings of paramilitary forces, the Rangers and the Frontier Corps.39 There are major concerns about the Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan, where multiple terrorist groups including Al Qaeda, the self-styled Islamic State, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Movement of Islamic Uzbekistan and the Turkmenistan Islamic Party, etc are concentrated. These groups can pose a direct threat to the CPEC in Pakistan’s northern region. A better understanding between Islamabad and Kabul is imperative to achieve border security.40

#### Chinese pressure on Pakistan is empirically effective – actions against ETIM prove.

Rehman 2014 (Zia Ur, Pakistani Journalist that focuses on Security in Pakistan, “ETIM’s presence in Pakistan and China’s growing pressure” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center Accessed 7/11/2014 <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/381280b226170116bb6f07dc969cb17d.pdf> JJH)

A strong military operation against al-Qaeda-affiliated militant groups, including ETIM, operating in Pakistan’s North Waziristan area can only benefit Sino-Pakistani relations. Analysts believe that the ongoing military operation strongly signals Pakistan’s resolve to fight terrorism. The U.S. and China have equally been pressuring Pakistan to end the presence of foreign militants operating in the latter’s tribal areas. However, it seems that the Pakistani government has been more worried about the impact of Chinese concerns on Pakistan’s economic, diplomatic and strategic relationship with China. With the Pakistani military carrying out a military operation in North Waziristan, analysts believe that many foreign militants, including ETIM fighters, will be forced to flee (Stewart, 2014). Major General Zafarullah Khan, the officer in charge of the ongoing military operation in North Waziristan, admitted that many of the militant leaders may have had time to escape before the operation got under way (BBC, 2014). Local analysts say that some foreign militants could move across the border into Afghanistan or into the neighbouring Pakistani tribal districts of Orakzai and Khyber, from where they could later return to North Waziristan.9 After the withdrawal of U.S.-led NATO forces, instability in Afghanistan could benefit ETIM: Uyghur militants could establish bases there, regroup, and both relaunch their attacks in China and target Chinese interests elsewhere (Khattak, 2014). While pressuring Pakistani authorities to carry out the operation against ETIM, China has also started to crack down on terrorist groups involved in violent activities in Xinjiang (Tiezzi, 2014b). Media reports suggest that this crackdown will mainly focus on religious extremists and terrorist groups and their training camps, and will last until June 2015 (Global Times, 2014). Experts believe that the recent attacks carried out in China did not need external planning and local radicalised militants could have executed them (Stewart, 2014).

#### Economic development is the only path for stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. China is key.

Rashid, 2015 (Ahmed, former Pakistani Militant and a journalist and best-selling foreign policy author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia and Afghanistan Pakistan Security Analyst. “Can China Replace the US in Stabilising Afghanistan?” Diplomaatia April Accessed, 7/4/2016, http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/can-china-replace-the-us-in-stabilising-afghanistan/)

Surprisingly, US officials say that Washington is not averse to a larger Chinese role in Afghanistan, if it can broker peace, keep out terrorists and help Afghanistan's economy. In fact, Beijing has interests that directly coincide with Washington’s. China and the US are already cooperating in training Afghan diplomats, and the next step would be for both countries to host training for Afghan army and police officers. China's main reason for trying to stabilise Afghanistan is that it now faces a national security threat from Islamic radicals belonging to the Uighur ethnic group that live in Xinjiang province and train with the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some of these militants are members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which is based in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. China is now infected with its own terrorism problems emanating from beyond its borders and it is desperate to end this threat—which is why it is pressuring Pakistan and Afghanistan. China would also like to exploit the mineral and energy resources in Afghanistan that have been identified by the US, but have gone untapped due to the continuing civil war there. ''Our broader strategy is also economic development—the construction of the Silk Road, which includes Pakistan and Afghanistan,'' said Ambassador Yuxi. Chinese investments in copper mining and oil and gas drilling have so far been largely suspended because of the fighting. China is investing billions of dollars in a road and rail transportation network that will stretch from western China to Germany via a new Silk Road crossing a dozen countries. In early March the first goods train completed a journey from eastern China to Berlin and returned home, taking three weeks. China wants to help build a route that will take just three days. It wants to build a railway in Afghanistan to carry minerals to China and a four-lane highway from the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Gulf across the length of Pakistan to the Chinese border. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has already signed economic corridor projects with China amounting to US$ 45 billion over a decade. Economic aid and money is the ultimate lure, making China's chances of calming a region that has seen nothing but war since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 much greater than the Americans could offer. The US failed to build a sustainable economy in Afghanistan or convince the Pakistani army to stop backing extremism. China's economic plans and its need for raw materials could finally give Afghanistan and Pakistan an economic bonanza and provide the incentive to end state support for extremist violence in both countries. For any fragile nation state, it's a once in a lifetime opportunity. Whether both nations will grasp it is still an open question.

#### Central Asian instability causes Russia War that goes nuclear

-oil pipelines and historical territorial claims = likely to intervene

McDermott 11—Roger N. McDermott specializes in Russian and Central Asian defense and security issues and is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown Foundation, 2011 (“General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict”, December 6, 2011, Accessed 7/9/16, Available Online at <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38748&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=dfb6e8da90b34a10f50382157e9bc117#.V4FJwGgrK03> JRR)

In the current election season the Russian media has speculated that the Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov may be replaced, possibly by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, which masks deeper anxiety about the future direction of the Armed Forces. The latest rumors also partly reflect uncertainty surrounding how the switch in the ruling tandem may reshuffle the pack in the various ministries, as well as concern about managing complex processes in Russian defense planning. On November 17, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, offered widely reported comments on the potential for nuclear conflict erupting close to the country’s borders. His key observation was controversial, based on estimating that the potential for armed conflict along the entire Russian periphery had grown dramatically over the past twenty years (Profil, December 1; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, November 28; Interfax, November 17). During his speech to the Defense Ministry’s Public Council on the progress and challenges facing the effort to reform and modernize Russia’s conventional Armed Forces, Makarov linked the potential for local or regional conflict to escalate into large-scale warfare “possibly even with nuclear weapons.” Many Russian commentators were bewildered by this seemingly “alarmist” perspective. However, they appear to have misconstrued the general’s intention, since he was actually discussing conflict escalation (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 17; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Krasnaya Zvezda, November 18). Makarov’s remarks, particularly in relation to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war, were quickly misinterpreted. Three specific aspects of the context in which Russia’s most senior military officer addressed the issue of a potential risk of nuclear conflict may serve to necessitate wider dialogue about the dangers of escalation. There is little in his actual assertion about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy that would suggest Moscow has revised this; in fact, Makarov stated that this policy is outlined in the 2010 Military Doctrine, though he understandably made no mention of its classified addendum on nuclear issues (Kommersant, November 18). Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have represented the country as being surrounded by enemies. According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his presentation, armed confrontation with the West could occur partly based on the “anti-Russian policy” pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, which may equally undermine Moscow’s future relations with NATO. Military conflict may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability in Afghanistan or Pakistan; or western intervention against a nuclear Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired “color revolutions” similar to the Arab Spring and the creation of a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18). Since the reform of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has consistently promoted adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate the transformation of the military and develop modern approaches to warfare. Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and harness military assets in a fully integrated network, Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed and are continuing to change (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17). The contours of this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions between war and peace often blurred, interface precisely in the general’s expression of concern about nuclear conflict: highlighting the risk of escalation. However, such potential escalation is linked to the reduced time involved in other actors deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of network-centric approaches among western militaries and being developed by China and Russia. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO “out of area operations” from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation; further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases such as Syria. Potential escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second and third order consequences, makes Makarov’s comments seem more understandable; it is not so much a portrayal of Russia surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises Moscow may have few options at its disposal (Interfax, November 17). There is also the added complication of a possibly messy aftermath of the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and signs that the Russian General Staff takes Central Asian security much more seriously in this regard. The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the region may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather limited conventional military power Russia currently possesses, which may compel early nuclear first use likely involving sub-strategic weapons, in an effort to “de-escalate” an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of facing large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas vital to its strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its conventional weaknesses. As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the age-old problem confronts the General Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently, Makarov once again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as speed and harnessing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) become increasingly decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand careful attention – especially when the disparate actors possess varied capabilities. Unlike other nuclear powers, Russia has to consider the proximity of several nuclear actors close to its borders. In the coming decade and beyond, Moscow may pursue dialogue with other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging from BMD, US Global Strike capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an expanded nuclear club, and several potential sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must consider escalation in its widest possible context. Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.

#### Pakistan stability is key to combat the export of global terrorism.

Smith, 2011 (Paul J., Prof. of National Security Affairs @ US Naval War College “The China–Pakistan–United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the “War on Terrorism”” Asian Affairs: An American Review 38:4 Taylor and Francis <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00927678.2011.604291> JJH)

Nevertheless, in July 2010, the newly elected British Prime Minister David Cameron made several blunt remarks regarding Pakistan’s relationship to terrorism. Specifically, he asserted that Pakistan should not be allowed to “promote the export of terror, whether to India, Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world.”87 Cameron’s statement, while controversial in Pakistan, captured sentiments that can be quietly heard within police and intelligence agencies in Europe and North America, particularly as an alarmingly high percentage of major terrorist plots uncovered in Europe or the United States have some linkage to Pakistan.88 Moreover, Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorist violence perpetrated by various domestic militant groups. From January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2010, Pakistan experienced 1,032 terrorist attacks (with 1,680 persons killed and 3,561 persons wounded), placing it third globally (after Afghanistan and Iraq) on the list of countries with the highest incidences of terrorist violence.89 Admiral Mike Mullen stated that “the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the epicenter of global terrorism.”90 Similarly, a U.S. Congressional Research Service report highlighted the fact that the “increase in Islamist extremism and militancy in Pakistan is a central U.S. foreign policy concern.”91 Few events highlight the severity of the terrorism challenge emanating from Pakistan as well as the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, in which a ten-man terrorist squad launched a nighttime maritime attack on the city, killing more than 179 people over a two-day period. Subsequent investigations indicated that the attack had been coordinated from Pakistan using satellite telephones. When U.S. officials detained Pakistani-American David Headley in a routine immigration inspection at the Chicago airport, they unwittingly unraveled a key part of the Mumbai attack. Headley had conducted surveillance in India on behalf of Lashkare-Taiba, the group believed to have directed the attacks.92 Even more disturbing were subsequent press reports that appeared to implicate Pakistani intelligence officials in the plot. Headley reported attending “dozens of meetings” with officials from the ISI and representatives from Lashkar-e-Taiba.93 Headley also reported carrying two memory sticks for his digital camera that were used to conduct surveillance in India on future targets. He allegedly provided one stick to his Lashkar-e-Taiba handlers and the other to the ISI representative.94 The Headley revelations appeared to confirm what many scholars had asserted for years: official (albeit clandestine) support for Islamist militancy is ingrained in Pakistan’s military and intelligence culture.95 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s current ambassador to the United States, wrote in 2004 (prior to his current post) that “Pakistan has looked upon militant Islam as a strategic option for at least three decades, going back to the Bangladesh war with India in 1971.”96 Such an option was apparently being exercised in the July 7, 2008, bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, an attack that was later attributed by the U.S. government to Pakistan’s intelligence service.97 U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson reportedly stated that there was “no chance” that Pakistan’s military would withdraw its covert support for militant groups targeting Afghanistan and India, despite the provision of billions of dollars in U.S. aid to Islamabad.98

#### A successful nuclear terrorist attack results in massive proliferation and global nuclear war

-victim state likely to use military force against terrorists, could mean aggression towards other states

Frank 5/9/2013 (Forrest, research associate at Naval War College, “NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND THE ESCALATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT,” Accessed 7/10/16 <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Ww-5IEL-O9UJ:https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9508e128-a340-4760-8666-5192428cdb15/Nuclear-Terrorism-and-the-Escalation-of-Internatio.aspx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us> JJH)

The use of military force in response to nuclear terrorism by the victim state cannot be overlooked. Military force could be deployed against the same wide variety of states noted above. The range of military actions that could be undertaken could vary greatly from minimum efforts to close the border between the victim state and its neigh- bors to more drastic actions. These actions might include some or all of the following: interdiction of terrorist infil- tration routes; attacks on terrorist base camps; .embargo or blockade of states aiding terrorists or permitting terrorists to operate from their territories; attacks on the civilian population of other states roughly equaling the destruction caused by a nuclear terrorist act; destruction of other states' nuclear facilities; o r even a full-scale invasion and occupation of other states in reprisal for nuclear terrorism It is clear that acts undertaken by the victim state toward other states would have profound effects on international order. The military actions described above would be sufficient to unleash a major war, depending on the states directly involved and the strength of their respective alliance systems. Incidents of nuclear terrorism involving materials nominally under international safeguards would automatically raise very serious questions about the reli- ability of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on nuclear materials. IAEA inspection of national nuclear materials accounts, the primary safeguard against diversion of nuclear materials, that fail to detect the diver- sion of nuclear materials subsequently thought to have been used in the com- mission of a nuclear terrorist act may raise very grave questions about the entire safeguards system. Such questions once raised would be very hard to quiet, hence weakening the IAEA's ability to perform its critical function of verifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.29 Nuclear terrorism may also raise a number of problems relating to the obligations assumed by the nuclear weapon states in their adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty- Security Council Resolution 255, (19 June 1968).3 0 The nuclear weapon states might find themselves in a posi- tion of direct confrontation with one another because of demands on the part of the government of the state attacked by nuclear terrorists for assistance. Furthermore, use of nuclear terrorism by a group claiming the status of a state, i.e., a liberation movement, might cause major political problems.in relations among the nuclear weapon states, as well as between the nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states. Successful nuclear terrorism might also give rise to more general security states would become concerned about nuclear terrorism and might undertake actions that could easily be misinterpreted by other, potential adversaries. Successful nuclear terrorism in one part of the world might be an invitation to terrorists in other parts of the world to use nuclear explosive devices, radiologi- cal weapons, or attacks on nuclear facilities as an effective, spectacular means of achieving political and eco· nomic objectives. Government leaders might conceivably be faced with a new set of dominoes-nuclear facilities, sources of radioactive materials, or sources of fissionable materials. In surveying the political conse· quences of nuclear terrorism, it becomes clear that nuclear terrorism creates problems which, in turn, may be more destructive over the long term than the act of nuclear terrorism itself. Initiation of hostilities between two or more states as the result of a catalytic nuclear terrorist act ought to be an outcome over which great efforts would be ex- pended in an effort to avoid it. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to the problem of limiting the escalation of conflict arising from nuclear terrorism. We now turn to some possible steps that might be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally by nations of the world to avoid the "worst case" outcome of a nuclear terrorism incident.

#### Scenario 2: CPEC

#### CPEC is key to integrate Xinjiang

The Indian Express, 4/18/2016 (“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pakistan’s road of high hopes” Accessed 7/5/16 <http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/cpec-pakistan-china-nawaz-sharif-xi-jinping-2758111/> JJH)

Much more than what there is for Pakistan, many feel. The CPEC is part of China’s larger regional transnational ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, whose two arms are the land-based New Silk Road and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road, using which Beijing aims to create a Silk Road Economic Belt sprawled over a large patch of Asia and eastern Europe, and crisscrossed by a web of transport, energy supply and telecommunications lines. Gwadar lies close to the Strait of Hormuz, a key oil shipping lane. It could open up an energy and trade corridor from the Gulf across Pakistan to western China, that could also be used by the Chinese Navy. The CPEC will give China land access to the Indian Ocean, cutting the nearly 13,000 km sea voyage from Tianjin to the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca and around India, to a mere 2,000 km road journey from Kashgar to Gwadar. The development of Kashgar as a trade terminus will reduce the isolation of the restive Xinjiang province, deepen its engagement with the rest of China, and raise its potential for tourism and investment. Central Asian republics are keen to plug their infrastructure networks to the CPEC — this will allow them access to the Indian Ocean, while contributing to the OBOR initiative. For Chinese companies, the massive scale of the CPEC provides investment opportunities for several years to come. As per the terms of the agreement, they will be able to operate the projects as profit-making entities, Reuters reported. The China Development Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd, one of China’s ‘Big Four’ state-owned commercial banks, will loan funds to the companies, who will invest in the projects as commercial ventures. Major Chinese companies investing in Pakistan’s energy sector will include China’s Three Gorges Corp., which built the world’s biggest hydro power scheme, and China Power International Development Ltd.

#### Lack of Xinjaing integration causes CCP collapse.

Devary, 10/2/2014 (Scott, Master’s of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy from Seton Hall, “The Approaching Xinjiang Crisis Point” The Diplomat Accessed 7/10/16 <http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/the-approaching-xinjiang-crisis-point/> JJH)

“China Executes 8 Convicted on Terrorism Charges,” the headline reads. It is a succinct, eye-grabbing statement that causes me to pause. As I finish the byline, I recognize an all-too familiar pattern in the Chinese justice system. Where the Uighur ethnic minority are concerned, excessive force and an opaque sense of impartiality are the rule. Official Chinese news sources read off charges linking the men to violent and dangerous separatist activities. The Tiananmen Square attack from the end of October in 2013 that left five dead and twenty-nine injured is laid at the feet of one of the men, an alleged mastermind, but the response by the state rings hollow and the reason is a complicated one. The Uighur separatism issue is far from solved, and the threat of domestic terrorism still looms large in Xinjiang. For Western observers, Chinese domestic security policy has never had the appearance of justice or finesse, due largely in part to restrictions on a free press in matters important to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Law and order are important to every state, but a functioning justice system must rely on transparency and citizens’ rights as much as the guarantee of punitive action against a society’s worst offenders. One need only review the complex and controversial history of the CCP’s claims to the Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions to recognize that the law and public good have been capriciously applied in the CCP’s recent past. This relative inconsistency in the use of force and treatment of citizens’ rights belies one of the central failings of Beijing’s policy regarding the violence of the Uighur separatist movement in Xinjiang: Overzealous use of force from a variety of official and unofficial agencies in the region only hinders the CCP leadership’s goal of a pacification. Despite this inconsistency, these events can give foreign analysts insight into what means the CCP is willing to take to maintain its rule – and how far it is willing to go. At the very least, they reveal how adaptable and responsive the central party apparatus is at dealing with such a nebulous security threat. The use of force in domestic police action within China is difficult to fully conceptualize for the Western observer, whose political systems are usually based on the idea of political costs and finite political capital. How does one assess political costs for an arcane single-party system with state-run and officially-sanctioned public news bureaus? There can be no doubt that there are internal power struggles: Competition over resources and policy preferences and priorities must surely exist within the closed doors of the CCP. Ascertaining how much compromise, bargaining, and public influence are weighed by policy elites remains difficult, however. This is why the Uighur separatism issue is becoming more important and warrants greater scrutiny from foreign policy and academic circles. It is a litmus test to see how far the CCP and its leaders are willing to go in resolving a perceived internal existential threat in either direction: citizen rights reform or increasingly draconian security measures. Complex History Uighurs are the plurality in the western Xinjiang Province, which covers roughly one sixth of China’s territory: 47 percent of the population, with Han Chinese accounting for 38 percent. This is significant when considering just how important Xinjiang may become to China. Being the largest region within China, and a considerable energy resource base (Xinjiang is home to the Tarim basin, one of China’s largest potential domestic energy development sites according to Sinopec and PetroChina estimations). This information can be readily found in the first paragraph of virtually every news story in Western media discussing the recent surge in violence and ethnic strife in the region. What these pieces fail to discuss further when acknowledging the approximately 300 dead Han Chinese and Uighurs are the changes in Chinese domestic security apparatus within their cities. They ignore the complex history of Xinjiang’s annexation in 1949, the policies of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (a quasi-military body in charge of both peacekeeping and infrastructure development for the region empowered by the PLA), and the relative disparities in resource extraction to development and income the Uighurs face versus their Han Chinese counterparts in the region. China’s hold on Xinjiang has not always been as consistent as in the last six decades. The Uighur population has never been compliant with Han dominion, with a variety of uprisings and violent incidents since the annexation of Xinjiang in the 18th century. Moreover, during the 19th century, Uighur Chieftain Yakub Beg led a fierce uprising against the Qing dynasty rulers for twenty-two years, even gaining foreign support and trade from Tsarist Russia and the British Empire at the time. Additionally, the Uighurs established an independent state of Eastern Turkestan Republic in the 1930s, which lasted until Communist forces reoccupied the western province at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. During the early years of communist rule, the establishment of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps led to a quasi-military body being in charge of the region’s security and economic development. Performing a hybrid role of economic planning, construction, infrastructure management, and militia, the XPCC, although technically a civilian bureaucracy, was instructed to remain armed at a time when China feared border incursions and an escalation of tensions with the Soviet Union. Although it was temporarily dissolved by Mao Zedong in 1975, it was reestablished by Deng Xiaopeng in 1981 and continues to be a powerful economic and kinetic security body in the region. Tellingly, Han Chinese largely fill the XPCC and exclude the local Uighur population from economic and security policy development. Complicating the reputation of communist rule in Xinjiang are controversial policies such as virtual slave labor (Kuomintang nationalist troops captured during the civil war and being sent to the west to civilize and transform the desert into arable farmland) and the relocation of the “Shanghai Girls” during the Cultural Revolution which, under the auspices of resettling urban Chinese to rural areas, is viewed by many historians as a means of pacifying the colonial Han by providing them with brides. Modern Uighur resistance to Han dominion over Xinjiang is peculiarly murky. It involves both legitimate appeals for human rights, and violent extremism and terrorism. The varying separatist political factions have received training and material support throughout Central Asia and from sympathetic extremist organizations, performing bombings, leading bloody riots that leave hundreds dead or injured, and assassinating local officials. These insurgency tactics complicate domestic security policy for Beijing, and of special consideration is the Uighur émigré population, of whom there are approximately one million worldwide, according to Chien-Peng Chung. Chung wrote in 2002 that “Beijing fears them nevertheless, because the mere possibility that they may cause disruption creates an impression of instability in Xinjiang and dampens foreign investment.” At the time, Xinjiang’s economic and civil infrastructure were considerably less developed. Twelve years later, with greater economic investment, energy resources, commodity production, and Han migration the Uighur separatist threat has even more potential to disrupt Beijing’s interests. Chung asserted that the impact on investment and development in the region of the physical threat would be of primary interest for the CCP in 2002, but economic growth (although of considerable value to the central party for maintaining its leadership mandate) is only half the equation. Beijing knows that a Han pogrom against the Uighur minority, even despite the continued terrorist threat, would have drastic consequences for the CCP both economically and politically. The other major threat to Beijing is the continued physical threat the Uighur separatists represent to territorial unity for China. Losing control of territory, especially territory as valuable as Xinjiang, is a particularly troublesome concept for the CCP leadership, and very likely an existential threat to the party’s leadership mandate. Consider the psychology that has undergird the CCP since the fall of the last imperial dynasty: fear of foreign aggression and dominance over China, dissolution of China as a single entity into separate states, and civil war. Henry Kissinger’s 2011 On China summarizes this psychology well in an eminently readable text, but a separatist group that is consistently able to secure training and material support from outside China and is able to consistently wage a violent opposition to Beijing is a very serious threat to the CCP’s image of absolute control, and its ability to provide the best leadership possible for its civilian population. Uighur separatists have been able to provoke radical domestic security measures from Beijing that apply to its own Han majority as well: long lines for security check points to ride the subway, armed paramilitary police patrols, and helicopters in the skies of Beijing are just the first of costly security measures that change the way the average Chinese citizen is affected by the separatist movement. Removing the insulation of the general Han populace from the fight in the remote western province has only further increased public scrutiny on the CCP’s domestic security policy. A popular Sina Weibo commentator blogged, “the terrorists have achieved their goals, in part. Increase the costs of law enforcement, reduce social efficiency, and raise public tensions.” A further complication comes from slowing GDP growth. A decline in annual economic growth of even a few percentage points is no small matter for the CCP leadership. Beijing has a vested interest in making sure its control is perceived as absolute (as well as competent) in order to maintain the party’s position at the head of Chinese society. On the subject of competence: Beijing’s draconian and paternalistic methods for dealing with the Uighur threat have been ineffective in curtailing the violence. Consider the more recent security policy decisions. Beijing has used a number of different tactics to quell disruption in the region at each instance of violence. The Chinese security forces have monitored and cut off Internet and communications infrastructure for the Uighur populace, instituted curfews, used “shock and awe” reprisal, enforced economic and political isolation, and even instituted public dress codes. What we see now is the nexus of Chinese security policy with the complications of its economic development policy. Throughout its history under communist rule Xinjiang has experienced dramatic and sudden economic and demographic changes. Chung wrote in 2002 that Beijing’s “war on terror” was ultimately fruitless because it was not addressing the systemic economic and political isolation that the Uighur minority faced in China. Furthermore, the lengths to which Beijing will go to subdue the Uighur separatists shows an inability to adapt to a complex ethnic divide in its own state. “China is distorting the real situation of the Uighur struggle,” Dilxat Rexit, a spokesman for the World Uyghur Congress in Germany, said. “This so-called charge of terrorism is a way for the government to avoid taking responsibility for the use of excessive force that causes so many casualties.” Rexit argues a point that we have heard before in reference to Beijing: a failure to address human and citizen rights issues, only avoidable in the past because the CCP was able to consistently make good on economic development and security promises (or because of the threat of violence). This trend exacerbates the party’s problems in the modern era as interconnectivity through social media and internet publications continues to make it harder for a regime to enact information control on a populace. The harder they squeeze, the more the rest of the world hears of it, and that comes with consequences. The pressure of developing a robust economy in the last four decades has often led the CCP to forsake regional politics in favor of a greater macro-end result. And while the results of this focus speak for themselves, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and dramatically changing the balance of economic power in the world, the CCP continues to alienate the party from the majority of its countrymen (the lower and middle classes) by failing to address citizen rights and quality of life issues. Uighur Separatists have engaged in terrorism and abhorrent violence, and those responsible should be prosecuted in accordance with accepted standards of justice. However, it can hardly be said that there is no legitimacy to the claims of economic and social inequality for the peaceful members of the Uighur populace within China. Denial of basic human rights, overzealous policing, and lack of access to the economic infrastructure of their homeland are a very real threat to their existence and way of life. In May this year President Xi Jinping paid lip service to the plight of the Uighurs in acknowledging efforts to increase bilingual education and job access, but absent from his assertions was any mention of the XPCC and other quasi-military structures employed by the Han migrants that continue to keep the Uighurs at barrel’s length. Stranger still is Xi’s push for “inter-ethnic fusion” by attempting to promote via cash incentive Han and minority marriages, a concept rooted in lofty goals of a melting pot society but ultimately seeking to dilute the ethnic identity of troublesome minorities in China. The speech and the solutions are tone deaf to the plight of the Uighurs, even going so far as to suggest dispersing the Uighur population into the rest of China in a “reverse migration.” There are few data to suggest that these measures are curtailing the separatist movement any more than their predecessors did. Why is the CCP consistently unable to resolve the threat of Uighur separatism and terrorism? There are no shortage of bright and dynamic leaders. Much is certainly written about ethnic divide and insurgency, with data to support it, and party control is no longer bolstered by ethnic chauvinism. It is obvious that part of Beijing’s policy for “integration” and maintenance of domestic peace and harmony between the minorities and Han within China should be a careful assessment and reform of discriminatory behavior by economic and political institutions, and yet those measures seem dangerous in the CCP’s eyes. Is the idea of reform linked with being perceived as weak on security issues for Beijing, or is it merely really a protracted campaign against extremists where even the slightest redress of grievances is seen as appeasement? Two Threats The Uighur minority represents two threats to the CCP: the existential threat of losing regional continuity (and therefore jeopardizing the strength of communist rule), and the inability to adapt to reform in order to diminish internal security threats. Considering the CCP’s necessity to appear strong at all times, it foregoes the scalpel in favor of the sledgehammer, ignoring a minority population rather than seeking to give them a greater economic stake in the region. Despite the control the party exerts in all facets of the Chinese state, the CCP leadership is content to either tie its hands and face the violence of Uighur separatists with paramilitary force and “shock and awe tactics” or it is fundamentally incapable of seeking broader income redistribution, citizens’ rights, and social reform that would help to appease or at least mollify and control Uighur groups. It would serve foreign analysts and academic bodies well to delve further into this issue, and seek to establish precisely what variables are affecting the decision-making process for the party.

#### CCP instability prompts Chinese lash-out to tap into nationalist tendencies, specifically in the South China Sea

Cole 14 — J. Michael Cole, editor and chief of www.thinking-taiwan.com, a web site operated by the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—an educational foundation, former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2014 (“Where Would Beijing Use External Distractions?” *The Diplomat*, July 10th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-external-distractions/>, Accessed 6-30-16)

Throughout history, embattled governments have often resorted to external distractions to tap into a restive population’s nationalist sentiment and thereby release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned against those in power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities through retributive democracy — that is, elections — have used this device to ensure their survival during periods of domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and economic growth, go down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened by domestic instability?

Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and rampant corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where, Beijing could manufacture external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be channeled. In past decades, the CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against external opponents, namely Japan and the United States.

While serving as a convenient outlet, domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese manufacturers), were about as far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was a function both of China’s focus on building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors) and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the world’s second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a decade of double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military.

Those impressive achievements have, however, fueled Chinese nationalism, which has increasingly approached the dangerous zone of hubris. For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding respect, which if denied can — and should — be met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to attribute China’s recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas to the emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a component that cannot be dissociated from this new phase in Chinese expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have told his counterparts at a tense regional forum in Hanoi in 2010, “There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and you are smaller countries.”

This newfound assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that, in times of serious trouble at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction. Doing so is always a calculated risk, and sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease mounting public discontent with his bungled economic policies. For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor), it must not result in failure or military defeat. In other words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a domestic crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for the embattled regime. Risk-taking is therefore proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for External Distractions: The greater the domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take, given that the scope and, above all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater.

With this in mind, we can then ask which external distraction scenarios would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a possibility. The intensifying crackdown on critics of the CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang, random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship — all point to growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood, which Beijing could use for external distraction.

1. South China Sea

The South China Sea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes with smaller claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the sense that the entire body of water is part of China’s indivisible territory and therefore a “core interest,” are sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some “incident,” timed to counter unrest back home, force China to react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has both the numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries which have skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a brief conflict would be low and the likelihood of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction, these opponents would best serve Beijing’s interests.

### 1AC — Cooperation Advantage

#### Chinese credibility on terror is low now but US-Sino Cooperation in Pakistan solves their credibility and increases US-Sino relations. That spills over into other issues in US-Sino relations.

-china’s effective response on terror spills over

Small et al 15— Andrew Small , transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Wei Zhu, program associate with the religion program at the Social Science Research Council in New York, Eric Hundman, doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Chicago, 2015 (“Is China a Credible Partner in Fighting Terror?”, November 24, 2015, Accessed 7/5/16, Available Online at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/24/china-islamic-state-terrorism-war-beijing-paris-us/>, JRR)

There clearly are reasons to doubt China’s credibility as a partner in fighting terror. Its unwillingness to draw clear lines between the terrorist, the political activist, and the aggrieved citizen makes certain forms of cooperation — such as detailed intelligence sharing — very problematic. Beijing’s repressive behavior in Xinjiang actively is worsening the conditions in which terrorist threats are liable to grow. And Beijing is willing to use its position on the U.N. Security Council to extend protection to members of specific terrorist organizations — such as Lashkar-e-Taiba — when it has political reasons to do so. Nonetheless, there is no question that China increasingly is the victim of serious terrorist attacks, both at home and abroad. These are not just attacks on Chinese state institutions but atrocities against Chinese civilians, exemplified by the Kunming attack in 2014. A number of the incidents also have the hallmarks of jihadi methods, implying some degree of external influence even if not direct support. Although their numbers are small and their capacity to act on the Chinese mainland is limited, there are active militant groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party that have had a visible presence in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and now Syria. And after a long period in which Al Qaeda and its affiliates, for tactical reasons, largely considered it inadvisable to make China a target, the Islamic State, by contrast, has been very explicit about the fact that it sees China as an enemy. This is a completely different landscape for Beijing from the one it faced ten years ago. It already has prompted more serious efforts on China’s part to help stabilize Afghanistan, which it fears becoming a safe haven for Uighur militants. Beijing is now one of the leading actors in trying to bring about a political settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Many of its economic initiatives in the region are motivated as much by security considerations as commercial ones. China believes that the conditions in which militancy has thrived really only can be addressed through a transformation of the economic situation in these countries, including Pakistan. In many of these efforts — particularly the reconciliation push in Afghanistan — Beijing is working already with the United States as a close partner. Syria is a more complicated case, where China’s antipathy towards the Islamic State coexists with its aversion to regime change, its backing of Russia’s position, and its caution about the sectarian dimensions of the conflicts underway there. China already has shown tacit support of anti-Islamic State measures though, including military strikes, and if the political pieces fall into place, it is not impossible to imagine a larger Chinese role. Conceived solely through the prism of Xinjiang and Beijing’s domestic counter-terrorism practices, there is good cause to be skeptical about China’s credibility as partner. There are forms of direct counter-terrorism cooperation with Beijing that will be limited, necessarily and rightly. But looking more broadly at stabilizing the whole arc running from Xinjiang to the Middle East, China’s economic and political role is likely to be a crucial one, and aspects of that partnership already are underway. In between offering condolences and expressing solidarity in light of the Nov. 13 Paris attacks, Chinese officials had some pointed comments for those in the West. Chinese President Xi Jinping also strongly criticized the double standard over how terrorism is treated compared to terrorism in the West and emphasized the crucial need for international cooperation against terrorism, linking the Paris attacks to the similar attacks in Xinjiang. While the Chinese government has usually followed an insular approach to domestic issues, it has consistently pushed to connect the unrest in Xinjiang with the Western-led war on terror and extremism. There are certainly some disaffected Uyghurs joining the likes of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State; a recent Islamic State video, for example, highlights its Chinese Uyghur members and includes some harsh words for Chinese infidels. But while the actual extent of those links are debatable, the government has taken a heavy-handed approach to clamp down on any potential subversive activity in Xinjiang, particularly given the instability in neighboring Afghanistan. In light of the Paris attacks, and the death of Chinese citizen Fan Jinghui at hands of the Islamic State, such policies may intensify. But the Chinese government is paying a price for its opaque ways: Western nations have been skeptical and sometimes dismissive of terrorism in China, accusing the government of exaggerating those risks. The Paris attacks are only the latest reminder to many Chinese people that while the Chinese expressed solidarity with France and denounced the perpetrators, the West has been more reluctant to express similar sentiments when such attacks (like the 2014 Kunming attacks) happen in China. The fear and terror caused by these attacks are real, as are the anger and frustration shared by many Chinese at how the West views attacks by Uyghur militants; that is, without sufficient concern and seriousness. The Chinese government has long tied the unrest in Xinjiang to the wider war on terror, but these latest remarks are the most vocal yet, strongly rebuking those that fail to recognize Xinjiang as another frontier in that struggle. At a time when many countries around the world are grappling with the extent and threat of Islamist extremism and terror, Chinese officials want to make clear the legitimacy of their country’s domestic terrorism problems and the importance (and effectiveness) of their policies, both through official statements and state-run media. China is decisively on the same page as Western nations in the struggle against militant Islamist groups. But already in uneasy collaboration with Russia in Syria, will Western nations accept China as another partner if it means compromises elsewhere — such as treating Xinjiang as a legitimate theater of terrorism? Will the threat of groups like the Islamic State necessitate a true global response with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council together as a united front? China has made its goals and interests clear, and the working relationship between China and the West in the war on terror will be an increasingly important topic moving forward. The question of whether China can be a credible partner for the United States is critical — China’s credibility not only will impact the effectiveness of any efforts to cooperate with the United States on terrorism, it also will affect cooperation in other areas where the two share interests, such as climate change, territorial disputes, and trade. However, China’s credibility is not just about China’s actions — it also rests on U.S. perceptions of those actions. In the case of fighting terror, these perceptions hinge on the degrees to which (1) the two countries agree on the nature of terrorism and (2) the United States trusts that China’s ultimate intentions are benign. Given increasing concerns about China’s rise, prospects that the United States will view China as a credible partner in fighting terror appear dim.

#### US-China cooperation over Pakistani terrorism prevent attacks against India.

Smith 11—Dr. Paul J. Smith is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, 2011 (“The China–Pakistan–United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the “War on Terrorism””, December 14, 2011, Accessed 6/30/16, Available Online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00927678.2011.604291>, JRR)

The weapons of mass destruction factor—particularly nuclear technology and materials—adds a powerful urgency to worries about Pakistan’s links to global militant organizations, especially given fears that Pakistan could fall under the control of militants. Pakistan played a central in the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network. Although the activities of the Khan network have been portrayed as the actions of rogue scientists and individuals who operated outside of official state direction, more careful analysis suggests purposeful state involvement, particularly with regard to Pakistan-Iran nuclear cooperation.110 Consequently, Pakistan is perceived to be a key node in potential international proliferation networks, especially with regard to the possibility of nuclear materials being transferred from the state into the hands of nonstate actors. In 2008, the American Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission stated: “Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan.”111 Today, Pakistan is believed to be the fifth largest nuclear power in the world (ahead of France and Britain), with an estimated one hundred deployed nuclear weapons.112 Concerned about proliferation possibilities, the United States has unsuccessfully attempted to remove a stockpile of highly enriched uranium located near an aging nuclear reactor in Pakistan. The U.S. government provided this uranium to Pakistan in the 1960s under the Atoms for Peace Program, during an era in which Washington gave “little thought to proliferation [because] Pakistan seemed too poor and backward to join the nuclear race.”113 The United States reportedly is concerned about diversion by insiders of nuclear material to militants. The issue has gained such priority in Washington that the Obama administration characterized the imperative to prevent terrorists from gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as a “vital interest.”114 Consequently, Pakistan is likely to remain the center of gravity for much global terrorism for many years (and possibly decades) to come. Historically, the United States and China have had the greatest ability to positively influence the Pakistani government, particularly when they act in concert toward common objectives. Beijing and Washington also have a strategic interest in mitigating or containing Pakistan-originating militant Islamist activities within their own borders or other areas associated with their national interests. However, before cooperation can be effective, both countries will need to reconcile differences in how each views Pakistan’s terrorism challenges. For example, China seeks to boost Pakistan’s nuclear program, presumably to maintain Pakistan as a strategic hedge against India, while the United States would prefer to restrain such capabilities out of concern for proliferation and linkages to terrorism. In addition, the larger challenge of an emerging U.S.-China rivalry worldwide—and the implications of reduced cooperation on global challenges such as terrorism—must be managed to prevent Pakistani leaders from playing the two powers against each other. Conclusion. The strategic triangle comprising the United States, Pakistan, and China was created during the Cold War and existed within a larger security configuration in which the Soviet Union served as the external antagonistic referent. It overlaid, dominated, and sometimes assuaged two other subregional structures (the 1947 Indo-Pakistan and 1962 Sino-Indian configurations). Within the Cold War superstructure, the strategic triangle could endure competitive periods—such as the early- to mid-1960s for the United States and China—because of the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the resilience of the triangle began to atrophy as U.S. engagement with Pakistan largely declined and was complicated by an array of economic and military sanctions. Consequently, the United StatesPakistan leg of the triangle diminished in strength, while the China-Pakistan leg continued to flourish, stimulated largely by the two countries’ rivalry over India and other common interests. For its part, the United States concentrated on advancing and improving relations with China. This trend was dramatically interrupted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, after which Washington reinvigorated its relationship with Islamabad. The rise of global terrorism appeared to represent the onset of a new Cold War–like external referent or threat that could sustain the strategic triangle among China, Pakistan, and the United States. The fact that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan during the early 2000s were assisted or at least tolerated by Pakistan and China adds credence to this view. For Pakistan, terrorism continues to pose a long-term threat to the country’s political and economic viability, as well as to regional security. The United States and China have the greatest potential to constructively influence Pakistan’s counterterrorism posture. However, if the countries choose competition and rivalry over cooperation, the range and extent of cooperation that both countries could employ vis-a-vis Pakistan will likely be circumscribed. If, for example, the United ` States strengthens ties with India with designs on containing China, this action will most likely contribute to Pakistan’s “neuralgic security concerns regarding India’s intentions and capabilities.”115 In turn, Islamabad’s old habits might be revived, such as turning to nonstate actor proxy groups to launch small-scale attacks against India or other countries. Indeed, possession of a nuclear deterrent has apparently emboldened Pakistan to continue pursuing such a proxy war strategy.116 On the other hand, if the United States and China can find and cultivate areas of common interest in terms of counterterrorism and stability in Pakistan (and, by extension, Afghanistan), their combined influence may help mitigate or contain regional violence, terrorism, and weapons proliferation. Under such circumstances, the China-Pakistan-U.S. strategic triangle may provide an alternative power structure that constrains the worst proclivities of the Pakistani state. However, before such goals can be realized, Beijing and Washington must acknowledge their common interests and recognize the indispensable and symbiotic role that the other plays in this triangular power dynamic.

#### Continued Pakistani terrorists attacks on India causes war.

Zarate 2/20/2011 (Juan C, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009, “An alarming South Asia powder keg,” Wasington Post 7/9/2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021805662.html> JJH)

In 1914, a terrorist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo - unleashing geopolitical forces and World War I. Today, while the United States rightly worries about al-Qaeda targeting the homeland, the most dangerous threat may be another terrorist flash point on the horizon. Lashkar-i-Taiba holds the match that could spark a conflagration between nuclear-armed historic rivals India and Pakistan. Lashkar-i-Taiba is a Frankenstein's monster of the Pakistani government's creation 20 years ago. It has diverse financial networks and well-trained and well-armed cadres that have struck Indian targets from Mumbai to Kabul. It collaborates with the witches' brew of terrorist groups in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, and has demonstrated global jihadist ambitions. It is merely a matter of time before Lashkar-i-Taiba attacks again. Significant terrorist attacks in India, against Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The countries remain deeply distrustful of each other. Another major strike against Indian targets in today's tinderbox environment could lead to a broader, more devastating conflict. The United States should be directing political and diplomatic capital to prevent such a conflagration. The meeting between Indian and Pakistani officials in Bhutan this month - their first high-level sit-down since last summer - set the stage for restarting serious talks on the thorny issue of Kashmir. Washington has only so much time. Indian officials are increasingly dissatisfied with Pakistan's attempts to constrain Lashkar-i-Taiba and remain convinced that Pakistani intelligence supports the group. An Indian intelligence report concluded last year that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate was involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and late last year the Indian government raised security levels in anticipation of strikes. India is unlikely to show restraint in the event of another attack. Lashkar-i-Taiba may also feel emboldened since the assassination in early January of a moderate Punjabi governor muted Pakistani moderates and underscored the weakness of the government in Islamabad. The group does not want peace talks to resume, so it might act to derail progress. Elements of the group may see conflict with India as in their interest, especially after months of unrest in Kashmir. And the Pakistani government may not be able to control the monster it created. A war in South Asia would be disastrous not just for the United States. In addition to the human devastation, it would destroy efforts to bring stability to the region and to disrupt terrorist havens in western Pakistan. Many of the 140,000 Pakistani troops fighting militants in the west would be redeployed east to battle Indian ground forces. This would effectively convert tribal areas bordering Afghanistan into a playing field for militants. Worse, the Pakistani government might be induced to make common cause with Lashkar-i-Taiba, launching a proxy fight against India. Such a war would also fuel even more destructive violent extremism within Pakistan. In the worst-case scenario, an attack could lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. India's superior conventional forces threaten Pakistan, and Islamabad could resort to nuclear weapons were a serious conflict to erupt. Indeed, The Post reported that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and capabilities are set to surpass those of India.

#### Indo-Pak nuclear war escalates quickly and causes extinction – computer models prove.

GSN 10 (Global Security Newswire, 3/16/2010, “Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns,” <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100315_4193.php>)

Computer modeling suggests a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would block out the sun with large amounts of airborne debris, disrupting global agriculture and leading to the starvation of around 1 billion people, Scientific American reported in its January issue (see GSN, March 4). The nuclear winter scenario assumes that cities and industrial zones in each nation would be hit by 50 bombs the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in World War II. Although some analysts have suggested a nuclear exchange would involve fewer weapons, researchers who created the computer models contended that the panic from an initial nuclear exchange could cause a conflict to quickly escalate. Pakistan, especially, might attempt to fire all of its nuclear weapons in case India's conventional forces overtake the country's military sites, according to Peter Lavoy, an analyst with the Naval Postgraduate School. The nuclear blasts and subsequent blazes and radiation could kill more than 20 million people in India and Pakistan, according to the article. Assuming that each of the 100 bombs would burn an area equivalent to that seen at Hiroshima, U.S. researchers determined that the weapons used against Pakistan would generate 3 million metric tons of smoke and the bombs dropped on India would produce 4 million metric tons of smoke. Winds would blow the material around the world, covering the atmosphere over all continents within two weeks. The reduction in sunlight would cause temperatures to drop by 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit for several years and precipitation to drop by one-tenth. The climate changes and other environmental effects of the nuclear war would have a devastating effect on crop yields unless farmers prepared for such an occurrence in advance. The observed effects of volcano eruptions, smoke from forest fires and other events support the findings of the computer modeling, the researchers said. "A nuclear war could trigger declines in yield nearly everywhere at once, and a worldwide panic could bring the global agricultural trading system to a halt, with severe shortages in many places. Around 1 billion people worldwide who now live on marginal food supplies would be directly threatened with starvation by a nuclear war between India and Pakistan or between other regional nuclear powers," wrote Alan Robock, a climatology professor at Rutgers University in New Jersey, and Owen Brian Toon, head of the Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences Department at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

### 1AC — Solvency

#### The plan increases Chinese pressure on Pakistan.

Curtis, 3/10/2016 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, “China’s South Asia Strategy” Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Accessed 7/1/16 <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/chinas-south-asia-strategy> JJH)

With regard to Afghanistan, the U.S. should continue to work closely with China to bring a peaceful solution to the conflict. But the U.S. must also convince China that unless Pakistan cracks down on the Taliban on its side of the border, the insurgents will continue to make military gains in Afghanistan. While Pakistan has a critical role to play in encouraging Afghan reconciliation, it must prove that it is willing to pressure Taliban leaders to reduce the violence in Afghanistan. It is not enough for Pakistan to merely convince the Taliban to come to the negotiating table. Otherwise, a reconciliation process would merely turn into a way for the Taliban to bide its time while making military advances in Afghanistan. The U.S. should also seek to convince China that overcoming the Islamist extremist threat in South Asia will require Pakistan to give up its reliance on terrorist proxies that attack India. The U.S. should convince China to cooperate on banning Pakistani terrorist organizations and individuals within the UN Security Council as a way to delegitimize terrorism more broadly. Washington must emphasize that, by giving Pakistan a pass on supporting terrorist groups that attack India, China is, in fact, encouraging overall extremist trends in Pakistani society. Lastly, the U.S. should support the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The U.S. should help evaluate the progress of CPEC and encourage U.S. companies to support projects that are economically feasible and that will contribute to economic development in Pakistan and regional economic integration. Although questions persist about China’s willingness to commit to major investments in the projects, and about Pakistan’s capacity to absorb the same, any steps that might even marginally improve the energy sector and infrastructure in Pakistan are welcome.

#### China is an honest broker and can pressure Pakistan to stop proving the Taliban a safe haven.

Caragliano and Coburn, 4/21/2015 (David, lawyer and an international development professional currently managing programs in Asia; Fellow of the Truman National Security Project and Noah, professor of political anthropology at Bennington College who served as an election monitor in Afghanistan in 2014; Fellow of the Truman National Security Project “Could Afghanistan Be a Model for US-China Cooperation?” The Diplomat Accessed 6/30/2015 <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/could-afghanistan-be-a-model-for-us-china-cooperation/> JJH)

Afghanistan is one place they can start. The U.S. and China both have an interest in a peaceful and self-sustaining Afghanistan. On the diplomatic front, the U.S., China, and Afghanistan have already been engaged in trilateral cooperation. At the London Conference, a multilateral event, senior officials from the three countries met privately to discuss Afghanistan’s future. Recent statements from China’s representative at the UN Security Council indicate a willingness to act as a mediator in Afghan peace and reconciliation process. The reasons for Chinese and U.S. interest in Afghanistan are clear. From the U.S. perspective, President Barack Obama’s decision to slow the withdrawal of troops through 2015 underscores the importance his administration attaches to the outcome of America’s engagement there. From China’s perspective, the shared border between Afghanistan and China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region means that China will continue to have a stake in its neighbor’s stability. Xi’s “One Belt One Road” development strategy envisions Chinese-built oil pipelines, telecom, and high-speed rail crossing Central Asia and bridging China, the Middle East, and Europe with Xinjiang as the hub. Further, the possibility that separatist Uyghur fighters may receive training in the lawless Afghanistan-Pakistan border region presents China with a troublesome vulnerability. Peace with the Taliban starts with establishing trust between the Afghan government and the Pakistani government, which has provided a safe harbor to Taliban insurgents. U.S. pressure on Pakistan has had limited effects, but China’s entry into the conversation could reshape the dialogue. As close allies and “all weather friends” with Pakistan, China is well positioned to play the role of honest broker, particularly given the fact that U.S.-Pakistani relations have deteriorated since they were declared a key partner in the global war on terror over a decade ago. Afghanistan needs a government that can bring infrastructure, jobs, education, healthcare, and justice to its people for any lasting peace. Both the U.S. and China have made investments in Afghanistan’s development, yet they take different approaches. Of the $1.594 billion in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in FY2015, about 19 percent is solely dedicated to the country’s economic development. The remainder covers peace and security, democracy and governance, health, education, and social services, and surely, these underpin sustainable, long-term growth. China’s contribution in Afghanistan pales in an absolute sense, but in Afghanistan and throughout the world, China has made targeted investments in infrastructure and natural resource extraction (much for its own consumption). Put in context, China’s recent promise of $327 million (RMB 2 billion) to Afghanistan over the next two years is not insignificant; U.S. assistance toward infrastructure in Afghanistan this year stands at $69 million. The countries’ divergent approaches to development are rooted in ideological differences. China’s rhetoric emphasizes its policy of non-interference in the domestic politics of sovereign governments. This principle goes back to the Final Communiqué of the 1955 Bandung Conference. (The event which this week’s Asian-African Conference in Indonesia commemorates.) Western donors are more inclined to link aid with the promotion of good governance as outlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. Despite their ideological differences, both countries face many of the same challenges on the ground. The crippling costs of endemic Afghan government corruption make any international development efforts challenging, to say the least. According to the Wall Street Journal, an Afghan diplomat admitted that the Afghan government viewed the China Metallurgical Group’s investment in the Aynak copper mine as a “cow to milk” for bribes. The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has made similarly bleak assessments on the misuse of U.S. project funds. In the context of Afghanistan, the U.S. and China may more easily broach otherwise sensitive topics – like transparency and openness in procurement. Chinese companies have already reported under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Central Asian and African countries. A trilateral dialogue allowing exploration of these issues could contribute to mutual understanding and may yield positive results. Each party in the tripartite holds special interest in ensuring a stable and predictable marketplace. Such cooperation is not equivalent to interfering in Afghan domestic politics because President Ashraf Ghani himself has prioritized these problems. Ghani has moved quickly, firing local officials and centralizing billions of dollars in procurement deals under his purview. There are daunting challenges, but he has acknowledged that multi-stakeholder initiatives to promote transparency can be useful to push for reform in government systems. Afghanistan presents challenges and opportunities for both the U.S. and China. Working together, they could fix the significant problems, energize high-level diplomacy, and provide a future model for U.S.-China cooperation.

#### Additional US Aid is mutually reinforcing with Chinese projects. Only the plan solves.

Markey and West, 5/12/2016 (Daniel S., Adjunct Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia @ CFR, and James, Research Associate, India, Pakistan, and South Asia @CFR, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan” Council on Foreign Relations Accessed 7/5/16 <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/behind-chinas-gambit-pakistan/p37855> JJH)

The United States will also have its own long-term concerns about the CPEC, as it represents the leading edge of China’s expanding access to, and likely influence within, Eurasia. As Pakistan grows closer to China, there may be temptation in Washington to compete for influence in Islamabad. This competition is best avoided, as it would be costly, unwinnable, and almost certainly counterproductive to other U.S. goals in Pakistan and the region. Pakistanis will reach their own conclusions about how best to pursue relations with Beijing and Washington, and are likely to pursue distinct ties with both sides. U.S. officials should seize the opportunity provided by Pakistan’s intense focus on the CPEC to advance its own set of politically sustainable goals in Pakistan, paying particular attention to U.S. concerns about terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the war in Afghanistan. Finally, though Chinese and Pakistani officials are wary of U.S. overtures, the CPEC should be appreciated as an opportunity for closer trilateral cooperation. The United States could redirect a portion of current civilian assistance funds into projects that are aligned with CPEC goals—such as technical improvements to Pakistan’s national power grid—to help create jobs, spur economic growth, and provide incentives for additional outside investment. U.S. aid can and should continue to play a constructive role in Pakistan, and if harmonized with Chinese efforts could enhance the efficacy of both. This would require opening a new, detail-oriented dialogue with both Pakistani and Chinese officials. In addition, U.S. officials, including from the State Department and Export-Import Bank, should use their conversations with Pakistani counterparts to ensure that CPEC-style protections for Chinese corporations and investors are also applied to U.S. firms. The CPEC will have the best chance of transforming Pakistan’s economic outlook if it also sparks a wave of foreign investment from other countries, including the United States.

### 1NC — India DA

#### India perceives CPEC as an attempt at containment

Ramachandran 15 — Sudha Ramachandran, independent researcher / journalist based in India. She writes on South Asian political and security issues. Her articles have appeared in Asia Times Online, The Diplomat, China Brief, etc., 2015 (“India and the CPEC project: to oppose or not to oppose?”, The Central Asia Caucus Analyst, September 10th, Accessed Online at http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13272-india-and-the-cpec-project-to-oppose-or-not-to-oppose?.html, Accessed 07-11-2016, SP)

IMPLICATIONS: Pakistan and China enjoy a warm relationship that goes back over five decades. Economic and defense co-operation is robust, including in the nuclear field. Co-operation over CPEC is expected to further cement the Sino-Pakistan bond, triggering concern in India. India has raised objections to the corridor’s route, which runs through Gilgit-Baltistan, territory which India lays claim to. Part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (which, in turn, is claimed by Pakistan), Gilgit Baltistan has been under Pakistani control since 1947. India has objected to Pakistan’s moves to assert ownership or consolidate control over what it considers Indian territory under its occupation. Thus it objected to Pakistan offering the Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963 and to China’s construction of Karakoram Highway and its investment in “development” projects here. India also has strategic concerns. For over a decade now, analysts have been drawing attention to China’s “String of Pearls,” a network of ports extending from its eastern coast to West Asia. They have argued that China’s funding and construction/upgrading of these ports aims at gaining access to naval facilities, perhaps even permission to set up bases here in the future. The strategy would give China permanent access to the Indian Ocean, through which vital shipping routes for China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf run. India fears that China’s String of Pearls is aimed at encircling and containing India. It views the Maritime Silk Route project as a benign reinvention of the String of Pearls strategy. Gwadar port is said to be the western-most “pearl” in this “string.” Its strategic location near the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz is of concern to India as 63 percent of India’s oil imports are transported via this waterway. A Pakistan-China presence here, especially with Beijing gaining management control of this port for 40 years has deepened India’s anxieties as it has the potential to undermine India’s energy and economic security. CPEC heightens the threat China poses to India’s defense. In the event of a military confrontation with India or if China decides to come to Islamabad’s aid in an India-Pakistan war, CPEC’s infrastructure will facilitate Chinese deployment of troops rapidly to India’s western front, as well.

#### Containing India causes conflict with China.

Joshi, 2013 (Sachindra, Masters Thesis and Lt. Colonel in the Indian Army, “THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER: IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE?” Accessed 7/15/16 www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA599319 JJH)

The frequent intrusions inside Indian territory by PLA patrols that Chinese officials often blame on their local commanders as acting on their own discretion if followed with long term occupation of territory or casualties, could compel India to react with force leading to an escalation to major conflict. The inexperience of the Chinese and Indian lower-level local commanders and soldiers could spark a conflict. Likewise, the Sino-Pak entente, threatening India with encirclement in J&K and/or a proxy war by China supporting Pakistan to create a Kargil-like situation that could force India to react either directly, or indirectly by using its Tibet card could further aggravate the situation. In the maritime theatre, both China and India view the South China Sea and Indian Ocean as their respective areas of influence and dislike others navies in their domain. In attempts to encircle and counter encirclement, both navies seem to be moving towards a potential conflict in the naval domain. Any issue on the land domain and/or maritime clash due to PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean and IN presence in the South China Sea could also escalate and engulf the naval domain. However, as of now, both PLAN and IN lack the capability to pose a real threat to each other. Any trigger for conflict would be a result of mistake and miscalculation from either side, however, the conditions and environment are set militarily for that trigger to escalate into a conflict.

#### Sino-Indian conflict goes nuclear – extinction

Rory Medcalf 12, Director-International Security Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, with FIONA CUNNINGHAM, The Dangers of Denial: Nuclear Weapons in China-India Relations–http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Cunningham\_and\_Medcalf%2C\_The\_dangers\_of\_denial\_web.pdf

The nuclear dynamic between China and India – the world’s two most populous states armed with the world’s most dangerous weapons – has long been a strangely cold issue in international affairs: underexplored and underestimated. It is often assumed they have a stable relationship involving mutual deterrence that would function in a crisis and that this benign situation will endure.1 But as their power and interests expand, such assumptions will need to be re-examined. It is striking that, despite their commonalities of restrained nuclear postures and disarmament rhetoric, China and India have failed to achieve reassurance and cooperation on nuclear issues. This is an unpropitious starting point for a relationship that is becoming more competitive. 2 The more troubling conceivable futures for Sino-Indian nuclear relations are marked by questions about the effectiveness of deterrence and a lack of preparation for crisis management. In any case, the implications of nuclear competition between China and India extend beyond the possibilities – remote but not to be dismissed – of military confrontation, the exchange of nuclear threats or nuclear use. This dynamic is creating new uncertainties in relations between the two powers, as well as their relations with the United States and Pakistan. It is also obstructing global arms control and disarmament efforts. In this Lowy Institute Analysis, we assess Sino- Indian nuclear dynamics including by examining the two countries' nuclear capabilities and postures, drivers of security tensions and potential flashpoints. We conclude by suggesting measures to restrain this nascent nuclear competition. Strategic tensions Competition, coexistence and asymmetry Mistrust is an enduring feature of relations between India and China, and has worsened in the past five years. Certainly some substantial elements of cooperation have simultaneously grown and persisted, resulting in what might be termed competitive coexistence rather than full- blown rivalry.\* China has become India's largest trading partner, though economic competition could deepen as manufacturing expands in India. As huge developing nations, India and China have parallel interests in some global forums, such as on climate change, but this has not led to patterns of sustained cooperation, trust or mutual respect.

### 1NC — U.S. Pressure CP

#### The United States federal government should:

#### condition all military assistance to Pakistan on Pakistan taking meaningful steps to shutdown the Haqqani network and Taliban operations in Pakistan.

#### increase intelligence, logistics and air support to Afghanistan

#### ease the rules of engagement for targeting the Taliban and ISIS.

#### Only sustained US pressure can solve

Khalilzad and Dobbins ‘16, 1/11/2016 (Zalmay, former American ambassador to Afghanistan and U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, is a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies., and James veteran diplomat who most recently served as the State Department's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a senior fellow at RAND, “Pakistan Holds the Key to Peace in Afghanistan” The RAND Blog Access 7/1/16 http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/01/pakistan-holds-the-key-to-peace-in-afghanistan.html JJH)

Without Pakistani initiative, talks with the Taliban are unlikely to succeed. Perhaps with Pakistani consent and support the Taliban will continue to push their advantage on the ground. Alternatively, given ground realities, the Taliban might demand that the United States and Afghanistan cede provinces in the east and the south to them. Territorial demands in particular would prove unacceptable to Washington and Kabul, as they would create a new terrorist sanctuary and serve as a launching pad for insurgents to divide Afghanistan and seize Kabul. Continued U.S. pressure is needed to induce Pakistani cooperation in reducing the violence. Congress withheld nearly a third of the military assistance allocated to Pakistan for 2015 due to Islamabad's failure to take meaningful action against the Haqqani network. An even larger proportion of the assistance should be conditioned in the coming year on Islamabad closing down the Haqqani network and Taliban military in the country. Another step that would steer Pakistan in a more cooperative direction is for the United States to move urgently in addressing the gaps in Afghan capabilities identified during the last fighting season in areas such as intelligence, logistics and air support. Washington should not rule out deploying some additional forces and easing rules of engagement for targeting the Taliban and ISIS targets. At this juncture, sustained and intensified pressure on Pakistan offers the only viable path to advancing the reconciliation process in a way that does not turn Afghanistan into a launching pad for terrorism and extremism.

### 2AC — India DA

#### 1. No link and turn- India wants cooperation over terrorism in Pakistan and the plan would increase India-China relations

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Some in the Indian strategic community have suggested that China shares a range of objectives with India including a prosperous, sustainable, and secure Pakistan that does not remain a base for al-Qaeda and its affiliates.16 The rapidly deteriorating situation in Pakistan and its long-term consequences for regional stability might, some suggest, result in greater cooperation between Beijing and New Delhi to stabilize the shared periphery between the two nations. Turbulence in Xinjiang, such as the riots between Han Chinese and the Muslim Uighurs in 2009, is indeed forcing Beijing to pay greater attention to the sources of international terrorism in Pakistan, given the prospect of Islamist extremism spilling over from Afghanistan and Pakistan into the restive autonomous region of western China. China’s concerns about Islamist militancy on its western border have been rising over the past few years and the security environment in Afghanistan and the larger Central Asian region remains a huge worry. Yet, China refuses to discuss Pakistan with India in order to ensure that its privileged relationship with Pakistan remains intact, and U.S.—China cooperation on Pakistan has remained minimal. China and India share a range of objectives in Pakistan, including preventing the rise and spread of extremism, fostering economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan, overall political stability and social cohesion in Pakistan, and the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Of all the major powers, it is China that can effectively leverage its growing economic profile in Pakistan to ensure Pakistan’s security establishment cedes power to the civilians, allowing the Pakistani state to function effectively. Chinese workers and assets have been targeted by extremists in Pakistan, and Chinese plans to emerge as a major investor in Afghanistan would remain a fantasy without Pakistan reining in extremist groups in Afghanistan.

#### 2. CPEC tensions won’t cause escalation

Adeel 15- Staff Writer at newPakistan, Cynthia Hall’s Nuclear Warning – Is It Worse Than It Seems? <http://new-pakistan.com/2015/06/01/cynthia-halls-nuclear-warning-is-it-worse-than-it-seems/> 7/12/16 @yangtri

We have been hearing a lot lately about RAW’s intentions against Pakistan and their fury over CPEC which has been termed as a ‘game changer’ for the region. Supposedly, there are 35,000 RAW agents on the loose in Pakistan, though our intelligence agencies have not been able to arrest a single one. We have been told that RAW is responsible for terrorism, though the actual terrorists who have been arrested in connection continue to be either run-of-the-mill extremists or educated middle-class jihadis. Each time, though, the stakes keep getting made higher. Now, the stakes have been taken to a truly terrifying level with claims that India is considering arming assets in Pakistan with “small nuclear devices”. However, the source of this latest claim makes it even more terrifying that it seems. This latest statement was allegedly made by a high ranking Indian intelligence officer and was reported by Cynthia Hall writing from Damascus. In case you are unfamiliar with this journalist, don’t feel too bad. She is a complete bloody mystery. Nobody has ever heard of her, and nobody can find any information about her anywhere. Despite the fact that she has never apparently written a report for any publication before, she somehow managed to travel into Syria and get an interview with high level intelligence officers who were more than happy to reveal to this strange woman some nuclear secrets and India’s strategic plans to violate international law. If you haven’t seen the article, I will post it below. The only known existence is this online picture that is shared on social media, so I can’t give you any link. Straight from the horse's... As you can see, the important points are carefully highlighted in case you only have a few seconds to read before you email this to your friends and relatives giving them the dire warning. In case you can’t tell from my tone, I am mostly being sarcastic. This is an obvious piece of very poorly made propaganda, and I will continue to support that position until Cynthia Hall herself comes forward and explains what she was doing in Syria and how she had such incredible access to Indian intelligence. There is one thing that I am not being sarcastic about, though, and that is that this piece of propaganda is terrifying to me. Not because I believe that India is going to give terrorists “small nuclear devices”, but because I worry about what it means when propaganda escalates into the nuclear zone. It would make no sense for India to give proxies small nuclear weapons to use against Pakistan. The first response would obviously be a nuclear retaliation, which would mean that India was acting suicidally. India’s paranoia may have brought it to a point where they are arresting small birds, but there’s no evidence that they have become crazy enough to invite a nuclear war.

#### 3. Link turn – Terrorist attacks have have decimated India for years. India likes the plan because it’s perceived as a strong counter-terror measure.

#### 4. Joshi card is too old- CPEC has been around for a while and that should have triggered the impact.

#### 5. India is breaking containment now.

Abbhi, 1/26/2015 (Ashay, Research Analyst based out of Noida, India and was a Lecturer at the London School of Energy Studies, “String of Pearls: India and the Geopolitics of Chinese Foreign Policy” E-International Relations Accessed 7/12/16 <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/26/string-of-pearls-india-and-the-geopolitics-of-chinese-foreign-policy/> JJH)

China and India are constantly looking for better energy pastures. In the process, the two global giants are moving towards a diplomatic stand-off that could devastate the balance of peace in the Indian subcontinent, which, as it is, hangs by a mere thread. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, that were earlier thick with the Chinese are slowly embracing New Delhi’s reach out potentially becoming India’s strength in the region. The near-equal influence exerted in these countries by India and China could result in a neutral stance taken by them in the event of a war. However, China has the support of India’s western neighbor, one that has so far been diplomatically deaf to India’s efforts. But to counter that, Vietnam is rapidly becoming to India what Pakistan is to China. The US dynamic also plays a significant role here, especially when considering the oil wealth of the Middle East that India’s strong US ties can get it access to, countered by China only through its energy and diplomatic relations with Iran. While the ‘string of pearls’ policy may give Chinese energy better security in the Indian Ocean, the reverse of it will give India access to more oil and gas while countering Chinese military influence in the region and diminishing the diplomatic threat to itself. At the cusp of military and energy security balances the diplomatic battle is raging in the region, one that may not have a clear winner for years but has generated enough interest for the world to watch the passive stand-offs keenly. China has been pursuing its ‘string of pearls’ policy against India for more than a decade, but only now has the dynamic started to change, with Modi driving his own ‘reverse string of pearls’ policy, snatching one pearl at a time until China stands red-faced holding the mere string.

#### 6. Link turn-OBOR helps India

Saran 15- Shyam Saran, Indian career diplomat. He joined the [Indian Foreign Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Foreign_Service) in 1970 and rose to become the [Foreign Secretary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Secretary_(India)) to the [Government of India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_India). Prior to his appointment as the Foreign Secretary he served as India's ambassador to [Myanmar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burma), [Indonesia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia)and [Nepal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepal) and as High Commissioner to [Mauritius](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mauritius). Upon completion of his tenure as the Foreign Secretary he was appointed Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Indo-US civil nuclear issues and later as Special Envoy and Chief Negotiator on Climate Change. [EXTERNAL AFFAIRS](http://thewire.in/category/external-affairs/), What China’s One Belt and One Road Strategy Means for India, Asia and the World <http://thewire.in/12532/what-chinas-one-belt-and-one-road-strategy-means-for-india-asia-and-the-world/> TMY 7/5/16

What’s in this for India? Since India lacks the resources today to set up competing networks, it may be worthwhile to participate in those components of the OBOR which might improve Indian connectivity to major markets and resource supplies While looking at the emerging geo-political landscape, Saul Bernhard Cohen, in his book Geopolitics, envisages the emergence of three strategic realms this century. One is the US-dominated maritime world of the North Atlantic and the North Pacific Basin; there is the second realm of Maritime Europe, organised around the European Union, and a Continental Asia geo-strategic realm covering the Eurasia landmass with Russia as the original core. But, as pointed out earlier, China has emerged as a separate Continental Maritime realm, shrinking the space for Russia in Central Asia and for the US in the North Pacific. There is an incipient effort to co-opt Russia on the one hand and Europe on the other to confine the US to the American hemisphere. The playing out of this story has major implications, because in case China succeeds with the global strategy underlying OBOR, India may well be consigned to the margins of both land and maritime Asia or become, by compulsion or by choice, a subordinate component of the Chinese-dominated network that is, in the words of Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, “hard-wiring” the new world. Interestingly, Cohen foresaw a time when India, like China, could carve out a fourth geo-strategic realm also continental/maritime in nature. This it would do by dominating the eastern and western reaches of the Indian Ocean and the sub-continental landmass, south of Eurasia but linked to it. If this were indeed possible then India would have an opportunity to deal with the challenge of the Chinese geo-strategic realm on its doorstep with greater room for manoeuvre. I have argued before and do so again: If there is one country which has the potential to catch up with China and even overtake it, it is India. The current asymmetry is not riven in stone. What it will take India to achieve this long-term goal is well-known and I will not repeat it. Currently, India has neither the resources nor the political and economic weight to put in place competitive and alternative connectivity networks on a global scale. Therefore, for the time being, it may be worthwhile to carefully evaluate those components of the OBOR which may, in fact, improve India’s own connectivity to major markets and resource supplies and become participants in them just as we have chosen to do with the AIIB and the NDB. For example, building a road/rail link to Central Asia through Iran using the port of Chahbahar could then use Chinese built routes to access both Central Asian and Russian destinations as well as Europe. It may be more important to deploy our limited resources to build an Indian Ocean network of ports, with connecting highways and rail routes such as exemplified by the planned Mekong-Ganga corridor and the Sittwe-Mizoram multi-modal transport corridor. There have been longstanding plans to develop the deep water port on Sri Lanka’s eastern coast, Trincomalee, as a major energy and transport hub and yet, despite the warning message in the shape of Chinea building the Hambantota port in southern Sri Lanka and expanding the Colombo port, virtually no work has been undertaken since Indian Oil acquired the tank farm located at the port. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie at the very centre of the Bay of Bengal and could be developed to serve as a regional shipping hub for the littoral states and beyond. And yet, India continues to treat these islands as a distant outpost rather than leveraging their unique location at the very centre of one of the most strategic stretches of ocean space. There has been much talk about India launching a Spice Route, a Cotton Route and even a Mausam project tying the countries around the Indian Ocean bound together by the monsoon winds. Instead of spreading our limited resources thinly over these mostly rhetorical ripostes to China’s OBOR, it may be more prudent to focus on limited but strategically key routes and ports along our adjacent seas and islands to safeguard our most important equities. To recapitulate, the first priority would be developing our own Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a modern transport and shipping hub for the Bay of Bengal Basin. At the next level would be Chahbahar port to the west with road/rail links to Central Asia; Trincomalee port to the east, with shipping links to the Bay of Bengal littoral ports and beyond; the Mekong-Ganga corridor linking India’s east coast with Indo-China; and the Kaladan multi-modal transport corridor in Myanmar’s Rakhine province, including the port of Sittwe. The proposed BCIM corridor could then become part of this broader network. Once this primary circle has been secured one could move on to progressively expanding circles as resources become available. What is important to note is that in this 21st century strategy, security and economics go together. Creating a dense web of economic and trade relations itself becomes an assurance of security. It is fair to say that China, in deploying the OBOR initiative, has demonstrated a level of ambition and imagination which is mostly absent in India’s national discourse. It is time both scholars and practitioners started to think and act strategically on issues such as OBOR which will have a significant impact on India’s vital interests.

#### 7. Case o/w the DA- Status Quo CPEC existence proves there’s no brink for the DA, but the 1ac indicates Pakistan has an incentive to escalate faster because of their “use them or lose them” mindset. .

#### 8. No China-India war – economics and US deterrent

Tharoor 11 (Ishaan, Editor – Global Spin, “China and India at War: Study Contemplates Conflict Between Asian Giants,” European Dialogue, 11-7, http://eurodialogue.org/China-and-India-at-War-Study-Contemplates-Conflict-Between-Asian-Giants)

There are plenty of reasons why China and India won't go to war. The two Asian giants hope to reach $100 billion in annual bilateral trade by 2015. Peace and stability are watchwords for both nations' rise on the world stage. Yet tensions between the neighbors seem inescapable: they face each other across a heavily militarized nearly 4,000km-long border and are increasingly competing against each other in a scramble for natural resources around the world. Indian fears over Chinese projects along the Indian Ocean rim were matched recently by Beijing's ire over growing Indian interests in the South China Sea, a body of water China controversially claims as its exclusive territorial sphere of influence. Despite the sense of optimism and ambition that drives these two states, which comprise between them nearly a third of humanity, the legacy of the brief 1962 Sino-Indian war (a humiliating blow for India) still smolders nearly five decades later. And it's alive on the pages of a new policy report issued by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, an independent think tank that is affiliated with India's Ministry of Defense. "A Consideration of Sino-Indian Conflict" is hardly a hawkish tract — it advocates "war avoidance" — but, by spelling out a few concrete scenarios of how conflict may look between the two countries, it reveals the palpable lack of trust on the part of strategists both in New Delhi and Beijing. The report applauds long-term Indian efforts underway to beef up defenses along the Chinese border, but warns that Beijing may still take action: In future, India could be subject to China's hegemonic attention. Since India would be better prepared by then, China may instead wish to set India back now by a preventive war. This means current day preparedness is as essential as preparation for the future. A [defeat] now will have as severe political costs, internally and externally, as it had back in 1962; for, as then, India is yet again contemplating a global role. While a lot of recent media attention has focused on the likelihood of Sino-Indian clashes at sea, the IDSA report keeps its scope trained along the traditional, glacial Himalayan land boundary, referred to in wonkish parlance as the LAC, the Line of Actual Control. Since the 1962 war, China and India have yet to formally resolve longstanding disputes over vast stretches of territory along this line. Those disputes have resurfaced noticeably in recent years, with China making unprecedented noises, much to the alarm of New Delhi, over its historical claims to the entirety of the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh — what the Chinese deem "Southern Tibet." The Chinese even rebuked Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for having the audacity of visiting the Indian state during local elections in 2009. Not surprisingly, it's in this remote corner of the world that many suspect a war could kick off, particularly around the historic Tibetan monastery town of Tawang. India has reinforced its position in Arunachal with more boots on the ground, new missile defenses and some of the Indian air force's best strike craft, new Russian-made Su-30 fighters. After decades of focusing its army west against perennial threat Pakistan, India is tacitly realigning its military east to face the long-term challenge of China. The report speculates that China could make a targeted territorial grab, "for example, a bid to take Tawang." Further west along the LAC, another flashpoint lies in Kashmir. China controls a piece of largely uninhabited territory known as Aksai Chin that it captured during the 1962 war. Indian press frequently publish alarmist stories about Chinese incursions from Aksai Chin and elsewhere, playing up the scale of Chinese investment in strategic infrastructure on its side of the border in stark contrast to the seeming lethargy of Indian planners. Part of what fuels the anxiety in New Delhi, as the report notes, is the threat of coordinated action between China and Pakistan — an alliance built largely out of years of mutual antipathy toward India. In one mooted scenario, Pakistan, either with its own forces or terrorist, insurgent proxies, would "make diversionary moves" across the blood-stained Siachen glacier or Kargil, site of the last Indo-Pakistani war in 1999, while a Chinese offensive strikes further east along the border. Of course, such table-top board game maneuvers have little purchase in present geo-politics. Direct, provocative action suits no player in the region, particularly when there's the specter of American power — a curious absence in the IDSA report — hovering on the sidelines. Intriguingly, the report seems to dismiss the notion that China and India would clash in what others would consider obvious hotspots for rivalry; it says the landlocked Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan would likely be treated as a neutral "Switzerland", while Nepal, a country of 40 million that entertains both Beijing and New Delhi's patronage, is more or less assured that neither of its big neighbors would risk violating its sovereignty in the event of war.

### 2AC — U.S. Pressure CP

#### 1. Perm do both.

#### 2. Case outweighs – indo-pak war outweighs sino-india war because of deep-seeded tensions

#### 3. US Pressure fails – multiple reasons

Dhume, 9/27/2011 (Sadanand, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, “Is Pakistan Too Big to Fail?” Wall Street Journal Accessed 7/15/16 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204422404576594841278196676> JJH

To the average onlooker, such bluster from a country with an economy about the size of Romania's may be baffling. To understand it, one has to see how Pakistan's ruling elites, in particular the generals who call the shots on foreign policy and national security, have come to view their country: as the geopolitical equivalent of a giant bank that's too big to fail. After all, which other country houses 180 million Muslims, the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, a plethora of jihadist groups in proximity to those weapons, an "all-weather" friendship with China, and a choke-hold on supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan? By this logic, the U.S., scarred by its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, can do little more than mouth disapproval and threaten to cut off aid. The generals might have a point in seeing the world this way. There's little reason to believe that Washington would have shown such forbearance toward its putative ally—the ISI's relationships with the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban have hardly been secret—if Pakistan didn't have nuclear weapons or control major supply lines into Afghanistan. As long as they possess this leverage, they think they can keep up their brinksmanship.

#### 4. Doesn’t solve CPEC — China is key to strengthen the corridor and in turn integrate Xinjiang.

#### 5. Doesn’t assume killing of Mansour and Spring Offensive – that means Pakistani military leadership is less willing to cave to US demands

## #4 — Cybersecurity CP

### Format/Explanation

Assume the Cybersecurity aff with the Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations (warming) advantages (below). Assume the neg read the Diplomatic Freeze CP (and internal net-benefit, also below). The neg has five minutes to extend the CP vs. the 2AC frontlines included below. No, the neg may not kick the CP.

### 1AC — Plan Text

#### The United States federal government should deepen bilateral cybersecurity negotiations with the People’s Republic of China to expand cooperation between U.S. and Chinese Computer Emergency Response Teams with the goal of achieving a joint protocol and concrete compliance framework.

### 1AC — Cybersecurity Advantage

#### Contention One: Cybersecurity

#### First, despite the recent U.S.-China cyberespionage agreement hacks are still happening

Daugirdas and Mortenson 15 — Kristina Daugirdas, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, was awarded the Francis Deák Prize for an outstanding article published in the American Journal of International Law, serves as co-editor of the Contemporary Practice of the United States section of the American Journal of International Law, and Julian Davis Mortenson, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, co-editor of the "Contemporary Practice of the United States" section of the American Journal of International Law, one of the principal drafters of the merits briefs in the landmark case Boumediene v. Bush, 2015 (“Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: General International and U.S. Foreign Relations Law: United States and China Reach Agreement Regarding Economic Espionage and International Cybersecurity Norms,” *American Journal of International Law* (109 A.J.I.L. 878), October, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis, Accessed 06-22-2016, AS)

Obama and Xi reached the agreement during their talks at the White House on September 24-25. n7 But the substance of the agreement had been "in the works" several weeks before that, with discussions beginning after China's alleged theft of records from the Office of Personnel Management, and continuing when National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice traveled to Beijing in late August to prepare for Xi's visit to the White House. n8 Following those conversations, Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Meng Jianzhu--acting as a Special Envoy for Xi--met with senior administration officials in Washington from September 9-12 to discuss cybersecurity issues, n9 leading to "substantial agreement" on those topics, including Chinese economic espionage. n10 At the time, [\*881] administration officials characterized those talks as "pretty blunt" and "pretty ugly," n11 and it was unclear whether a final agreement would be reached during Xi's visit. n12

According to press reports, China agreed to affirm the norm against economic cyberespionage in part because it was "rattled" by the threat of U.S. sanctions. n13 Last April, Obama had issued an executive order permitting the imposition of sanctions on individuals or entities that engage in malicious cyberenabled activities, including economic espionage, that threaten the United States' interests. n14 So far no such sanctions have been imposed, but press reports indicated that the administration was contemplating sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals. n15 An administration official acknowledged that the United States decided to refrain from issuing any sanctions prior to Xi's visit, in light of the progress made during the discussions between Meng and senior administration officials. n16 Such sanctions do remain a possibility, however. During Xi's visit, Obama reiterated that the administration "will apply [sanctions] and whatever other tools [the United States] ha[s] in [its] toolkit to go after cyber criminals, either retrospectively or prospectively," where there is "proof that they've gone after U.S. companies or U.S. persons." n17

In his announcement of the agreement, Obama noted that the primary question is now whether China's "words [will be] followed by actions." n18 Indeed, at a congressional hearing several days after the agreement was reached, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work said, "I think all of us have some healthy skepticism about this, but I believe it's a good confidence-building measure and a good first step, and we will see if it leads to better behavior on the part of the Chinese." n19 Explaining the agreement, Work said:

[\*882] [O]ne hopes that . . . this agreement may create the space for us to have a--more than a conversation, but one that would lead to some kind of a change in behavior on the part of these state actors. . . . [W]hat we have done [after identifying the source of a cyber attack] is, we have confronted China, and China, in some cases, has said, "Look, this was a hacker that was insider our country, but we had no control over him." What this [agreement] allows us to do is say, "Okay, well, what are you going to do about that? That's a cybercrime. Are you going to provide us the information we need to prosecute this person? Are you going to take care of it on your own?" n20

In the weeks after the agreement was reached, China arrested several Chinese hackers that U.S. officials had identified as having stolen commercial secrets from U.S. firms with the intention of giving or selling that information to Chinese state-run companies. n21 A report by private researchers showed, however, that hackers linked to the Chinese government have continued to try to acquire confidential information by accessing U.S. technology and pharmaceutical companies' networks. n22 Administration officials are aware of that report, but have declined to comment on it. n23 U.S. Cyber Command's Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. James K. McLaughlin pointed out that the elimination of Chinese economic cyberespionage will take time, and it may simply be "too early . . . to see any of th[e] changes" called for by the agreement. n24

#### Second, a CERT compliance framework paves the way for strong cooperation on cybersecurity and decreases the risk of cyber-catastrophe.

Gady 15 — Franz-Stefan Gady, Senior Fellow and Foreign Policy Analyst at the East-West Institute, Editor at *The Diplomat,* M.A. in International Relations from John Hopkins University, B.A. in International Relations from Weber University, 2015 (“Can the US and China Cooperate on the First (and Last) Line of Cyber Defense?,” *The Diplomat,* October 30th, Accessible Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/can-the-us-and-china-cooperate-on-the-first-and-last-line-of-cyber-defense/>, Accessed On 06-22-2016, MA)

To avoid past mistakes, the rather vague September agreement needs to be followed up as soon as possible by bilateral meetings to more clearly define specific venues of cooperation between China and the United States.

And while the September agreement talks about a meeting of a new joint China-U.S. high-level government-to-government working group to combat cybercrime to be held before the end of the 2015 and biannually in subsequent years, other initiatives to deepen cooperation between the two countries need to happen.

One possible way to do so is to strengthen cooperation between the Chinese and U.S. Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). In general, CERTs are the first (and last line) of defense in protecting a country’s critical information infrastructure from cyberattacks and are tasked with coordinating responses to network intrusions across the nation and beyond.

China’s CERT is specifically tasked with “building up the national monitoring, warning, emergency response, evaluation and public opinion centers for network security.” It serves as the coordinating body for other CERTs in China and also engages with CERTs in other countries.

Of particular note here is the cooperation between the CERTs of China, Japan, and South Korea. The CERTs meet annually, share information including threat data, have established a 24/7 technical hotline, and purportedly have a protocol for crisis escalation in place in the event of major cyberattacks. Representatives of the three countries recently met in Seoul to better coordinate their cyber policies when it comes to fighting cybercrime and terrorism.

China and the United States have also been cooperating on a CERT level over the last couple of years, but at a rather ad-hoc and impromptu level, which has substantially undermined collaboration. For example, up until now no joint protocol exists for how to handle requests for information or what type of information needs to be provided for one side to take action when an incident occurs.

#### Third, US-China cooperation solves cyber norms.

Lieberthal and Singer 14 — Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, former professor at the University of Michigan, has a bachelor’s from Dartmouth College, and a master’s and doctorate in political science from Columbia University, and Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and an A.B. from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2014 (“Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” *John L. Thornton China Center* and *21st Century Defense Initiative* at *Brookings*, February, 06-29-2016, MA)

But the United States and China are the two most significant national players in this sphere. Moreover, these two leading states represent very different views on the proper use and future of the Internet. We therefore feel that thinking through these issues in a U.S.-China context can provide a useful way to develop approaches that should then be discussed more broadly, with the goal of ultimately establishing global norms and implementing mechanisms to bring greater order and security to those parts of the cyber realm where this is feasible.

More importantly, the spillover effect of cybersecurity on the broader U.S.-China relationship is also perhaps more critical than for any other bilateral relationship. This is both because of the enormous importance of U.S.-China relations in the emerging world order and, in turn, the growing role of cyber issues in eroding strategic trust and poisoning public and elite attitudes. If this trend can be reversed through improved engagement by the U.S. and China on cybersecurity, the outcome would be a “triple win.” It would bolster U.S.-China bilateral relations, serve as a crucial building block for multilateral efforts in the cyber arena, and also aid in broader US-Chinese engagement on other issues of importance, like global finance and the environment, where the two nations must learn to work better together.

#### Fourth, unclear norms ensure escalation — arms races and false flag attacks.

Rosenzweig 9 — Paul Rosenzweig, Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Senior Advisor to the Chertoff Group on National Security, Deputy Assistant Secretary for policy at the US Department of Homeland Security, 2009 (“National Security Threats in Cyberspace," *American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security*, September, Accessible Online at [www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.7/Jensen/fn137.Rosenwieg.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.7/Jensen/fn137.Rosenwieg.pdf), Accessed On 01-26-2016, MA)

Offensive dominance creates a great risk of cyber arms races. State and non-state actors are likely to view the prevalence of offensive cyber threats as a legitimate rationale for bolstering their own capabilities, both defensive and offensive, thus fueling an action-reaction dynamic of iterative arming. Experts believe that at least 20 nations are engaged in a cyber arms competition and possess the type of advanced capabilities needed to wage cyber war against the United States.121 As Michael Nacht, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, told us, “An arms race is already going on in cyberspace and it is very intense.”122 Conflict in cyberspace is uniquely predisposed to escalation given uncertainties about what constitutes an act of war and the growing number of state and non-state actors seeking offensive capabilities. Actors are more likely to misperceive or miscalculate actions in cyberspace, where there is no widely understood strategic language for signaling intent, capability and resolve.123 Uncertainty will encourage states to prepare for worst-case contingencies, a condition that could fuel escalation. Furthermore, “false flag” attacks, in which an actor purposefully makes an attack look like it came from a third party, could also ignite a conflict.124

#### Finally, cyberattacks escalate and provoke retaliation — misattribution undermines checks on conflict.

Dycus 10 — Stephen Dycus, Professor of Law at the University of Vermont, Visiting Professor of National Security at the United States Military Academy, M.A. in Legal Studies from Harvard University, 2010 (“Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare,” *Journal of National Security Law & Policy*, Vol. 4, No. 155, August 11th, Accessible Online at <http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/11_Dycus.pdf>, Accessed On 06-29-2016, MA)

The term “cybersecurity” might be understood to refer to defense against cyber attacks. “Cyber attack” suggests offensive use, but the label is inexact and might be misleading. A preemptive strike to ward off an imminent enemy attack is considered defensive. Digital espionage might be part of the preparation for an attack, or it might be perceived that way by the target, which might then be provoked to defend itself by responding with a preemptive attack, either cyber or kinetic.

The important point here is that any use of cyber weapons, offensive or defensive, could have enormous consequences for the security and other interests of the United States. The effect of such use, actual or potential, matters more than the labels. And if the effect – on human life or property, for example, or diplomatic relations or compliance with the law of armed conflict – is substantial, Congress has a role to play in adopting policy for that use.

Congress has not thus far adopted measures suited to the regulation of cyber warfare. The War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm’s way, rather than with clicking a computer mouse to launch a cyber attack, although the strategic consequences might be similar. And the WPR’s relatively relaxed timetable for executive notice and legislative response is unrealistic for war on a digital battlefield. Similarly, if cyber warfare is regarded as an intelligence activity, the intelligence oversight measures just described cannot, for reasons already indicated, ensure that Congress will be able to play a meaningful role. In the words of the National Research Council study cited above, “Today’s policy and legal framework for guiding and regulating the use of cyberattack is ill-formed, undeveloped, and highly uncertain.”

Our experience with nuclear weapons may point to needed reforms. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has had a fairly clear nuclear policy (albeit one that deliberately includes an element of ambiguity) – one known generally to Congress, the American public, and potential enemies.46 Congress has approved or disapproved the purchase of the weapons and delivery systems. It has been briefed on the policy, and it has debated that policy vigorously.47 While Congress has not articulated U.S. nuclear policy in any coherent form, it has collaborated closely with the executive branch in the development and execution of that policy.

Cyber weapons bear a striking resemblance to nuclear weapons in some important ways. An enemy’s cyber attack would, like a nuclear strike, probably come without a clear warning. There are as yet no reliable defenses against either a cyber attack or a nuclear attack. Collateral damage from a nuclear attack would almost certainly be very extensive and would linger for an extended period.48 The direct and indirect effects of a cyber attack, while different in kind and degree, still could be widespread and indiscriminate.49

In other ways, cyber weapons are critically different from their nuclear counterparts. For one thing, the time frame for response to a cyber attack might be much narrower. A nuclear weapon delivered by a land-based ICBM could take 30 minutes to reach its target. An electronic attack would arrive instantaneously, and leave no time to consult with or even inform anyone outside the executive branch before launching a counterstrike, if that were U.S. policy. What most distinguishes digital warfare, however, is the potential difficulty in identifying the source of a cyber attack. It is always possible, of course, that an enemy might covertly deliver a nuclear device to the U.S. homeland in a shipping container or a Cessna. But the apparent ease with which a cyber attack may be carried out without attribution could make it impossible to fight back at all. If an attacker made it appear that the source was an innocent neutral state or perhaps another enemy of the attacker, a misdirected U.S. response might provoke a wider conflict. The potential difficulty in tracking the source also makes a policy of deterrence based on a threat of retaliation far less credible.

Given these characteristics of cyber warfare, and the continuing refinement of cyber weaponry, we approach a state of extreme strategic instability, with each nation on hair-trigger alert. The execution of an illconceived cyber war policy calling for a prompt response – or any response – to an attack or threatened attack could have disastrous, unanticipated consequences. It also might, depending on the circumstances, violate the law of armed conflict.

### 1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage

#### Contention Two: US-China Relations

#### First, a framework for CERT cooperation would prevent hiccups in relations and bolster cyberdefense.

Mussington 15 — David Mussington, Adjunct Professor in Political Science at Georgetown University, Fellow at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in Political Science from Carleton University, M.A. in Economics and Political Science from the University of Toronto, 2015 (“The Missing Compliance Framework in the 2015 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Agreement,” *Institute for Defense Analysis,* November 18th, Accessible Online at <https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/ITSD/2015/D-5648.ashx>, Accessed On 06-22-2016, MA)

A concrete compliance framework would be a significant diplomatic and political breakthrough – indicating that both sides had considered the costs of continuing the status quo – selecting instead an alternate course with agreed facts, definitions, and dispute discussion (if not resolution) procedures. Further, such a bilateral framework might partially insulate the relationship from temporary hiccups – caused by the discovery of ongoing activities (legacy) that had yet to be reined in consistent with the new rules of the game. CERT-to-CERT-type contacts would further deepen the linkage between bilateral agreements to refrain from proscribed actions in cyber and operational exchanges on data that support non-controversial investigations of cyber-crime. Lastly, such a framework could provide a mechanism for discussion of IP rights holder injury and remediation options. In this way the compliance framework would provide added support to law enforcement cooperation on cyber-crime already established, as well as aligning well with norms emerging from the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) process.

#### Second, cybersecurity is the most important issue for relations and effects the entire relationship.

Lieberthal and Singer 14 — Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, former professor at the University of Michigan, has a bachelor’s from Dartmouth College, and a master’s and doctorate in political science from Columbia University, and Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and an A.B. from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2014 (“Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” *John L. Thornton China Center* and *21st Century Defense Initiative* at *Brookings*, February, 06-29-2016, MA)

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#### US-Sino ties are key to harmonize approaches to check *climate change*

Rudd ‘15

Kevin Rudd, President of the Asia Society Policy Institute and former Prime Minister of Australia. In February 2014, he was named a Senior Fellow with John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he completed a major research effort on the future of China-United States relations. – “The 'New Normal' of Bilateral Relationships” – Beijing Review - NO. 21 - May 18, 2015 - http://www.bjreview.com.cn/print/txt/2015-05/18/content\_688317.htm

If the [United States and China] can conclude the bilateral investment treaty, this will be a huge impetus. Regionally, there are significant differences in terms of different territorial claims in areas around China's coast, in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Globally, great cooperation has already begun in the area of climate change. But I conclude with this. If the two governments have a strategic framework to manage their differences, and to expand their areas of cooperation, they may in time discover that they have in the 21st century a combined purpose. What is that combined purpose? There are so many threats out there common to China and common to the United States, that they start to be much larger than any disagreements China might have with the United States, or the United States may have with China. When I look at terrorism, it's an external threat to China and to the United States, and to all civilized peoples. It's a threat to order. When I look also at other areas, we've mentioned, of course, the problem of climate change, but then, its offshoots such as food insecurity and water insecurity. And the list goes on. External threats to financial stability, external threats to other forms of stability as well. So my argument is that if we focus on the things that unite rather than the things that divide, there will be a large unleashing of political energy to deal with underlying problems in the relationship as well.

#### US-Sino ties can break global inaction – together, the two nations can galvanize many allies.

Florick ‘15

et al; Davis Florick is a master's candidate in East-West Studies at Creighton University. His areas of concentration include, but are not limited to. East Asia and former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union states. He was recently interviewed, in print, by Voice of America regarding North Korean tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone and. on television, with Consider This... where he discussed the recent upheaval in Ukraine. He has also been published in International Affairs Forum, the World Business Institute. and previously in International Affairs Review. “Remapping U.S.-China Relations: A Holistic Approach to Building Long-Term Confidence and Transparency” – International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2002%20Remapping%20US-China%20Relations%20-%20Florick%20and%20Cronkleton.pdf

Perhaps no two countries have a greater impact on energy and environmental security strategy than China and the United States. China finds itself in an incredibly resource constrained environment without the necessary environmental and resource management capabilities. Moreover, the consequences of environmental degradation are not limited to any particular location and must be solved multilaterally to shape not only the United States and China's own domestic policies, but also those of their global partners and allies. Beijing and Washington's advocacy for things such as resource preservation and environmental sustainability is vital to raising awareness and funding. The long-term commitment required to solve these systemic issues further necessitates U.S.-Chinese cooperation. By developing joint resolutions, Beijing and Washington will stand a much better opportunity of garnering international support for real, positive change.

#### Climate Change is real and anthropogenic

EDF ‘9

[Environmental Defense Fund, a US-based nonprofit environmental advocacy group, “Global Warming Myths and Facts,” 1/13/2009, http://mrgreenbiz.wordpress.com/2009/01/13/global-warming-myths-and-facts-2/]

**There is no debate among scientists about the basic facts of global warming**. The most respected scientific bodies have stated unequivocally that global **warming is occurring, and people are causing it** by burning fossil fuels (like coal, oil and natural gas) and cutting down forests. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences, which in 2005 the White House called "the gold standard of objective scientific assessment," issued a joint statement with 10 other National Academies of Science saying "the scientific understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt action. It is vital that all nations identify cost-effective steps that they can take now, to contribute to substantial and long-term reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions." (Joint Statement of Science Academies: Global Response to Climate Change [PDF], 2005) The only debate in the science community about global warming is about how much and how fast warming will continue as a result of heat-trapping emissions. Scientists have given a clear warning about global warming, and we have more than enough facts — about causes and fixes — to implement solutions right now. MYTH Even if global warming is a problem, addressing it will hurt American industry and workers. FACT A well designed trading program will harness American ingenuity to decrease heat-trapping pollution cost-effectively, jumpstarting a new carbon economy. Claims that fighting global warming will cripple the economy and cost hundreds of thousands of jobs are unfounded. In fact, companies that are already reducing their heat-trapping emissions have discovered that cutting pollution can save money. The cost of a comprehensive national greenhouse gas reduction program will depend on the precise emissions targets, the timing for the reductions and the means of implementation. An independent MIT study found that a modest cap-and-trade system would cost less than $20 per household annually and have no negative impact on employment. Experience has shown that properly designed emissions trading programs can reduce compliance costs significantly compared with other regulatory approaches. For example, the U.S. acid rain program reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by more than 30 percent from 1990 levels and cost industry a fraction of what the government originally estimated, according to EPA. Furthermore, a mandatory cap on emissions could spur technological innovation that could create jobs and wealth. Letting global warming continue until we are forced to address it on an emergency basis could disrupt and severely damage our economy. It is far wiser and more cost-effective to act now. MYTH Water vapor is the most important, abundant greenhouse gas. So if we’re going to control a greenhouse gas, why don’t we control it instead of carbon dioxide (CO2)? FACT Although water vapor traps more heat than CO2, because of the relationships among CO2, water vapor and climate, to fight global warming nations must focus on controlling CO2. Atmospheric levels of CO2 are determined by how much coal, natural gas and oil we burn and how many trees we cut down, as well as by natural processes like plant growth. Atmospheric levels of water vapor, on the other hand, cannot be directly controlled by people; rather, they are determined by temperatures. The warmer the atmosphere, the more water vapor it can hold. As a result, water vapor is part of an amplifying effect. Greenhouse gases like CO2 warm the air, which in turn adds to the stock of water vapor, which in turn traps more heat and accelerates warming. Scientists know this because of satellite measurements documenting a rise in water vapor concentrations as the globe has warmed. **The best way to lower temperature and** thus reduce **water vapor levels is to reduce CO2 emissions.** MYTH Global warming and extra CO2 will actually be beneficial — they reduce cold-related deaths and stimulate crop growth. FACT **Any beneficial effects will be far outweighed by damage and disruption.** Even a warming in just the middle range of scientific projections would have devastating impacts on many sectors of the economy. Rising seas would inundate coastal communities, contaminate water supplies with salt and increase the risk of flooding by storm surge, affecting tens of millions of people globally. Moreover, extreme weather events, including heat waves, droughts and floods, are predicted to increase in frequency and intensity, causing loss of lives and property and throwing agriculture into turmoil. Even though higher levels of CO2 can act as a plant fertilizer under some conditions, scientists now think that the "CO2 fertilization" effect on crops has been overstated; in natural ecosystems, the fertilization effect can diminish after a few years as plants acclimate. Furthermore, increased CO2 may benefit undesirable, weedy species more than desirable species. Higher levels of CO2 have already caused ocean acidification, and scientists are warning of potentially devastating effects on marine life and fisheries. Moreover, higher levels of regional ozone (smog), a result of warmer temperatures, could worsen respiratory illnesses. Less developed countries and natural ecosystems may not have the capacity to adapt. The notion that there will be regional “winners” and “losers” in global warming is based on a world-view from the 1950’s. We live in a global community. Never mind the moral implications — when an environmental catastrophe creates millions of refugees half-way around the world, Americans are affected. MYTH Global warming is just part of a natural cycle. The Arctic has warmed up in the past. FACT The global warming we are experiencing is not natural. **People are causing it**. People are causing global warming by burning fossil fuels (like oil, coal and natural gas) and cutting down forests. Scientists have shown that these activities are pumping far more CO2 into the atmosphere than was ever released in hundreds of thousands of years. **This buildup of CO2 is the biggest cause of global warming**. Since 1895, scientists have known that CO2 and other greenhouse gases trap heat and warm the earth. As the warming has intensified over the past three decades, scientific scrutiny has increased along with it. Scientists have considered and ruled out other, natural explanations such as sunlight, volcanic eruptions and cosmic rays. (IPCC 2001) Though natural amounts of CO2 have varied from 180 to 300 parts per million (ppm), today's CO2 levels are around 380 ppm. That's 25% more than the highest natural levels over the past 650,000 years. Increased CO2 levels have contributed to periods of higher average temperatures throughout that long record. (Boden, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center) As for previous Arctic warming, it is true that there were stretches of warm periods over the Arctic earlier in the 20th century. The limited records available for that time period indicate that the warmth did not affect as many areas or persist from year to year as much as the current warmth. But that episode, however warm it was, is not relevant to the issue at hand. Why? For one, a brief regional trend does not discount a longer global phenomenon. We know that the planet has been warming over the past several decades and Arctic ice has been melting persistently. And unlike the earlier periods of Arctic warmth, there is no expectation that the current upward trend in Arctic temperatures will reverse; the rising concentrations of greenhouse gases will prevent that from happening. MYTH We can adapt to climate change — civilization has survived droughts and temperature shifts before. FACT Although humans as a whole have survived the vagaries of drought, stretches of warmth and cold and more, entire societies have collapsed from dramatic climatic shifts. The current warming of our climate will bring major hardships and economic dislocations — untold human suffering, especially for our children and grandchildren. We are already seeing significant costs from today's global warming which is caused by greenhouse gas pollution. Climate has changed in the past and human societies have survived, but today six billion people depend on interconnected ecosystems and complex technological infrastructure. What's more, **unless we limit the amount of heat-trapping gases we are putting into the atmosphere, we will face a warming trend unseen since human civilization began** 10,000 years ago. (IPCC 2001) The consequences of continued warming at current rates are likely to be dire. Many densely populated areas, such as low-lying coastal regions, are highly vulnerable to climate shifts. A middle-of-the-range projection is that the homes of 13 to 88 million people around the world would be flooded by the sea each year in the 2080s. Poorer countries and small island nations will have the hardest time adapting. (McLean et al. 2001) In what appears to be the first forced move resulting from climate change, 100 residents of Tegua island in the Pacific Ocean were evacuated by the government because rising sea levels were flooding their island. Some 2,000 other islanders plan a similar move to escape rising waters. In the United States, the village of Shishmaref in Alaska, which has been inhabited for 400 years, is collapsing from melting permafrost. Relocation plans are in the works. <continues…> Scarcity of water and food could lead to major conflicts with broad ripple effects throughout the globe. Even if people find a way to adapt, the wildlife and plants on which we depend may be unable to adapt to rapid climate change. While the world itself will not end, the world as we know it may disappear. MYTH Recent cold winters and cool summers don’t feel like global warming to me. FACT While different pockets of the country have experienced some cold winters here and there, the overall trend is warmer winters. Measurements show that over the last century the Earth’s climate has warmed overall, in all seasons, and in most regions. Climate skeptics mislead the public when they claim that the winter of 2003–2004 was the coldest ever in the northeastern United States. That winter was only the 33rd coldest in the region since records began in 1896. Furthermore, a single year of cold weather in one region of the globe is not an indication of a trend in the global climate, which refers to a long-term average over the entire planet. MYTH Global warming can’t be happening because some glaciers and ice sheets are growing, not shrinking. FACT In most parts of the world, the retreat of glaciers has been dramatic. The best available scientific data indicate that Greenland's massive ice sheet is shrinking. Between 1961 and 1997, the world’s glaciers lost 890 cubic miles of ice. The consensus among scientists is that rising air temperatures are the most important factor behind the retreat of glaciers on a global scale over long time periods. Some glaciers in western Norway, Iceland and New Zealand have been expanding during the past few decades. That expansion is a result of regional increases in storm frequency and snowfall rather than colder temperatures — not at all incompatible with a global warming trend. In Greenland, a NASA satellite that can measure the ice mass over the whole continent has found that although there is variation from month to month, over the longer term, the ice is disappearing. In fact, there are worrisome signs that melting is accelerating: glaciers are moving into the ocean twice as fast as a decade ago, and, over time, more and more glaciers have started to accelerate. What is most alarming is the prediction, based on model calculations and historical evidence, that an approximately 5.4 degree Fahrenheit increase in local Greenland temperatures will lead to irreversible meltdown and a sea-level rise of over 20 feet. Since the Arctic is warming 2-3 times faster than the global average, this tipping point is not far away. The only study that has shown increasing ice mass in Greenland only looked at the interior of the ice sheet, not at the edges where melting occurs. This is actually in line with climate model predictions that global warming would lead to a short-term accumulation of ice in the cold interior due to heavier snowfall. (Similarly, scientists have predicted that Antarctica overall will gain ice in the near future due to heavier snowfall.) The scientists who published the study were careful to point out that their results should not be used to conclude that Greenland's ice mass as a whole is growing. In addition, their data suggested that the accumulation of snow in the middle of the continent is likely to decrease over time as global warming continues. MYTH Accurate weather predictions a few days in advance are hard to come by. Why on earth should we have confidence in climate projections decades from now? FACT Climate prediction is fundamentally different from weather prediction, just as climate is different from weather. It is often more difficult to make an accurate weather forecast than a climate prediction. The accuracy of weather forecasting is critically dependent upon being able to exactly and comprehensively characterize the present state of the global atmosphere. Climate prediction relies on other, longer ranging factors. For instance, we might not know if it will be below freezing on a specific December day in New England, but we know from our understanding of the region's climate that the temperatures during the month will generally be low. Similarly, climate tells us that Seattle and London tend to be rainy, Florida and southern California are usually warm, and the Southwest is often dry and hot. Today’s climate models can now reproduce the observed global average climates over the past century and beyond. Such findings have reinforced scientist’s confidence in the capacity of models to produce reliable projections of future climate. Current climate assessments typically consider the results from a range of models and scenarios for future heat-trapping emissions in order to identify the most likely range for future climatic change.

#### The impact is billions of deaths.

Cummins ‘10

(Ronnie, International Director – Organic Consumers Association and Will Allen, Advisor – Organic Consumers Association, “Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century”, 2-14, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6)

The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario, billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation. If the U.S. significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions, other countries will follow. One hopeful sign is the recent EPA announcement that it intends to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately we are going to have to put tremendous pressure on elected public officials to force the EPA to crack down on GHG polluters (including industrial farms and food processors). Public pressure is especially critical since "just say no" Congressmen-both Democrats and Republicans-along with agribusiness, real estate developers, the construction industry, and the fossil fuel lobby appear determined to maintain "business as usual."

### 1AC — Solvency

#### CERT cooperation exists but is largely undefined — no categorization of CSIRT functions.

Morgus et. al 15 — Rober Morgus, a policy analyst with New America’s Cybersecurity Initiative, a member of the Global Commission on Internet Governance's Research Advisory Network, received his B.A. with honors in Diplomacy and World Affairs from Occidental College, and Isabel Skierka, a research associate with the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), was a Carlo Schmid fellow at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where she worked on the Alliance’s Smart Defence Initiative, has a master’s in international conflict studies at the war studies department of King’s College London and holds a bachelor’s degree in European studies from Maastricht University, and Mirko Hohmann, a research associate with the Global Public Policy Institute, holds a Master of Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a Bachelor of Arts in international affairs from the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Tim Maurer, Former Director of the Global Cybersecurity Norms and Resilience Project and Head of Research, Cybersecurity Initiative, holds a Master in Public Policy concentrating on international and global affairs from the Harvard Kennedy School, 2015 (“National CSIRTs and their Role in Computer Security Incident Response,” *New America Foundation*, November, Available Online at <https://www.newamerica.org/documents/1431/CSIRTs-incident-response.pdf>, Accessed 06-27-2016, p. 11-12, AS)

Though some coordination in the operations of nCSIRTs has occurred, there remains a great deal of uncertainty regarding the standardization of the role of nCSIRTs. When building CERT-UK, the United Kingdom’s nCSIRT, the UK Cabinet Office identified 47 possible functions of an nCSIRT, but it ultimately prioritized only four of these functions in the creation of CERT-UK.32 Nonetheless, the defining feature of an nCSIRT [end page 11] – similar to operationally focused CSIRTs in the private sector and elsewhere that primarily remediate damage and recover and rebuild systems – is its incident response function. Exceptions to this are nCSIRTs that double as governmental CSIRTs and are responsible for remediation, recovery and rebuilding of government networks. But most nCSIRTs focus much more on the coordination of response and information sharing and dissemination, unlike smaller CSIRTs in the private sector or government. In this coordinating function, an nCSIRT does not have a direct, operational role, but more of an advisory role. It receives, analyzes and synthesizes incident and vulnerability information disseminated by other CSIRTs. It then re-distributes this processed information to its constituency through bulletins or a shared database.

In the US, US-CERT is operationally responsible for federal government networks and has a coordinating role as the national point of contact for domestic and international stakeholders. It operates alongside the Industrial Control Systems CERT, which coordinates incident response among critical infrastructure owners and operators. Germany’s national information security agency (BSI) operates the national governmental CSIRT that serves as an authorized national point of contact, and also runs Bürger-CERT, which provides citizens and small enterprises with email updates on IT-related threats and vulnerabilities. Luxembourg, on the other hand, splits governmental and national tasks and operates GOVCERT.LU, which is responsible for governmental networks only, and CIRCL, which is responsible for private sector and non-governmental entities in Luxembourg and serves as the nCSIRT. Additionally, some nCSIRTs serve as the “response team of last resort,” either redirecting a case to the CSIRT responsible for handling it or providing some degree of support itself. The service portfolio of CSIRTs has been described in detail in a number of publications,33 but the categorization of CSIRT functions was being reconsidered in a FIRST committee at the time of writing this report,34 and a clear delineation of functions specific to nCSIRTs does not exist.

#### China says yes — they’ve cooperated before on the same subject.

Gady 15 — Franz-Stefan Gady, Senior Fellow and Foreign Policy Analyst at the East-West Institute, Editor at *The Diplomat,* M.A. in International Relations from John Hopkins University, B.A. in International Relations from Weber University, 2015 (“Can the US and China Cooperate on the First (and Last) Line of Cyber Defense?,” *The Diplomat,* October 30th, Accessible Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/can-the-us-and-china-cooperate-on-the-first-and-last-line-of-cyber-defense/>, Accessed On 06-22-2016, MA)

That China is willing to cooperate more closely with other countries can be seen with Beijing’s participation in yearly joint cyber exercises – the Cyber Exercise Drill – organized by the Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT). The aim of these “blind drills” is to coordinate international responses to cyberattacks. The exercises specifically deal with improving communication protocols, information sharing, and crisis response times of the CERTs participating.

As an initial first step, the United States could join the drill and apply the lessons learned on the multilateral level to the Sino-U.S. bilateral level. (In the past, APCERT has extended invitations to the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation-Computer Emergency Response Team and the European Government Computer Security Incident Response Teams).

Cooperation between countries is possible, and this has been exemplified in the field of cybercrime. There, Beijing and Washington have cooperated on multiple occasions in the past. The last time, a few weeks prior to the Obama-Xi meeting in Washington D.C. in September, the Chinese government agreed to arrest a number of Chinese hackers at the request of the U.S. government.

### 1NC — Diplomatic Freeze CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should initiate a diplomatic freeze on cyber-cooperation with China.

#### First, the counterplan is the only way to prevent conflict — resolve is key.

Auslin 15 — Michael Auslin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Yale University, Director of Japanese Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 2015 (“Time for realism in US-China relations,” *National Interest,* September 22nd, Accessible Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-realism-us-china-relations-13915>, Accessed On 07-06-2016)

As for cyber, it is Beijing that has caused this crisis, and no U.S. administration should be negotiating a pact with the wolf in the sheep pen. First, we should be thinking of financial sanctions and diplomatic freezes as punishment for aggression already committed and that to come.

It also is past time to throw some cyber elbows to show we won’t simply sit and take whatever fouls China decides to commit. There is no question that the U.S. is probably more vulnerable that China on the cyber front, but we are steadily being led down the path towards a real cyber Pearl Harbor (such as the shutting down of our energy grid) by our unwillingness to show that we can play the same game. It’s a discomfiting thought, but that is the world we have let ourselves be trapped into.

The point of the new realism is not to force a conflict with China. It is to avoid one. Only steady strength, a firm response, and a willingness to speak the truth will show Xi Jinping and his fellow leaders that America is no better friend and no worse adversary. The choice lies entirely with the Chinese leadership. So far, they have ignored Susan Rice’s earnest exhortations, and instead shown a dangerous willingness to undermine the very peace that has allowed their country to grow so much. By acting in our best interests, we will also help deflect China from a path that increasingly looks like one that will result in far greater risks to stability, prosperity, and peace.

#### Second, the counterplan takes out and turns the case — China won’t change, and engagement increases the risk of attacks.

Auslin 15 — Michael Auslin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Yale University, Director of Japanese Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 2015 (“It’s time to stop pretending Beijing is a partner,” *National Review*, June 22nd, Accessible Online at <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420087/its-time-stop-pretending-beijing-partner-michael-auslin>, Accessed On 07-06-2016)

No one should be surprised that a rising power is flexing its muscles. But we should worry that American policy appears to be to turn the other cheek. There is no rule of statecraft that demands that a status quo power do everything possible to avoid upsetting relations with a rising challenger. Indeed, unless the status quo power (the U.S. in this case) is satisfied with a steady diminution of its credibility, influence, and even comparative power, then it must respond to the destabilizing actions of the challenger precisely so as to try and maintain stability.

Pretending that relations with China are “normal” or are experiencing just a few bumps in the road is not a responsible position. Nor, quite frankly, is it a prudent one. So far, one can only conclude that America’s reluctance to impose some type of cost on China for its destabilizing actions has merely abetted more assertive behavior, which even President Obama has called “aggressive.”

One might argue that the Obama administration’s so-called pivot to Asia is either (a) an appropriate response to China’s actions or (b) the catalyst for China’s increased aggressiveness. But the pivot remains more rhetoric than reality, good plans that have not yet come to full fruition and don’t really add up to a significant change in America’s posture in Asia. Instead, Washington needs a root-and-branch reexamination of its policy toward China.

How much more hacking will the American people or their representatives accept? What happens if Chinese-backed hackers turn off part of the electrical grid or water supply, simply to make the point that they can, and that Washington should be wary of pushing China even further? Then our inaction will have led us to being blackmailed. The same question applies to how far Washington wants to let China change the balance of power in the South China Sea or other parts of Asia, until one day the risks of future intervention seem too high to bear.

It is time to put Beijing on notice that their own actions force us to consider our relationship with them to be an adversarial one. It is not enough to simply call such actions “a significant source of concern,” as White House spokesman Josh Earnest did yet again last week, and then return to old nostrums such as that we need China to help us keep stability in the South China Sea. China increasingly is the aggressor, not the protector.

Solving the China problem means, first of all, admitting that it exists. Second, it means moderating our own behavior. That includes no longer participating in diplomatic Potemkin villages like this week’s S&ED. Jaw-jawing does little either to solve our problems with China or to moderate their behavior, but the Chinese get global credibility from the pomp and circumstance the United States affords them. Let’s talk when we have a real reason to, not because we fear not to.

Similarly, we should be curtailing military exchanges like the one that brought a top Chinese general to the Pentagon last week. We certainly should not be inviting China to participate in our most coveted military exercises, like the naval RIMPAC gathering, to which Beijing has garnered yet another invite despite sending a spy ship along with its participants last year. It may even mean taking some tit-for-tat cyber action, to show that Chinese choices have consequences.

With its inaction, the American government does not look confident or prudent in the face of China’s growing assertiveness. It looks weak and feckless. And that invites more brazen actions that will keep us in a cycle of frustration and confusion, weakening our position abroad and our security at home. It’s time to start solving the China problem.

#### Third, we’ll identify an internal net-benefit — Chinese cyber-attribution.

#### China fails at cyber attribution — operational security, detection, and attribution of intrusions

Harold et. al. 16 — Scott Warren Harold, Associate Director at the Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Political Scientist and Faculty Member at Pardee RAND Graduate School, holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in political science from Columbia University and a B.A. in international relations from Michigan State University, and Martin C. Libicki, Senior Management Scientist and Professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Berkeley, an M.A. in city and regional planning from the University of California, Berkeley, and an S.B. in mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Project Associate at the RAND Corporation, completed her MPhil in International Relations at the University of Oxford and earned her AB in East Asian Studies from Princeton University, 2016 (“Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace,” *Rand Corporation*, March 22nd, ISBN 0833092499, Available Online via Google Books, p. 74, AS)

China’s reluctance to accept U.S. accusations of Chinese hacking may reflect the fact that China cannot detect and attribute U.S. cyber espionage as well as the United States can detect and attribute China’s cyber espionage. This fact is based on three differences: China’s operation security lags U.S. capabilities; China’s ability to detect intrusions lags U.S. capabilities; China’s ability to attribute detected intrusions lags U.S. capabilities.39 As long as China’s attribution capabilities substantially lag U.S. capabilities, it may be hard to convince China that such a deal would be fair. Worse, until China gains confidence in its own attribution capabilities, it may not believe that U.S. attribution capabilities are particularly good either.40 Several respondents indicated that it would be difficult to have a meaningful agreement without improvements in China’s attribution capabilities.

#### US-CERT preforms critical attribution work and can share that information with international partners

Schneck 14 — Phyllis Schneck, Deputy Undersecretary for Cybersecurity of the National Protection and Programs Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2014 (“Cybersecurity: Enhancing Coordination to Protect the Financial Sector: Statement for the Record of Dr. Phyllis Schneck,” *Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs*, December 10th, Available Online at <http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/990f3741-335b-49be-ad3a-a43475ac41b5/23C6AE00CC53D93492511CC744028B5E.schnecktestimony121014.pdf>, Accessed 07-12-2016, p. 3-4, AS)

Financial Sector Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks [end page 3]

The continued stability of the U.S. financial sector is often discussed as an area of concern, as U.S. banks are consistent targets of cyber-attacks. There have been increasingly powerful DDoS incidents impacting leading U.S. banking institutions in 2012 and 2013 and some high-profile media coverage of financial sector cybersecurity issues in 2014. US-CERT has a distinct role in responding to a DDoS: to disseminate victim notifications to United States Federal Agencies, Critical Infrastructure Partners, International CERTs, and US-based Internet Service Providers.

US-CERT has provided technical data and assistance, including identifying 600,000 DDoS related IP addresses and supporting contextual information about the source of the attacks, the identity of the attacker, or other associated details. This information helps financial institutions and their information technology security service providers improve defensive capabilities. In addition to sharing with relevant private sector entities, US-CERT provided this information to over 120 international partners, many of whom contributed to our mitigation efforts. US-CERT, along with the FBI and other interagency partners, also deployed to affected entities on-site technical assistance, or “boots on the ground.” US-CERT works with federal civilian agencies to ensure that no USG systems are vulnerable to take-over as a part of a botnet, since botnets are a tool that cybercriminals use to deflect attribution in DDoS attacks.

#### Attribution tech is used by China to repress dissidents and prevent free speech

Clark and Landau 10 — David D. Clark, Senior Research Scientist at MIT's Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL), received his Master's and Engineer's degrees in Electrical Engineering from the MIT, received his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from MIT, and Susan Landau, an American mathematician and engineer, and Professor of Social Science and Policy Studies at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, previously worked as a Senior Staff Privacy Analyst at Google, was a Guggenheim Fellow and a Visiting Scholar at the Computer Science Department, Harvard University, 2010 (“Untangling Attribution,” *Proceedings on a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks*, Available Online at <http://www.nap.edu/read/12997/chapter/4>, Accessed 07-15-2016, AS)

Costs of Attribution

Few technical solutions have purely one-sided effects, and attribution is no exception to this general principle. Once a mechanism for attribution is put in place, we must expect that it will be used in differently in different jurisdictions, according to the laws and customs of each country. While in the U.S., we may talk about deterrence as a goal to stop the breaking of our laws; another country might use the same tools to repress dissidents. It would also be likely to use better attribution tools to detect our intelligence services at work. Making one task easier makes other tasks easier, unless we take specific actions to separate classes of activity in a technical way. This sort of separation would imply the use of [end page 39] different tools in different circumstances; a consequence of this is that attribution tools should not be built into the core fabric of the Internet.

#### Freedom of speech is a d-rule — it is vital to human progress and preventing atrocity.

Pinker 15 — Steven Arthur Pinker, Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, Ph.D. in Experimental Psychology and Linguistics from Harvard University, B.A. in Psychology from McGill University, 2015 (“Why Free Speech is Fundamental,” *The Boston Globe,* January 27th, accessible online at <https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/01/26/why-free-speech-fundamental/aaAWVYFscrhFCC4ye9FVjN/story.html>, Accessed 07-12-2016, MA)

Is free speech merely a symbolic talisman, like a national flag or motto? Is it just one of many values that we trade off against each other? Was Pope Francis right when he said that “you cannot make fun of the faith of others”? May universities muzzle some students to protect the sensibilities of others? Did the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists “cross a line that separates free speech from toxic talk,” as the dean of a school of journalism recently opined? Or is free speech fundamental — a right which, if not absolute, should be abrogated only in carefully circumscribed cases?

The answer is that free speech is indeed fundamental. It’s important to remind ourselves why, and to have the reasons at our fingertips when that right is called into question.

The first reason is that the very thing we’re doing when we ask whether free speech is fundamental — exchanging and evaluating ideas — presupposes that we have the right to exchange and evaluate ideas. In talking about free speech (or anything else) we’re talking. We’re not settling our disagreement by arm-wrestling or a beauty contest or a pistol duel. Unless you’re willing to discredit yourself by declaring, in the words of Nat Hentoff, “free speech for me but not for thee,” then as soon as you show up to a debate to argue against free speech, you’ve lost it.

Those who are unimpressed by this logical argument can turn to one based on human experience. One can imagine a world in which oracles, soothsayers, prophets, popes, visionaries, imams, or gurus have been vouchsafed with the truth which only they possess and which the rest of us would be foolish, indeed, criminal, to question. History tells us that this is not the world we live in. Self-proclaimed truthers have repeatedly been shown to be mistaken — often comically so — by history, science, and common sense.

Perhaps the greatest discovery in human history — one that is prior to every other discovery — is that our traditional sources of belief are in fact generators of error and should be dismissed as grounds for knowledge. These include faith, revelation, dogma, authority, charisma, augury, prophesy, intuition, clairvoyance, conventional wisdom, and subjective certainty.

How, then, can we know? Other than by proving mathematical theorems, which are not about the material world, the answer is the process that the philosopher Karl Popper called conjecture and refutation. We come up with ideas about the nature of reality, and test them against that reality, allowing the world to falsify the mistaken ones. The “conjecture” part of this formula, of course, depends upon the exercise of free speech. We offer these conjectures without any prior assurance they are correct. It is only by bruiting ideas and seeing which ones withstand attempts to refute them that we acquire knowledge.

Once this realization sank in during the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, the traditional understanding of the world was upended. Everyone knows that the discovery that the Earth revolves around the sun rather than vice-versa had to overcome fierce resistance from ecclesiastical authority. But the Copernican revolution was just the first event in a cataclysm that would make our current understanding of the world unrecognizable to our ancestors. Everything we know about the world — the age of our civilization, species, planet, and universe; the stuff we’re made of; the laws that govern matter and energy; the workings of the body and brain — came as insults to the sacred dogma of the day. We now know that the beloved convictions of every time and culture may be decisively falsified, doubtless including some we hold today.

A third reason that free speech is foundational to human flourishing is that it is essential to democracy and a bulwark against tyranny. How did the monstrous regimes of the 20th century gain and hold power? The answer is that groups of armed fanatics silenced their critics and adversaries. (The 1933 election that gave the Nazis a plurality was preceded by years of intimidation, murder, and violent mayhem.) And once in power, the totalitarians criminalized any criticism of the regime. This is also true of the less genocidal but still brutal regimes of today, such as those in China, Russia, African strongman states, and much of the Islamic world.

Why do dictators brook no dissent? One can imagine autocrats who feathered their nests and jailed or killed only those who directly attempted to usurp their privileges, while allowing their powerless subjects to complain all they want. There’s a good reason dictatorships don’t work that way. The immiserated subjects of a tyrannical regime are not deluded that they are happy, and if tens of millions of disaffected citizens act together, no regime has the brute force to resist them. The reason that citizens don’t resist their overlords en masse is that they lack common knowledge — the awareness that everyone shares their knowledge and knows they share it. People will expose themselves to the risk of reprisal by a despotic regime only if they know that others are exposing themselves to that risk at the same time.

Common knowledge is created by public information, such as a broadcasted statement. The story of “The Emperor’s New Clothes’’ illustrates the logic. When the little boy shouted that the emperor was naked, he was not telling them anything they didn’t already know, anything they couldn’t see with their own eyes. But he was changing their knowledge nonetheless, because now everyone knew that everyone else knew that the emperor was naked. And that common knowledge emboldened them to challenge the emperor’s authority with their laughter.

The story reminds us why humor is no laughing matter — why satire and ridicule, even when puerile and tasteless, are terrifying to autocrats and protected by democracies. Satire can stealthily challenge assumptions that are second nature to an audience by forcing them to see that those assumptions lead to consequences that everyone recognizes are absurd.

That’s why humor so often serves as an accelerant to social progress. Eighteenth-century wiseguys like Voltaire, Swift, and Johnson ridiculed the wars, oppressions, and cruel practices of their day. In the 1960s, comedians and artists portrayed racists as thick-witted Neanderthals and Vietnam hawks and nuclear cold warriors as amoral psychopaths. The Soviet Union and its satellites had a rich underground current of satire, as in the common definition of the two Cold War ideologies: “Capitalism is the exploitation of man by man; Communism is the exact opposite.”

We use barbed speech to undermine not just political dictators but the petty oppressors of everyday life: the tyrannical boss, the sanctimonious preacher, the blowhard at the bar, the neighborhood enforcer of stifling norms.

It’s true that free speech has limits. We carve out exceptions for fraud, libel, extortion, divulging military secrets, and incitement to imminent lawless action. But these exceptions must be strictly delineated and individually justified; they are not an excuse to treat speech as one fungible good among many. Despots in so-called “democratic republics” routinely jail their opponents on charges of treason, libel, and inciting lawlessness. Britain’s lax libel laws have been used to silence critics of political figures, business oligarchs, Holocaust deniers, and medical quacks. Even Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous exception to free speech — falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater — is easily abused, not least by Holmes himself. He coined the meme in a 1919 Supreme Court case that upheld the conviction of a man who distributed leaflets encouraging men to resist the draft during World War I, a clear expression of opinion in a democracy.

And if you object to these arguments — if you want to expose a flaw in my logic or a lapse in my accuracy — it’s the right of free speech that allows you to do so.

### 2AC — Diplomatic Freeze CP

#### 1) Perm — do both. As part of the meetings, inform Beijing that the effect of not reaching an agreement would be a diplomatic freeze. This increases US leverage.

#### 2) Diplomacy is the only method to prevent cyberattacks.

Stratfor 15 — Stratfor, major risk consultancy and intelligence firm, 2015 (“U.S., China: Diplomatic Solutions to Cybersecurity Problems,” *Stratfor,* September 24th, Accessible Online at <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/us-china-diplomatic-solutions-cybersecurity-problems>, Accessed On 07-11-2016)

Government officials have not disclosed the specific points of the Sept. 11 agreement, but it is unlikely at this point that Beijing or Washington will substantially shift their cybersecurity policies against one another. Nevertheless, the Sept. 11 meeting highlights an important step for the United States, which relies on foreign policy to protect its economic interests from foreign cyberattacks.

The U.S. government currently has few tools outside of foreign policy to defend its private sector from cyberattacks. And China, including its individual citizens and businesses, has significant economic incentive to continue siphoning trade secrets from U.S. businesses in cyberspace. While the United States is among the most technically capable countries in cyberwarfare, these capabilities do not enable the government to guard the private sector against intruders. As a result, Washington is simply unable to stem the flow of cyberattacks without support from Beijing. The United States has more to lose to industrial espionage, and China has more to gain from allowing it to continue.

Washington has placed significant emphasis on protecting its interests from China's economic ambitions and on the critical role cyber espionage plays. In addition to lobbying aggressively for intellectual property rights protections worldwide, the White House has continually sought effective means to protect the U.S. private sector in cyberspace. The White House is not alone in this quest; virtually all countries, including China, are attempting to incorporate network security into domestic and foreign policy.

#### 3) Even if imperfect, the September Agreement proves that the US and China can cooperate in cyberspace.

#### 4) The counterplan doesn’t solve cybersecurity or relations.

Yi 15 — Shen Yi, Associate Professor and Deputy Director of the Center for Cyber Governance at Fudan University, 2015 (“For China and the U.S., Cyber Governance Is Better Than Cyberwar,” *The Huffington Post,* September 22nd, Accessible Online at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shen-yi/cyber-governance-cyber-war-china_b_8177732.html>, Accessed On 06-29-2016)

A more responsible way of looking at U.S.-China cyber relations would be to recognize that cyber conflicts and cooperation between the two countries as the “new normal.” Naturally the best way to manage the relationship should be to listen to each other and treat each other as equal partners. Only on that basis, can we begin to construct the much needed rules to govern the global cyber commons.

The strategy of pressuring China, forcing it to make concessions, will not become a lasting model of U.S.-China interaction in the cyberspace, even though the U.S. still enjoys significant strategic advantage in global affairs.

The essential spirit of the USCIIF is cooperation. Only by exploring new dimensions of cooperation in the digital economy, could the U.S. and China respond to new threats to cybersecurity, and promote mutual development and prosperity. It is unwise to call China’s overture a “conspiracy” and dismiss it as “flexing tech muscles.”

As a Chinese saying goes, “the world is more beautiful when one adopts a long-term view and keeps an open mind.” Now, Silicon Valley is leading. Will Washington follow?

#### 5) No Case Takeout — cooperation with China creates the tools needed to solve for large-scale cyberattacks, it doesn’t embolden them. There’s no clear impact to Chinese cyber-legitimacy — cooperation aligns their credibility with achieving global norms. Diplomatic freezes make things worse by giving them an excuse for cyberattacks.

#### 6) The Net Benefit is Non-Unique —

#### A) Chinese censorship is effective now.

Stout 15 — Kristie Lu Stout, Correspondent for CNN in Asia, M.A. in Media Studies from Stanford University, B.A. in Journalism from Stanford University, 2015 (“China's Great Firewall: Fortune at the expense of freedom?,” *CNN,* March 25th, Accessible Online at <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/25/asia/china-internet-censorship-kristie-lu-stout/>, Accessed On 07-15-2016)

It wasn't supposed to work.

But China's Great Firewall — a massive Internet surveillance and content control system -- has, in many respects, been an unparalleled success.

China has Internet companies worth billions of dollars and more web users than the population of the United States — all while still being able to block information it deems counter to its interests.

And now, some fear, the model is going global.

"If you are sitting in Beijing, what's the problem?" asks Bill Bishop, China watcher and author of the Sinocism China newsletter in the latest episode of "On China."

"You are still in power, you have 650 million Internet users, you have billions of dollars of economic value going to the Internet everyday, you've used the Internet to increase government transparency, investors love us and they can't throw enough money at our companies that have more than half a trillion dollars in market capitalization," says Bishop.

Internet with Chinese characteristics

Soon after China tip-toed onto the Internet in the late 1980s, it laid down the foundation of the Great Firewall but critics asserted that an Internet with Chinese characteristics would be no Internet at all.

During a high-profile media tour in Beijing in 1999, MIT Media Lab founder and technology pundit Nicholas Negroponte declared that a "healthy disrespect for authority" was required for any successful Internet industry.

A year later, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that "liberty will spread by cell phone and cable modem" and that any attempt to control the Internet in China would be "like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall."

Well folks, it's now 2015 and China has done the impossible.

It's nailed the Jell-O. China has proven it can have its Great Firewall and enjoy great prosperity too.

Lokman Tsui, associate professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and former head of free expression at Google Asia-Pacific, says that most Chinese are happy with the status quo.

"Their lives have noticeably improved," he says. "The model has worked so far."

#### B) Further Chinese crackdowns are inevitable.

WaPo 16 — Washington Post, a major US newspaper, 2016 (“China’s scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works,” *The Washington Post,* Byline: Simon Denyer, Accessible Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html>, Accessed On 07-14-2016)

Yet there is to be no turning back. Later this year, China is expected to approve a new law on cybersecurity that would codify, organize and strengthen its control of the Internet.

It has introduced new rules restricting foreign companies from publishing online content and proposed tighter rules requiring websites to register domain names with the government.

Apple was an early victim, announcing in April that its iTunes Movies and iBooks services were no longer available in China, six months after their launch here (though shortly after it announced a $1 billion investment in a Chinese car service).

As it pursues a broad crackdown on free speech and civil society, China has tightened the screws on virtual private network (VPN) providers that allow people to tunnel under the Firewall.

#### 7) No Internal Link — dissidents can use VPNs.

WaPo 16 — Washington Post, a major US newspaper, 2016 (“China’s scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works,” *The Washington Post,* Byline: Simon Denyer, Accessible Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html>, Accessed On 07-14-2016)

Still, there have always been deliberate loopholes.

Take VPNs, tools that allow users in China to tunnel into the Internet via a different country. Virtual private networks enable users to encrypt traffic, circumvent censorship and experience the Internet exactly as if they were in the United States, for example, albeit at a cost in terms of browsing speed.

The Chinese government has long known and accepted the fact that a small percentage of its population circumvents the Firewall using VPNs. It is, after all, essential that domestic and foreign businesses be able to access information across borders, and it keeps the English-speaking elite happy to allow them a small window on the world.

“They are willing to tolerate a certain amount of porousness in the Great Firewall, as long as they feel that ultimately, if they need to exert control, they can,” said Jeremy Goldkorn, director of a media and Internet consulting firm called Danwei.

#### 8) Gradualism Turn

#### A) Democratic reform is inevitable, but internet activism makes it too fast, causing CCP collapse.

Economou 11 — Chris Economou Ph.D. Candidate at George Was Elliott School of International Affairs. He is currently studying for his Masters in International Affairs with a concentration in U.S. Foreign Policy, International Affairs Review, May 2, 2011, "Revolution.com: Political Reform & the Rise of the Internet in China", http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/314

It is 2 P.M., and a group of young, would-be protesters are being led away by Beijing police from the local McDonalds. Inspired by the Jasmine Revolutions taking place across the Middle East, these protesters were less fortunate than their Arab counterparts. Their efforts, planned largely through the Internet, were swiftly curtailed when they were discovered by the Beijing authorities. On Sunday, February 20, the protests planned to unfold across China never occurred—the “revolution” was over before it began. To China’s leaders, however, the problem remains, because as long as the Internet flourishes in their country the threat of political reform will persist.

A vocal proponent of Internet freedom, President Barack Obama has consistently stressed its importance in China. In a 2010 trip to China, Obama stated that access to information helps citizens hold their own governments accountable, generates new ideas, and encourages creativity and entrepreneurship. China’s leaders are not wholly averse to political reform and, in some instances, welcome it as a means to aid economic and political stability. In a 2010 speech, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao warned that China’s economy and national modernization process would be jeopardized if the country failed to undertake systemic political reform.

The Internet, however, presents a problem for China’s leaders as it encourages reform faster than the government prefers or has the time to adjust to. When the Internet was first introduced to China in 1994, it had 10,000 users. Today, that number has jumped to 210 million users and counting.

In confronting the Internet, China’s government has used both repression and compliance. One of the largest and most controversial methods of Internet repression used by the Chinese authorities is a government-sponsored program, aptly named the “Great Firewall of China.” The “Great Firewall” consists of an estimated 50,000 people, employed just to monitor and censor any websites deemed controversial. China’s government also relies on physical repression. At the annual National People’s Congress (NPC) in March, it was revealed that the new budget would include 624 billion yuan ($95 billion) for items related to law and order, a 13.8% increase from 2010. In the wake of the February 20 crackdown, this suggests that China’s leaders comprehend the impact the Internet is having on their society and are adjusting their security services accordingly.

Yet Beijing is also aware that repression alone will not solve the problem and has yielded small political concessions to stem public unrest. In 2003, for example, Chinese authorities responded to rising Internet chatter regarding an increase in rural poverty and issued a new administrative regulation entitled “Relief Methods for Vagrants and Beggars.” This repealed regulations that restricted migration to China’s cities as well as controversial police powers. Additionally, China’s current leaders, Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao,, have held a number of online dialogue sessions throughout the country as a means to speak to the people directly.

How China’s next leaders handle the Internet’s impact remains to be seen. The political ideology of both Xi Jinping, China’s next assumed president, and Li Keqiang, China’s next assumed prime minister, are largely opaque. Given the secretive nature of Chinese politics, analysts can only assume and search for clues in each leader’s past to predict how they will address the Internet and political reform. Regardless of the individual views they hold, China’s next leaders will still be stifled by a political system that neither welcomes nor is structured to handle significant change. China’s highest decision-making body, the nine-member Standing Politburo, and the 370-strong Central Committee are dominated by hard-line communists who are more concerned with maintaining stability than political reform.

Many of China’s leaders understand the value and necessity of reforms, but this initiative must come gradually and from the top, not the bottom, so as to maintain their country’s economic and political stability. And for good reason—according to a 2010 spring survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 87 percent of Chinese said they were satisfied with the way things were going in their country. The same project also found that 74 percent believed their lives would be better in five years. China’s leaders want to maintain this optimistic sentiment among their people. Therefore, Americans should neither expect nor demand significant political or Internet reforms in China in the near future. Instead, the value of the Internet and the role it can play in Chinese society should continue to be gently advocated with the hope that one day China’s leaders will respond to the needs of their people and bring true reform to the government.

#### B) CCP instability causes lashout and US-China war.

Bremmer 14 — Ian Bremmer, President of Eurasia Group, and David Gordon, Chairman and Head of Research at Eurasia Group, 2014 ("China’s Risky Reforms," *Project Syndicate*, February 14th, Accessible Online at <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ian-bremmer-and-david-gordon-caution-that-the-leadership-s-proposed-reforms-heighten-the-risk-of-instability-at-home-and-abroad>, Accessed On 07-15-2016)

These scenarios are highly unlikely in 2014. But early signals suggest that if trouble develops, the party will choose a crackdown over concessions, and there is no guarantee that party unity will hold in such a scenario.

For outsiders, the reform process also poses risks that extend well beyond the global economic fallout of a sharp Chinese slowdown. The country’s neighbors, particularly Japan, have the most to fear. If reforms become broadly unpopular or expose dangerous divisions within the leadership, the government will have good reason to divert public attention from controversies at home by picking fights abroad. Frictions between China and the Philippines, Vietnam, and others in the South China Sea persist, but confrontations with Japan, including over territorial disputes in the East China Sea, are more likely to cause the most damage.

No one in power in either country wants a war, but diplomatic dust-ups between China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies, respectively, have already taken a toll on their commercial relations. In particular, Japanese companies operating in China have sustained significant reputational and financial damage during recent episodes of trouble between the two governments.

Conflict with the United States is unlikely for the moment. At such a delicate time internally, China would gain nothing from antagonizing the US. But trouble with US allies, particularly Japan, could draw the US into a fight that it would strongly prefer to avoid.

#### C) That goes nuclear and causes extinction.

Wittner 11 — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” *Huntington News*, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

#### 9) Free speech is not an absolute right — adopt a consequentialist approach to free speech.

Dawes 15 — Simon Dawes, Professor of Media Studies and Sociology at Paul Valery University (France), Ph.D. in Media Studies and Communication from Nottingham Trent University, 2015 (“Free speech, but not as an absolute value,” *Open Democracy,* January 9th, Accessible Online at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/simon-dawes/charlie-hebdo-free-speech-but-not-as-absolute-value>, Accessed On 07-15-2016)

But free speech and a free press are neither the same thing, nor are they absolute values. Because of scope, scale and influence, the press have a far greater impact than an individual, and therefore have a greater responsibility to limit the offence they may cause. And both freedoms are always and already restricted anyway – by laws (of defamation, confidentiality etc.), by social norms, by their conflicts with other values (such as privacy or national security), and so on.

Those who have rushed to republish the controversial images that ultimately got the cartoonists (and others) killed have done so in the name of free speech, claiming that free speech is ‘non-negotiable’. But those same organisations have been critical of UK tabloids for printing stories in the name of free speech where it has violated other values, such as privacy, or failed to pass a public interest test, or where it is symptomatic of corporate power’s corrupting influence over politics and public life. Surely the recognition that free speech is a negotiable (and strategic) right in those instances undermines the claim that it is non-negotiable when it comes to addressing the offence taken at images of Mohammed, whether or not one agrees that their publication, or even republication, is justified.

We need to discourage misguided and reactionary representations of these attacks as simply attacks on free speech, and acknowledge that free speech itself is not an absolute value. We must recognise the validity of debates over what limits to free speech are acceptable – whether or not we approve of the kind of images that Charlie Hebdo has published, or with their mass republication on numerous websites this week.

## #5 — Track Two CP

### Format/Explanation

Assume the Taiwan Grand Bargain 1AC (Nuclear War and Relations advantages). The 1NC included the Track Two CP (below) and the Election DA (Clinton good with a warming impact). The neg has five minutes to extend the CP vs. the 2AC frontline included below.

### 1NC — Track Two CP

#### The United States should establish a Track Two U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue as per Swaine, and should request that Track Two efforts assess the desirability or undesirability of negotiating a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China that would involve offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

#### Counterplan solves best and spurs follow on – indicts of prior Track 2 diplomacy efforts don’t apply

Swaine et al., Ph.D., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, ‘15

(Michael, Nicholas Eberstadt, Ph.D. is a political economist and a demographer by training and is also a senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research; M. Taylor Fravel, Ph.D. is an associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT; Mikkal Herberg is research director of the National Bureau of Asian Research’s Energy Security Program; Albert Keidel is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and an adjunct graduate professor in the Georgetown University Public Policy Institute; Evans J. R. Revere is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies; Alan D. Romberg is distinguished fellow and the director of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center; Eleanor Freund, junior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Rachel Esplin Odell, Junior fellow at Carnegie, Audrye Wong, Junior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for international peace, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic Net Assessment,” April 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/net\_assessment\_2.pdf

The first four chapters of analysis on the major trends influencing the prospects for conflict and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and the resulting five possible regional security environments, together present a range of significant implications for the United States and the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). This chapter presents these implications in terms of several types and levels of strategic risk and opportunity, followed by a discussion of five areas where the United States can exert its influence to maximize opportunities while minimizing risk. On this basis, the last section of this report presents a range of policy recommendations for PACOM and Washington. Implications This report has identified a range of factors that are currently producing, or are likely to produce, strategic risks and opportunities for the United States over the short, medium, and long term. Strategic Risks The most significant risk for the United States involves movement toward the competitive and conflictual side of the Status Quo Redux security environment. This development, along with a long-term danger of a transition toward an Asia-Pacific Cold War–type environment, would be driven primarily by intensifying U.S.-China security competition, either directly or indirectly through disputes with third parties. Such disputes would likely occur within the existing U.S.-led alliance system and in the probable absence of an ambitious regionwide collective security system. This security competition reflects the workings of two underlying sets of factors: 1. An uncertain pattern of regional and global economic, political, and military multipolarity. The first factor is structural and concerns the increasingly uncertain pattern of regional and global economic, political, and military multipolarity. This uncertainty centers on the strengthened capacity of China to project power and influence across maritime Asia and growing concerns about its long-term strategic intentions. It also involves a shift of the regional economic center of gravity toward China, reflected in closer regional trade ties with China and unprecedented increases in Chinese investment, and economic influence, across the region. 2. Increasing divergence between Washington and Beijing concerning the power distribution most conducive to regional order and prosperity. The second factor centers on an increasing divergence between Washington and Beijing regarding the type of power distribution most conducive to long-term regional order and prosperity. The Chinese view prefers international progress toward a long-term (for example, end-of-century) goal of a parity-based balance of power working through consensus agreements (not formal security alliances) sanctioned or organized under the United Nations or other international organizations. In this eventual cooperative security system, China would presumably enjoy a level of power and influence second to none, but not substantially more than other major states. Conversely, the United States and its allies favor a continued U.S. “leadership” role and the continued predominance of U.S. military power across the Western Pacific. This would be exercised through the hub-and-spokes system of bilateral security alliances and forward-deployed forces, reinforced by political and economic relationships and soft power. This approach does not aim to exclude China from playing a more important regional role or seek to diminish the role of multilateral regional forums and institutions. However, it clearly posits an order founded on continued U.S. predominance in key areas. This difference in preference regarding the regional power distribution underlies the increasingly evident contrast, in military deployments and related policies, between a U.S. effort to maintain its past level of maritime primacy in the Western Pacific and growing Chinese efforts to limit and check that primacy, through the deployment of new or improved military capabilities. The evolution of the Asian security environment ultimately presents several primary and secondary risks: Primary Risks A Shift in National Resources Toward Security Competition The first primary risk is a steady, strategic shift of resources in many Asian states away from peaceful and cooperative economic development toward greater arms development or racing, along with various types of zero-sum political, economic, and military security competition and rivalry. The primary duos involved in such competition would likely include, first and foremost, the United States and China, followed by China and Japan, North and South Korea, the United States and North Korea, China and India, China and Vietnam, and possibly China and the Philippines. Increased Tests of Resolve and Political-Military Crises A second related primary risk consists of an increased tendency among key regional states to engage in tests of resolve or efforts to “lock in” advantages over territorial and resource disputes in the seas along China’s maritime periphery. This is accompanied by an increased likelihood of high-intensity political-military crises, whether deliberate or accidental, and either directly or indirectly involving the United States. Those involved would likely include China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. A United States More Embroiled in Third-Party Disputes The third primary risk, occurring directly as a result of the previous risk, is a significant danger of the United States’ becoming embroiled in confrontations between local disputants, many of which are U.S. allies or partners. The twin imperatives for the United States—of reassuring allies or partners involved in such disputes while deterring coercive or destabilizing behavior by all sides—will pose an increasing challenge to U.S. attempts to sustain long-term stability in the region. Greater Challenges to the Unity and Power of the U.S. Alliance System Fourth, over the medium to long term, a primary strategic risk involves a weakening of relative U.S. power and the overall cohesion of the U.S. alliance system in the AsiaPacific. This could involve more public attempts by China to question the value of the U.S. alliance system and to pressure or entice U.S. partners to opt out of that system, possibly by presenting an increasingly more alluring, alternative set of relationships that provide both economic and security benefits. This type of pressure has the potential to increase tensions between Japan and South Korea (both U.S. allies), and between Washington and both Tokyo and Seoul over historical and territorial issues and the engagement of China. Secondary Risks Exclusionary Political and Economic Arrangements The secondary risks presented by the changing security environment include the possibility of increasing tensions over various types of bilateral and multilateral political and economic arrangements that favor some countries over others or seek to exclude specific countries. Here, the central potential problem is between the United States and China, perhaps involving an exclusionary, Sino-centric economic and political structure, although SinoJapanese antagonism could also deteriorate into a more intensely competitive dynamic. Severe Domestic Instability and Violent Regime Collapse in North Korea Another secondary strategic risk involves increasing domestic unrest and political repression in key states associated with economic, demographic, and political difficulties. Such unrest could result in destabilizing international consequences (for example, refugee flows, heightened tensions with neighbors, aggressive foreign policies, and public health problems). This type of problem is most likely to emerge in North Korea, where it would also likely have the most serious consequences. Violent regime collapse in that country could involve intense factional conflict, refugee flows into South Korea and China, various “loose nukes” scenarios, and U.S.-China confrontations over how to address the situation. Domestic Instability and Nationalist Forces in China The likelihood of severe domestic disorder is notably lower in China than it is in North Korea. The greatest strategic risk associated with Chinese economic instability will likely involve disruptions in the international economy. However, if domestic instability results from the emergence of ultranationalist protests or leadership, aggressive foreign policy behavior is a possible risk. U.S. Miscalculations or Overreaction in Response to a More Powerful and Assertive China An increasingly complex and challenging security environment, involving shifts in the relative balance of power and ongoing distrust between the United States and China, could lead Washington to rely excessively on punitive, deterrence-oriented, and primarily military means to deal with unacceptable Chinese policies and behavior. This could reduce opportunities for collaboration and make confrontational scenarios more likely. Strategic Opportunities Fortunately, a range of factors conducive to current and future strategic opportunity also exists in the Asia-Pacific region. These factors could serve to restrain or eliminate many of the strategic risks cited above. Common Support for Continued Economic Growth Most notable of these factors is a common interest among states in cooperating to sustain economic growth and access to resources. The key players with frictions over territorial and political issues (such as the United States and China, Taiwan and China, Japan and China, North and South Korea, and Japan and South Korea) are likely to remain (or become) deeply engaged economically. Even though exclusionary patterns of economic behavior are possible, strong complementarities between Asian economies will reinforce the need to resolve disputes through negotiation and compromise. The Absence of Deeply Adversarial and Existential Disputes Most competitions and disputes among the major Asian states are not existential in nature. That is, while the issue might involve adversarial and zero-sum elements (as in the case of sovereignty disputes), the survival of an entire government or regime or the independence of a nation does not hinge on the outcome of the issue. In this context, the relatively limited nature of the threats involved provides greater space for restraint, compromise, and accommodation in managing disputes. Continuing American Strength Despite the probable relative decline of specific types of U.S. capabilities relevant in the vicinity of Chinese territory, a high likelihood remains that Washington will continue to exercise very strong, if not dominant, economic, military, and political influence across the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, the United States will almost certainly retain the ability to prevent or at least effectively manage the emergence of clear and important threats to its most vital regional interests, assuming U.S. leaders understand those interests and the best means required to protect them over the long term. The Possibility of a More Flexible China Even though China is engaged in more assertive efforts to defend its interests, the historical record and the views of many knowledgeable Chinese analysts today suggest that a stronger, more secure, and confident Beijing might become more flexible and accommodating in the future, especially in altercations with neighbors. The Possibility of More Cooperation in Dealing With North Korea Future domestic instability in North Korea, or more dangerous behavior by Pyongyang, might result in greater international cooperation in confronting the problem. The possibility of cooperation will depend in part on the evolution of the forces shaping the developments in North Korea and the existence (or lack thereof) of prior agreements and understandings reached by involved powers, notably China, the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The possibility that North Korea might shift dramatically in the direction of Chinese-style domestic economic reforms, openness to international commerce, and expansion of personal freedoms for its citizens is a long-shot possibility for intermediate steps leading to eventual peaceful relations on the peninsula. The Imperative to Cooperate in Dealing With Transnational Threats Most Asian states will almost certainly continue to recognize the imperative of maintaining cooperation in addressing various types of future transnational, nontraditional security threats, from pandemics, terrorism, and piracy to the health of the international economic order and common energy security challenges. Such dangers will almost certainly not abate during the time frame of this report, and many could increase. Conditions Influencing the Prospects for Strategic Opportunities and Risks Whether the United States can minimize or eliminate strategic risks and maximize strategic opportunities over the short, medium, and long terms will depend on its ability to create or shape developments in five interrelated areas: The Prospects for Significant Bilateral, Multilateral, and Regional Security Assurances or Structures First, and arguably foremost, are the prospects for significant bilateral, multilateral, and regional security assurances or structures that could reduce the propensity of Asian states—especially the United States and China—to engage in zero-sum forms of strategic rivalry and arms races. Such mechanisms could prevent escalation into an Asia-Pacific Cold War scenario and provide the basis for sustained regional cooperation in addressing common problems, while also improving the likelihood of successful crisis avoidance or management. Such mechanisms might include: • a binding code of conduct for the management of maritime territorial and resource disputes, and with regard to the operation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and other military activities in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal states; • various confidence-building measures regarding military exercises, deployments, ISR operations, and other activities; • a variety of crisis management mechanisms designed to improve the clarity and credibility of signaling and to improve elite understanding of the motives and crisis management calculations of the other side; • comprehensive cooperative or collective security structures; and • formal procedures for cooperating in the management of transnational and nontraditional security threats such as natural disasters and pandemics. Various trends weighted toward either conflict or cooperation suggest that, on balance, the more ambitious of such bilateral assurances and structures (such as multilateral collective security structures) are not likely, even over the long term. This is largely due to the tremendous variation within the Asia-Pacific regarding key states’ size, capabilities, domestic political structures, historical experiences, and associated geostrategic interests. Absent a development approaching a successful democratic transformation in China resulting in a more cooperative, less suspicious relationship with the West; American and allied acceptance of a reduction in the prominence of the long-standing U.S.-led huband-spokes system of bilateral security alliances; and a lowering of tensions over many of the “hot spots” listed below, it is extremely difficult to see how such ambitious structural change could come about. Nevertheless, less ambitious security assurances and crisis management mechanisms are entirely possible—and necessary—given the growing concern in Washington and Beijing over intensifying security competition. This is bolstered by the existence of individuals (including some former government officials) who are supportive of a policy of mutual strategic accommodation. For example, the potentially adverse impact of increased defense spending and military modernization among the major Asian powers could be mitigated by mutual agreements. In particular, it is plausible that countries in the region, led by China and the United States, could agree on a series of steps that recognize and enable the legitimate features of military modernization required for national security while reducing the possible threats to others posed by such features. Such an approach would require greater transparency with respect to the objectives of modernization programs (and national security strategies), avoidance of certain “redlines” that would trigger counterresponses, and mutual restraint in certain domains, including both military and paramilitary (for example, coast guard) realms. This could include limits on the pace of modernization in sensitive or potentially destabilizing military realms, such as long-range precision strike systems, submarines, or amphibious and aircraft carrier capabilities, as well as a variety of confidence-building measures, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) agreement. Although difficult to develop, such a process of mutual reassurance is not incompatible with the long-term interests of any major Asian power. Understandings Concerning National Objectives, Military Doctrines, and the Potential Use of Force Second, some level of greater understanding needs to be reached between the political leaderships in Beijing and Washington regarding each other’s national objectives, military doctrines, and potential use of force toward volatile issues or “hot spots” that could provoke intense confrontation and instability in the Asia-Pacific. This is a necessary prerequisite to previously discussed undertakings. Such volatile issues, or “hot spots,” include North Korea, Taiwan, maritime and other territorial disputes involving third parties, maritime energy and resource requirements, and military surveillance activities in the vicinity of each side’s territorial borders. These issues will likely persist as potential sources of hostility between the United States and China for many years. With the exception of nontraditional security threats, they present the most important challenge to future stability and order in the Asia-Pacific. Mutual understanding between Washington and Beijing regarding these catalysts of potential conflict requires reaching consensus and clarity within each government on each of the issues, as well as a clearer grasp on how each side would react to specific types of developments. Reaching such clarity and understanding, both internally and between the United States and China, might also require credible mutual accommodations on these specific issues and “hot spots.” For example, assessments of the level of potential threat posted to each side by an imploding North Korean regime, or by U.S. military surveillance activities along the Chinese coast, would be heavily influenced by preexisting security assurance mechanisms and the degree to which the other side had signaled its willingness to accept certain outcomes. The Presence of Communication Channels With Allies and Partners of the United States and China Third, the presence or absence of clear communication channels with, and avenues of influence and persuasion over, allies, partners, or key security interlocutors of the United States and China (such as Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and India) will prove increasingly important over time. The actions of these and other parties could draw Washington or Beijing or both into a severe confrontation or raise the level of negative security interactions across the region. Accordingly, the more Beijing and—especially—Washington can clearly convey to these powers their objectives, military doctrines, and political and security “bottom lines” regarding potentially volatile contingencies, the better the prospects for avoiding such adverse outcomes. Obviously, providing clarity on such issues poses certain risks. For example, an ally could use its knowledge of the U.S. or Chinese “bottom line” to manipulate or provoke actions just short of such limits. However, making clear the general types of behavior that would be regarded as provocative, as well as the negative consequences that could result from such actions, could mitigate the risks of manipulation. The failure to make clear U.S. long-term interests and commitments, the nature and limits of U.S. power and leadership, and the policies and means available to obtain U.S. objectives raises the possibility of events turning into tests of U.S. credibility. The Level of Cooperation in Preventing or Managing Transnational Crises Fourth, the ability of the United States to minimize strategic risks and maximize strategic opportunities will depend on the level of cooperation in managing critical common interests or preventing crises, including with regard to such issues as the health of the global economic system, the security of vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), global and regional terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. As indicated, such challenges will almost certainly persist over the long term and remain a major (and in some cases growing) concern for all powers in the region. Both the United States and China will likely prove unable to manage these challenges unilaterally; some level of bilateral (and in some cases multilateral) cooperation will almost certainly be necessary. The key question is: will the imperatives for maintaining cooperation in these areas remain predominant in the minds of U.S. and Chinese leaders—thus keeping the prospects of an Asia-Pacific cold war relatively low—if some or all of the three preceding factors evolve in highly negative ways? The Dynamics Driving the Forces of Nationalism Fifth, opportunities for risk minimization and opportunity maximization will depend on the dynamic relationship between the forces of nationalism and growing public awareness of the government’s overseas policies and actions; national economic success or failure; and political leadership change in China, the United States, and among third-party actors. Both economic success and failure could correlate with increasing nationalist sentiments and political maneuvering that facilitates the emergence of more externally aggressive political leaderships. Some of these catalysts are already evident in China, Japan, and Russia. The emergence of such leaderships is by no means inevitable, however, especially given the continued economic and political realities incentivizing cooperation. Nevertheless, the close and growing connection between nationalist appeals and regime legitimacy in many states could counteract such positive incentives. Diplomatic Recommendations Much of the analysis in this report confirms that the evolution of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific over the next twenty-five to thirty years will be heavily—and in some cases decisively—influenced by the actions of the United States. In other words, the challenges and opportunities confronting the United States and PACOM in the AsiaPacific are not simply developments to which Washington and Honolulu must respond; to a very great extent, they exist and will evolve as a result of the actions U.S. leaders take now and in the future. While the United States remains the strongest and most influential power across the region, its ability to shape the region will likely diminish, especially if Asian (and particularly Chinese) economic growth continues at a relatively rapid pace, as expected. As a result, the development of a long-range U.S. strategy that can extract the maximum benefits out of an increasingly complex security environment will be essential. The analysis of this report suggests a range of possible policy recommendations for the United States government and PACOM. Clarify U.S. Interests in the Asia-Pacific First, appropriate U.S. agencies should undertake a discussion aimed at identifying the long-term primary, secondary, and tertiary strategic interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific in the context of the dynamic changes identified in this report. Such a discussion should encompass both U.S. requirements and preferences regarding the future Asian strategic landscape, including: • U.S. operational strategies and deployments toward the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan; • the desired relative military capabilities, deployments, and major activities (for example, ISR and military exercises) of the United States and China in the Western Pacific; • the specific content and implications of U.S. operational military concepts, such as the Air-Sea Battle concept, for both long-term strategic interests and crisis stability; • U.S. preferences regarding the size and military purpose of nuclear, space, and cyberweaponry and related capabilities in the Asia-Pacific; • U.S. willingness (or lack thereof ) to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea that possesses a credible ability to deliver nuclear weapons to regional targets or possibly to the continental United States; • the preferred long-term disposition of the U.S.-led alliance system under varying conditions (including discussions of how that alliance system can complement a broader, more inclusive security architecture for the Asia-Pacific); and • the overall level and types of multilateral political and economic relationships and structures that would best serve U.S. interests. Clarity regarding long-term U.S. requirements and preferences on these issues would provide the basis for an effort to develop effective security assurances and deterrence messages to China and other major Asian powers, including U.S. allies. Such an undertaking would reduce strategic risk and enhance strategic opportunities over the long term. Although U.S. interests may change over time, a distinction between vital and secondary interests, and the factors that might change both types of interests, and in what manner, can and should be clarified significantly. Conduct an Unprecedented U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue Second, as part of an expanded effort to develop more effective means of strategic reassurance between the United States and China and, indirectly, with other Asian states, Washington should actively support the development of a long-term strategic dialogue with Beijing. Such a dialogue, undertaken initially at the Track 2 level but with clear government backing, should be long term, more integrative regarding a variety of concerns, and more strategy-centered than the current dialogues held with China. Such a dialogue would require integrating global, regional, and functional strategic issues (both competitive and cooperative) with a larger discussion of grand strategic objectives and interests over time. This dialogue would perform, bilaterally, many of the functions undertaken by this project, including: • linking long-term projections of likely trends and activities in the economic, energy and resources, social, political, diplomatic, and military arenas, with explanations of primary and secondary national interests as they relate to global, regional, and bilateral security issues; • identifying and explaining those trends and activities that would most likely create significant security concerns; and • determining what is required by each side—bilaterally, multilaterally, and otherwise—to avert growing security competition (including, if necessary, changes in anticipated force structures and deployments, new or more intense types of cooperative and trust-building exchanges, and other forms of reassurance). Such an undertaking would involve far more than simply exchanging views on issues and policies that vex one another. It would require detailed assessments and explanations— with a significant level of transparency—regarding a range of expectations, fears, and intentions. These expectations, fears, and intentions would need to be contained within a broad set of varying assumptions about global and regional objectives and trends. This does not imply assuming straight-line projections from current trends, but rather examining several alternate futures along a spectrum of possibilities, as is done in this report. To some degree this dialogue would necessarily need to be speculative and include some understanding of how different types of cooperative or competitive policies could interact over time. It would also require significant preparation regarding current and future trends and features, and the development of scenarios and hypotheses encompassing both U.S. and Chinese policies and priorities. Participants in such a strategic dialogue would need to include not only political and security specialists of the Asia-Pacific region, but also regional and country economists, experts in military strategy and weapons systems, and individuals with knowledge of each side’s political and decisionmaking processes. Although to some extent an intellectual and conceptual undertaking, this dialogue would primarily require a very practical, policyoriented understanding of the interests and requirements of both countries over time. Moreover, its observations and conclusions would need to be appropriate to the decisionmaking and policy structures of both countries. The results of this ongoing, government-supported Track 2 effort could eventually feed into a Track 1.5 dialogue in the military and diplomatic realms. It would involve discussions among government and nongovernment participants of national and military strategy and doctrine, and would ultimately involve the policies of the United States and China. Such a dialogue would be unprecedented, befitting the challenges posed by the current situation.

#### Spurs best policy and spills up while avoiding political fallout – Say no doesn’t apply – counterplan uniquely overcomes current opposition

Graham, ‘9 --- Sarah Ellen Graham and John Robert Kelley Center for International Studies/Annenberg Center for Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, “US Engagement in East Asia: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy”, Orbis, Vol. 53, No. 1, Winter 2009, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1465772>

Track Two as Policy-Related International Dialogue Events notwithstanding, track two literature identifies dialogue as the chief mode for reconciliation in conflict settings. In no other modern conflict has this proven more evident than in the Israel-Palestine conflict, which has been punctuated by series of orchestrated and unofficial peace settlement talks dating from the mid-1970s. ‘Academic conferences,’ arranged under the auspices of third-parties, have provided Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian intellectuals with opportunities to contemplate solutions in a neutral, non-attribution atmosphere. The meetings served as the basis for security dialogues since 1990 that have sought to establish networks, incorporating Israel, Palestine as well as the Arab League, Iran and Turkey, for cooperation on issues including regional security, arms control, confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), and the monitoring of borders and seas. The goal is to sustain communication over the long-term, on the basis that emerging ideas will ‘filter’ throughout representative groups and socialize respective constituencies into new behavioral norms and perceptions One of track two diplomacy’s chief theorists, Harold Saunders, once termed it a “policy-related, problem-solving dialogue,” thus extending the notion of good relations as an end unto itself. Saunders argued that by capitalizing on open communication for a policy-relevant purpose, track two dialogues extend diplomatic relationships to include a broader range of policy actors, and brings them together without the trappings and constraints of protocol. At the same time, to guarantee both credibility and influence track two participants must have experience within the policy milieu and wield connections to the official domain. In the conflict management arena, track two figures primarily act as intermediaries facilitating communications between disputing parties. But in the absence of conflict is there a raison d’etre for track two dialogues? Our assessment of the prospects for track two in Northeast Asia challenges the conventional notion that opening dialogue channels is necessary only in the context of conflict resolution. There are three key ways in which track two dialogue can facilitate policy coordination in non-conflict settings: by shaping elite perceptions; by maintaining open communication channels; and by enabling the pursuit of joint projects. As stated earlier, elites embedded in the policy-process play a vital role in track two arrangements because they represent credible agents of change. The efficacy of track two initiatives depends on elite participation in two ways. On the one hand, the ‘second’ track provides political cover so elites do not feel obliged to recite government policy or have to bear the political costs endemic to traditional diplomatic interactions. At the same time, track two processes are contingent on the fact that elites have access at the policymaking level. This dichotomy demonstrates the balance to be struck in crafting track two initiatives: relative independence of thought must be guaranteed without forsaking connections to power. By virtue of their respective social positioning, elites gathered in a track two atmosphere constitute an ad hoc epistemic community actively and collectively reflecting on policy issues. Whether track two solutions catalyze policy change depends partially on the access of elites to political leaders and partially on socialization, whereby ideas gain the acceptance of a broader segment of society. In conflict scenarios, socialization entails changing prevailing attitudes toward an adversary; in our conceptualization of track two the function of socialization is to build political support for policy collaboration at bilateral or multilateral levels. One part of the world where this approach has gained widespread acceptance is Southeast Asia, where Association of South East Asian Nations has encouraged regional security dialogue in track two settings. Between 1993 and 1995 there were at least 93 non-official meetings stemming from ASEAN convened to discuss regional security issues. In 2003 alone that number increased to 149 and surged further to 217 by 2005.

### 2AC — Track Two CP

#### 1. Perm do both – if the CP is right about spilling up into official dialogue, perm shields the link to elections.

#### 2. Solvency deficit - Only the bargain solves for an escalating war scenario- transparency doesn’t stop nuclear lashout. Clarity fails- China won’t believe the US and will still take the calculations to invade and trigger war.

#### 3. The CP takes too long - Every delay in reaching a grand bargain increases the risk of war.

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China May Not Rise

A third counterargument focuses on the possibility that China's economic growth may falter, preventing China from becoming a fully capable major power. Under these conditions, U.S. accommodation would be wasted, with The United States unnecessarily suffering the costs of the grand bargain.109 According to this argument, the United States should wait to learn more about China's economic trajectory.

As with many of the knotty issues raised by the strategy of accommodation, this argument involves weighing a number of uncertain outcomes. Waiting would not be without its own risks. Most directly, waiting not only delays the possibility of improving U.S. relations with China, but also reduces the probability of improving them in the future. The likely growing strains in the countries' relationship during the waiting period would reduce the probability of eventually reaching a grand bargain. Given the likelihood that China will meet its economic potential, albeit with stumbles along the way, negotiating a grand bargain now is less risky than waiting.

#### 4. Permute: do counterplan. Doesn’t sever — not *textually* competitive — adding second track is plan-plus. Plan *should* be done — not aff’s burden to defend immediacy or certainty.

#### 5. Reject plan-contingent counterplans: hypergeneric process args distort the topic, hurting depth and clash over core controversies. Debatability trumps “literature” — no enforceable standard for solvency evidence. Disads sufficient to “test” unconditional engagement.

#### 6. Say No — US participants won’t reach internal consensus and China will undermine track two credibility by using it for propaganda efforts

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China’s participation in and sponsorship of international conferences, closed-door trilateral meetings and other forms of academic exchanges has exploded in recent years. From the near absence of Chinese participants a decade ago, the conference circuit is now swarming with panelists, observers and journalists from China who increasingly set the tone during the panel sessions and Q&A periods. While such participation is arguably commensurate with China’s size and importance, a pattern has emerged that suggests an orchestrated effort to 'shape' the international narrative on issues of 'core interest' to Beijing, such as [its territorial claims in the South China Sea](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-vs-philippines-south-china-sea-the-only-thing-you-need-16638) or the 're-unification' of Taiwan. Prior to its emergence as a major player on the academic conference scene, Beijing often relied on a denial-co-optation strategy to shape the discourse on issues of high interest; denial of access, funding or research opportunities to academics, researchers and opinion-makers who refused to regurgitate Beijing’s line, and sweeteners to those who did. That strategy extended to the 'recruitment' of recently retired former government officials (many of them with some connection to national security apparatuses) through financial incentives and/or appointments to various advisory or consultancy positions. Beijing relied on those individuals to act as unofficial cheerleaders for its 'core interest' policies or as advocates of ceasing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. While such co-optation undoubtedly continues, China has also deepened its involvement in international conferences, Track-Two initiatives and trilateral dialogue. No longer reactive, China is now on a proactive track: it seeks to set the agenda by organising, or co-sponsoring, international events, or by establishing partnerships with organisations such as UNESCO or reputable think tanks in the West (e.g., Rand Corp). In order to do so, China has made substantial financial and human investments, opening its own think tanks, centres and ['private' non-profits](http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0210/c1002-26540763.html) overseas ([including in the US](http://thinking-taiwan.com/china-ramps-up-ideological-us/)), in some cases with the backing of powerful — and increasingly global — Chinese companies. By becoming co-organisers, Chinese outfits are now in a position to influence the composition of speakers at various conferences, both by inviting Chinese academics who toe Beijing’s line on 'core interests' and those whom it has co-opted, and by screening out panelists who they know are bound to present contradictory views. (Another component of that strategy is to shape the agenda so that 'problem' issues, such as Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong or human rights, are ignored altogether.) The success of this strategy was made amply clear at a ['Beyond the Current Distrust' colloquium](http://www.cefc.org.hk/a-list/7285) held in Washington, DC, on 5 October 2015. Two of the four panels — 'Building a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power in the Western Pacific: How to Proceed' and 'Time to Decide: Contain China or Accommodate It?' — were stacked with and chaired by academics who advocate accommodation and appeasement. More recent conferences, again co-organised by a Chinese organization, also gave prominent space for Chinese academics to voice their opinions — or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda, that is — on 'core issues' like Taiwan. Although there is nothing illegal in a state’s effort to shape the discourse in its favor, and in fact many states do so, China’s strategy warrants closer scrutiny.  The first problem is that since it is a relatively new player on the international conference circuit, many of the Chinese think tanks and research centers that are now involved in those endeavors are unknown to their partners overseas. Moreover, the overlapping nature of many of those organisations can be confusing, even to those who make a living of tracking them. To make things worse, some of the key players tend to wear a number of different hats and are involved with several organisations. Lastly, several of the Chinese individuals who are involved in those efforts have an undefined, and oftentimes undeclared, relationship with the state or CCP apparatus; in some instances this conceivably includes CCP propaganda organs, intelligence agencies, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). To be fair, many academics from the US. and elsewhere who are active in the conference circuit also have past connections to their governments. However, the main difference is that where such relationships usually are transparent and documented in open sources, the same cannot be said of many of the Chinese academics (I use this term in the largest sense of the word) who participate in those events. As with the PLA, China’s lack of transparency in the think tank field remains problematic; it undermines the legitimacy of its speakers — at least among those who look up their backgrounds and connections. Another area where Chinese academics and their counterparts differ is over plurality of opinion. Whereas Western participants at international conferences often openly disagree with each other on foreign policy — and there certainly is no consensus on how the US should respond to the challenges posed by China — the Chinese panelists tend to be extraordinarily united when it comes to China’s 'core interests'. The consistent and persistent messaging by the handpicked academics certainly lacks subtlety and bears the hallmarks of United Front operations; rather than encourage discussion it reinforces positions dictated by Beijing. Red flags are raised when every Chinese panelist at a conference homogeneously discredits Taiwan’s democracy (using terms like 'pseudo-democracy' or 'so-called democracy'), accuses the Taiwanese president of paying too much attention to public opinion, attacks the Sunflower Movement, emphasises the absolute need for Taiwan to embrace the '1992 consensus,' and laments the lack of gratitude by Taiwanese for the 'many concessions' (ask them what those are and they tend to fall silent) that China is said to have made to Taiwan over the years. Observing such behavior, it is very difficult not to conclude that such efforts are little more than a continuation of the old Marxist-Leninist strategy of repeating the same message over and over so as to create a new reality while crowding out dissenting voices. Therefore, instead of using those as platforms for dialogue, the Chinese side appears to be exploiting the conference circuit to disseminate propaganda in order to 'shape' the environment in its favor. Ultimately, the propagandistic — and to a certain extent arguably centrally orchestrated — nature of China’s participation in international conferences that touch on Beijing 'core interests' risks undermining the legitimacy of Chinese speakers. Furthermore, as the international community becomes better informed about the modus operandi of Chinese 'think tanks' and their overlapping (often undisclosed) interests with organs of the CCP, China’s return on its otherwise impressive investment can only diminish. Propaganda and information warfare works best when, as with the devil, others are convinced that it does not exist.

#### 7. CP links harder to politics because of leaks — and the CP fails.

Chigas 03 Diana Chiga, Director of Programs at the Conflict Management Group, 2003 (“Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy,” Beyond Intractability, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy> August, accessed 7/18/26) WP

In assessing the effectiveness of track two regional security dialogues in the Middle East, Dalia Kaye notes that "[i]t is an ironic aspect of track two that when such dialogue is most needed, it is often most difficult to bring about"[38] or to sustain. Unofficial processes cannot completely insulate themselves from the political environment in which they are taking place. Participants in these efforts are always responsive to the political developments in their own communities, and evaluate their joint work in the context of official activities, media coverage, and public opinion. In intractable conflicts, this context is invariably hostile. "Spoilers" actively try to undermine and marginalize efforts to build bridges across conflict lines. Participants are subject to direct harassment, intimidation, and sometimes violence from rejectionists, hardliners, and their own governments. Other, less overt, hostile bureaucratic actions by political authorities -- including failure to grant visas and permissions, and enforcement of laws forbidding contact -- make participation difficult.[39] And while unofficial intermediation processes are generally designed to be low key and private, they are not secret, and are vulnerable to negative media exposure caused by leaks or media commentary.[40] These constant and unrelenting attacks can have a harsh effect on morale and deter all but the most intrepid participants.

#### 8. No spillup — policymakers won’t follow-through

Simon 10

(Sheldon W. Simon, professor of Political Science and Facilty Associate for the Center for Asian Studies and Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University, 2010, “Evaluating Track 2 Approaches to Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific Region: The CSCAP Experience”, <http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CSCAP%20Reader/Assessing_Track-2-Diplomacy_Asia-Pac-Region_CSCAP-Reader.pdf>, JSM)

How effective have the Track 2 counterparts been in influencing the official policies of their governments? In order to answer this question, one needs to examine the relationship between the Track 1 and Track 2 groups. Does one group mainly affect the other, or do they influence each other? In theory, Track 2 groups were created to influence their government counterparts by providing studies on issues that officials had neither the time nor the expertise to address, or that were too sensitive to be raised in official meetings. The idea was that non-official specialists would influence the deliberations of government policy. In reality, however, government officials may ask for Track 2 studies that would provide the data and analysis to justify decisions already reached by governments. Additionally, governments may discourage Track 2 counterparts from embarking on certain topics by implying that Track 1 officials will pay no attention to the resulting studies. Therefore, the influence flows both ways between the two groups. Another issue that needs to be addressed is the independence of the Track 2 groups. In theory, Track 2 groups are independent of governments. They are composed of non-governmental experts who are beholden to no particular political group, who speak out independently on issues. In reality, some Track 2 groups are extensions of governments, particularly in communist states where the idea of independent specialists on security issues does not prevail, such as China, Vietnam and Laos. One way of determining independence is to see how Track 2 members are chosen. Are they appointed or elected? How long do the specialists serve on the group? Is there a hierarchy within the Track 2 group? Who determines the agenda of study? By addressing these questions, one can assess the independence of Track 2 groups in various ARF member states.